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Selected Bibliography on the Megarians and the Dialectical School: First Part

Introduction

"MEGARIAN SCHOOL. Euclides founded a "school" in the town of Megara, just across the isthmus from Athens, c. 400 B.C.E. It was apparently short-lived, and its history is somewhat confusing. Diogenes Laertius (2.106) says of Euclides that "those after him were called Megarians, then eristics, and later dialecticians, because of their setting out their arguments in question and answer." But in 2.113 he quotes "Philippus the Megarian" to the effect that Stilpo of Megara "drew away" several of the dialecticians to the school of Megara, and elsewhere reports vari¬ ous attacks on "the dialecticians" (7.163, 10.8, 10.24), and he and other ancient authors use "dialectician" as a label for Diodorus Cronus and for Philo the Dialectician. Thus it looks as if the label "dialecticians" in 2.106 may refer to a separate school or sect. But it does not seem likely that anyone called himself an "eristic"; this label was probably attached to certain of the Megarians because of their argumentative tendencies." (From Donald J. Zeyl, Encyclopedia of Classicl Philosophy, New York: Routledge, 2013, p. 328)

"DIALECTICAL SCHOOL. A philosophical tradition closely associated with the "minor *Socratic" Megarian (Megaric) and Eristical traditions and believed by some to have flourished c. 320-250 B.C.E. Diogenes Laertius reports (2.106) that one ’"Euclides of Megara (or of Gela), who was "concerned with ’"Parmenidean matters," originated a tradition whose adherents "were called Megarians (Megarikoi), then Eristikoi, and later Dialektikoi, Dionysius of Chalcedon having first named them thus because they formulated their arguments by question and answer." Scholarly tradition, then, takes philosophers referred to as "Megarikoi" (e.g., Euclides and Diodorus Cronus' contemporary, "Stilpo of Megara), those referred to as "Eristikoi" (e.g., Euclides' pupil and ""Aristotle's opponent, Eubulides of Miletus, and Alexinus of Elis), and those referred to as "Dialektikoi" (e.g., the supposed founder of the Dialectical tradition, Clinomachus of Thurii, Diodorus Cronus, and Diodorus' pupil Philo) as all belonging to the same tradition or school. With respect to philosophical method or style, most members of this group employed the "dialectical" (dialogue) approach of question-and-answer and attempted to bring philosophical opponents to their conclusions by carefully constructed puzzles and indirect (reductio) argumentation. With respect to philosophical doctrines, many seem to have combined a Socratic interest in moral issues with some form -in some cases much attenuated— of the Eleatic metaphysical doctrine of the unity and changelessness of "what is".""(From Donald J. Zeyl, Encyclopedia of Classicl Philosophy, New York: Routledge, 2013, p. 177)

Editions of the Fragments

  1. Deycks, Ferdinand. 1827. De Megaricorum Doctrina eiusque apud Platonem et Aristotelem Vestigiis . Bonn: E. Weber.

  2. Döring, Klaus, ed. 1972. Die Megariker. Kommentierte Sammlung der Testimonien . Amsterdam: B. R. Grüner.

    Inhaltsverzeichnis: Vorbemerkungen IX-XII; (T = Testimonien; K = Kommentar).

    I. Euklid und sein Kreis.

    1. Euklid T = 3; K = 73; 2. Diokleides T = 4; K = --; 3. Dionysios aus Chalkedon T = 14; K = 99; 4. Ichthyas T = 15; K = 100; 5. Kleinomachos T = 15; K = 101;

    II. Eubulides und sein Krei

    1. Eubulides T = 16; K = 102; 2. Euphantos von olynth T = 20; K = 114; 3. Memnon (?) T = 21; K = --;4. Alexinos T = 21; K = 115;

    III. Diodor und sein Kreis.

    1. Apollonios Kronos T = 28; K = --; 2. Diodor T = 28; K = 124; 3. Philon T = 45; K = 138; 4. Panthoides T = 45; K = 139; 5. Die Töchter Diodoros T = 45; K = --;

    IV. Stilpon und sein Kreis.

    1. Pasikles von Theben T = 46; K = --; 2. Thrasymachos von Korinth T = 46; K = --; 3. Stilpon T = 46; K = 140; 4. Philippos der Megariker T = 61; K = --; 5. Simmias von Syrakus T = 61; K = --; 6. Alkimos, Aristeides, Diphilos, Kleitarch, Metrodor, Myrmex, Paioneios, Phrasidemos, Timagoras T = 61; K = --;

    Anhang: Bryson und sein Schüler Polyxenos.

    Bryson T = 62; K = 157;

    Polyxeons T = 67; K = 166;

    Stemma der Lehrer-Schüler-Verhältnisse 171; Verzeichnis der wichtigen Literatur 172; Stellenregister 175-185.

    "Döring has assembled the first complete collection of textual fragments concerning the Megarian philosophers of the fourth and third centuries B.C., together with a commentary.

    The fragments are divided by the author into four groups, each centered around one of the better-known figures of the school: Euclid, Eubulides, Diodorus Cronus, Stilpo. Evidences concerning lesser-known personalities are included under the figure to whose "circle" they

    belonged. A fifth group of texts appears in an Anhang devoted to the sophist Bryson (often mistakenly associated with the Megarians) and his student Polyxenus. Divisions in the commentary parallel those in the text. The author also adds a stemma summarizing his

    conclusions about teacher-pupil relationships within the school, and there is a selective bibliography and a Stellenregister . An index, which in view of the work's organization would be helpful, is not included. Simply as a collection of texts, this is a major addition to the scholarship in its field; with the author's commentary, it is the most important work on the Megarians since Kurt von Fritz's Realencyclopädie article. Döring presents convincing evidence that some widely disseminated opinions about the school have little or no foundation. Some of his alternative views have important consequences, and not only for the history of the Megarians." (Robin Smith, "Review of Die Megariker: Kommentierte Sammlung der Testimonien , by Klaus Döring", Journal of the History of Philosophy , 12, October 1974, pp. 521-522)

  3. Muller, Robert, ed. 1982. Les Mégariques. Fragments et témoignages . Paris: Vrin.

    Traduction et commentaire.

    Table des matières: Introduction 7; Les fragments et témoignages (I. Euclide, II. Eubulide, III. Diodore, IV. Stilpon, V. Appendice: Bryson et son élève Polyxène) 19; Annexe I 75; Annexe II 91; Commentaire 95; Notes 183; Bibliographie 229; Index des sources 237; Index locorum 247-253.

    "Introduction. I. Les textes Mégariques.

    On s'accorde volontiers à reconnaître que les Mégariques sont parmi les plus mal connus des philosophes de l'Antiquité, assurément les plus insaisissables, alors même que les éléments de leur doctrine resurgissent régulièrement dans les travaux des interprètes de Platon et d'Aristote ou dans ceux des historiens de la logique, et après que plusieurs d'entre eux eurent joui auprès des Anciens d'une célébrité égale à celle des plus grands. A cela il y a d'abord une raison simple, la quasi-absence de textes: des originaux il ne subsiste en effet que quelques courts fragments difficiles à exploiter, et les témoignages des Anciens sont dans l'ensemble peu nombreux, souvent brefs, dispersés, et donc d'un accès malaisé. Cette situation défavorable n'est certes pas réservée aux seuls Mégariques, puisque bon nombre de Présocratiques, les Cyniques ou les Cyrénaïques, pour ne citer qu'eux, ne sont apparemment pas mieux lotis. Pour tous ceux-là, cependant, le lecteur moderne a à sa disposition, parfois depuis longtemps, des recueils regroupant l'essentiel ou la totalité des textes subsistants (1), alors que pour les Mégariques il lui aura fallu attendre le dernier tiers du XXe siècle: ce n'est qu'en 1972, en effet, qu'est paru le livre de K. Döring qui réunit pour la première fois l'ensemble des fragments et témoignages qui les concernent (2). Les qualités de ce travail, jointes à la commodité que constitue le fait d'avoir enfin regroupés et ordonnés la quasi-totalité des textes intéressant les Mégariques font qu'il est en passe de devenir classique, les historiens de la philosophie et de la logique s'y référant de plus en plus volontiers. On ne pouvait donc mieux faire, quand il s'est agi de proposer au lecteur français la documentation la plus complète et la plus sûre sur la pensée mégarique, que de prendre le livre de Dôring comme base de travail, et de traduire la totalité des fragments et témoignages rassemblés par lui en respectant sa numérotation et la disposition générale de son ouvrage.

    Il est bien connu cependant que les difficultés du genre empêchent presque fatalement un recueil de ce type d'être réellement exhaustif et de se suffire à lui-même. Il faut d'abord sélectionner et découper les textes pertinents, ce qui exige qu'on se donne des critères à la fois rigoureux et maniables, mais qui ne seront jamais totalement à l'abri de la contestation. Il faut ensuite tenir compte du fait qu'un extrait isolé de son contexte peut être inintelligible, ou interprété à contresens; de même la juxtaposition de fragments d'auteurs et de siècles différents, parfois très éloignés les uns des autres, peut avoir des conséquences malheureuses.

    Il faut reconnaître que sur le premier point le travail de Döring ne suscite que peu de réserves: ayant adopté le principe de ne retenir que les textes où apparaît formellement le nom des Mégariques en général ou de l'un au moins des membres présumés du groupe, l'auteur ne fait donc pas figurer dans son recueil les divers passages où la critique moderne a cru déceler des allusions aux Mégariques. Si cette prudence peut sembler excessive à certains, elle a du moins le mérite de la clarté et de la rigueur en proposant un minimum de textes incontestables: dans la mesure où il est difficile de trancher sur la base de simples critères externes dans les querelles opposant à ce sujet les spécialistes, elle laisse aux interprètes la responsabilité de leurs choix. Tout au plus pourrait-on remarquer que Döring est infidèle à son principe à une ou deux reprises -- en omettant telle phrase où figure pourtant le nom d'un Mégarique (3), ou en incluant un fragment dans lequel aucun nom n'est cité (4) -- et que parfois le mauvais découpage d'un extrait interdit d'en saisir clairement la signification.

    La deuxième difficulté, quant à elle, ne peut guère être tournée qu'en joignant aux fragments et témoignages une introduction ou un commentaire, dont l'objet serait de restituer aussi souvent que nécessaire les divers contextes, et de mettre en lumière la cohérence conceptuelle des principaux éléments de la doctrine, ou, à défaut, de faire apparaître au moins l'unité d'inspiration de l'ensemble. Bien que l'auteur ait complété son travail par un commentaire assez fourni (une centaine de pages), il ne paraît pas que cette reconstruction de la pensée mégarique ait été pour lui un objectif prioritaire: tous ses soins sont allés à la réunion et à l'établissement des textes, les éclaircissements qui les accompagnent étant plutôt de nature historique et philologique.

    C'est en tenant compte de ces difficultés et de cet état de fait que nous avons conçu notre propre travail. Les mérites du livre de Döring étant reconnus, on devait seulement chercher à le compléter pour pallier les inconvénients qu'on vient de relever. Pour combler les rares lacunes de sa collection, mais surtout pour éclairer par les sources anciennes elles-mêmes le contenu de quelques fragments elliptiques ou allusifs, un certain nombre de textes complémentaires ont été ajoutés en Annexe (5), ainsi qu'une brève liste des allusions probables ou possibles proposées par divers spécialistes; d'autre part, pour corriger dans la mesure du possible les effets négatifs de l'extrême dispersion de nos sources et de la brièveté de la majorité d'entre elles, on s'est efforcé d'éclairer par un Commentaire la signification littérale et la portée philosophique des divers fragments, la place occupée par ce commentaire se justifiant par la rareté, dans notre langue, des travaux consacrés aux Mégariques: hormis deux ou trois études déjà anciennes (6), on ne dispose en effet à ce jour que de quelques courts chapitres inclus dans les histoires générales do la philosophie et d'articles spécialisés sur telle ou telle question particulière de logique (7), ce qui est manifestement insuffisant quand on cherche à acquérir une vue cohérente sur la nature exacte et l'étonnant destin de la doctrine mégarique.

    Étrange destin, en effet, que celui des philosophes de Mégare. Les caractères particuliers de la documentation, que l'on vient de rappeler (sources indirectes, fragmentaires, longtemps difficiles à consulter), n'expliquent sans doute pas à eux seuls la méconnaissance dont ils sont encore partiellement victimes. Car il faut savoir qu'une certaine ambiguïté a marqué leur réputation dès l'origine: si on leur reconnaissait volontiers des talents hors pair, principalement dans le domaine de la dialectique, si on saluait la personnalité exceptionnelle à tous égards d'un Stilpon, on ne manquait pas de dénoncer d'autre part les dangers que présentait l'usage de ces mêmes talents, ou de souligner la vanité de leurs prétendus tours de force. Pour comprendre ces jugements contrastés -- auxquels font curieusement écho les appréciations contradictoires des historiens de la logique des XIXe et XXe siècles (8) -- et pour éviter les risques de méprise, il est indispensable de donner d'abord, à qui voudrait entreprendre la lecture des textes, une vue plus précise sur la situation historique de l'École de Mégare; on tentera ensuite, pour les mêmes raisons, de restituer quelque chose de l'unité d'une pensée souvent réduite à quelques thèses disparates et paradoxales." (pp. 7-9)

    (1) En ce qui concerne les Petits Socratiques, on rappellera pour mémoire les Antisthenis fragmenta de Winckelmann (1842), ainsi que les recueils de J. Humble (1931) et de F. Decleva-Caizzi (1965) auxquels a fait suite récemment la traduction française de L. Paquet (Les Cyniques grecs , Ottawa, 1975) ; les fragments d’Aristippe et des Cyrénaïques ont été rassemblés en 1956 par G. Giannantoni (avec une traduction italienne) et en 1961 par E. Mannebach.

    (2) K. Döring, Die Megariker, Kommentierte Sammlung der Testimonien , Amsterdam, B.R. Grüner, 1972.

    (3) Voir les fr. 123 et 186. — On notera que, par commodité et pour nous conformer à l’usage, nous utilisons l’abréviation « fr. » pour désigner les textes mégariques bien qu’en toute rigueur les fragments soient très peu nombreux et qu’il 'agisse en fait surtout de témoignages.

    (4) Fr. 95.

    (5) Pour éviter de briser la continuité de la numérotation originale, et parce que ces textes ne constituent pas à proprement parler des témoignages supplémentaires, on a préféré les regrouper à part et à la suite de l’ensemble constitué par Döring. Ces ajouts sont signalés après chacun des fragments concernés.

    (6) Aux livres de D. Henne (L’Ecole de Mégàre , Paris, 1843) et de C. Mallet Histoire de l’Ecole de Mégare et des Ecoles d’Ëlis et d’Ërétrie , Paris, 1845), qui accusent leur âge, il faut cependant ajouter les belles analyses de Hegel (Leçons sur l'histoire de la philosophie, trad. fr. de P. Garniron, Paris, Vrin, tome 2, 1971, pp. 339-359) et de E. Zeller (La philosophie des Grecs considérée dans son développement historique , vol. 3, trad. franç. de M. Belot, Paris 1884 ; nous citons cependant une édition allemande postérieure, voir plus loin), toutes deux contenues dans des ensembles plus vastes et risquant de ce fait de passer inaperçues.

    (7) La situation n’est pas très différente dans les autres langues. Une exception toutefois : l’article « Megariker» que K. von Fritz a signé dans la Realenzyklopadie de Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll (Suppl., vol. 5, Stuttgart, 1931, col. 707-724), et qui constitue l’étude la plus complète et la plus intéressante sur le sujet.

    (8) Cf. par exemple C. Prantl, Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande , I, Leipzig, 1855, réimpr. Graz-Austria, 1955, p. 33 («l’Ecole de Mégare... n’a pas non plus et en aucune manière poussé plus loin l’édification d’une logique»), et R. Blanché, La logique et son histoire , Paris, A. Colin, 1970, p. 91 (Les Mégariques sont «les vrais fondateurs de la logique dite stoïcienne »).

  4. Montoneri, Luciano, ed. 1984. I Megarici. Studio storico-critico e traduzione delle testimonianze antiche . Catania: Università di Catania.

    Indice generale: Premessa 7; Parte prima I Megarici. Studio storico-critico 13; Introduzione: I discepoli di Socrate e le loro scuole 15; I. Euclide e la sua scuola 39; II. Eubulide e seguaci 93; III. Diodoro Crono e seguaci 123; IV. Stilpone e seguaci 207; Stemma della diadoche megarica 226; Parte Seconda: I Megarici. Le testimonianze 227; Indice dei nomi antichi 323; Indice degli autori moderni 329; Indice delle fonti 333-345.

    La presente ricerca "vuole essere un primo tentativo unitario e globale di ricostruzione e interpretazione delle fondamentali problematiche speculative dei pensatori megarici, condotto sulla scorta di un'attenta ricognizione critica del lavoro storiografico degli ultimi due secoli." (p. 8)

    "Veniamo ora a illustrare la struttura dell'opera, che è bipartita.

    Abbiamo articolato la prima parte -- che ha carattere monografico -- in quattro capitoli, dedicati rispettivamente alle grandi figure dei "capiscuola" del Megarismo: Euclide, Eubulide, Diodoro Crono e Stilpone.

    La seconda parte comprende invece la traduzione delle testimonianze sui Megarici, ed è anch'essa strutturata in quattro sezioni (I. Euclide e la sua scuola; II. Eubulide e seguaci; III. Diodoro Crono e seguaci; IV. Stilpone e seguaci), corrispondenti ai quattro capitoli della prima parte.

    Diversamente da Döring che le raccoglie a parte (cf. Anhang: Bryson und sein Schüler Polyxenos , pp. 62-70), noi abbiamo incorporato nella sezione I le testimonianze su Brisone e Polisseno, conformemente al nostro punto di vista espresso nel capitolo I.

    In ciascuna sezione abbiamo raggruppato le fonti -- secondo la partizione adottata da Döring -- in: Testimonianze sulla vita (A), sugli scritti e la dottrina (B) e (soltanto per Euclide) sulla scuola (C). Abbiamo inoltre inserito -- quando ci è parso utile a una maggiore perspicuità di lettura -- titoli supplementari (in corsivo), con intento classificatorio e, insieme, chiarificatore del contenuto delle testimonianze.

    Per quanto riguarda la traduzione italiana, valgano le seguenti avvertenze:

    1. Sono state tradotte tutte le testimonianze comprese nella raccolta di Döring, a eccezione di alcune poche (precisamente quelle corrispondenti ai frr. 21, 22, 23, 58, 69, 72, 200, 201), che sono state omesse o perché prive di senso compiuto (frr. 21, 22, 23), o perché non interpretabili, trattandosi di testi papiracei assai lacunosi dai quali si ricavano non più che nomi e termini isolati. In ogni caso, Si tratta -- a nostro avviso -- di testimonianze praticamente irrilevanti dal punto di vista del loro contenuto storico-filosofico.

    Viceversa, abbiamo ritenuto utile inserire la traduzione di alcune testimonianze non comprese nella raccolta di Döring, e che sono quelle contrassegnate dai nn. 44, 48, 166, 174 del nostro ordinamento.

    2. Nella traduzione abbiamo di norma seguito il testo critico riprodotto da Döring, esplicitamente dichiarando i pochi casi nei quali abbiamo preferito una diversa lezione.

    Nella traduzione abbiamo disposto le testimonianze secondo un ordine di lettura che ci è parso coerente con le caratteristiche e le conclusioni della trattazione monografica. Per facilitare i riscontri col testo greco, abbiamo fatto seguire, al nostro numero d'ordine della testimonianza, quello corrispondente nella numerazione Döring, riportato in parentesi.

    Al fine di renderne più perspicuo al lettore il senso complessivo, abbiamo tradotto alcune testimonianze in una citazione più ampia rispetto a quella riportata da Döring. Esse sono state contrassegnate da un asterisco (*) posto accanto al nostro numero d'ordine della testimonianza." (pp. 10-11)

  5. Giannantoni, Gabriele, ed. 1990. Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae . Napoli: Bibliopolis.

    Collegit, disposuit, apparatibus notisque instruxit Gabriele Giannantoni, (4 voll.).

    Vol. I. 2. Euclidis et Megaricorum philosophorum reliquiae : Euclides Megareus, Eubulides Milesius, Alexinus Eleus, Euphantus Olvnthius, Apollonius Cronus, Diodorus Cronus, Philon Megaricus, Ichthyas Megaricus, Clinomachus Thurius, Pasicles Thebanus, Thrasymachus Corinthius, I)ioclides Megareus. Stilpon Megareus, Dionysius Chalcedonius, Panthoides Megaricus, Philippus Megaricus, Bryson.

    "Scopo della presente raccolta è quello di fornire, per la prima volta, l'intero corpus delle fonti antiche su Socrate e il movimento socratico.

    Accanto perciò a una riedizione delle Socraticorum reliquiae , il lettore troverà qui la prima raccolta delle fonti antiche su Socrate, la raccolta aggiornata di quelle su Eschine e r indicazione di quelle su gli altri uditori e seguaci di Socrate."

    "Le fonti relative a Euclide e alla scuola megarica sono state tradotte in italiano da L. Montoneri, I Megarici (1984) e in francese da R. Muller, Les Mégariques (1985). Entrambe queste traduzioni sono basate sulla raccolta di Döring: Montoneri (che dà alle fonti una diversa disposizione e una diversa numerazione), vi aggiunge solo il n. 44 (cfr. p. 246), che è un testo di al-Mubassir (« Zenone [di Elea] fu l'autore della dottrina che si chiama Megarica ), Muller, invece, dopo aver notato qualche lieve incongruenza nella raccolta di Döring (omissione di due testi che pure citano il nome di un Megarico [cf Sext. Emp. adv. math . X102 = F 13 e Plutarch. de stoic. repugn . 10 p. 1036 C- = F 18] e l'inclusione di un testo nel quale nessun Megarico è citato [cfr. Cicer. de nat. deor . 9,22-23 =Il C 4 aggiunge poi (pp. 75-93) una serie di testi, che pur non essendo testimonianze in senso stretto, aiutano tuttavia a comprendere determinate dottrìne attribuite ai Megarici: la maggior parte di questi testi (dr. pp. 65-86, ma a questi si possono congiungere anche i passi dal De fato ciceroniano tradotti a p. 88 circa il problema dei futuri contingenti) riguardano i cosiddetti « argomenti megarici » (il «mentitore» il «velato», il «sorite», ecc.); i rimanenti sono quelli già citati e passi di Seneca da me già inclusi (cfr. Il o 33 e II o 15) più l'indicazione di una serie di passi platonici e aristotelici, nei quali la critica moderna ha visto allusioni ai Megarici (cfr. SR 1 pp. 358-73 e la successiva nota 8)." (Dalla Nota 1. Sui criteri della presente raccolta )

    "In 1983 Gabriele Giannantoni produced his Socraticorum Reliquiae [SR], in four handsome volumes produced by the firm of Bibliopolis in Naples. The new edition of the writings of and testimonia for the Socratics is again handsomely produced by Bibliopolis, in four bound volumes with a photograph of Socrates adorning the box that contains them."

    (...)

    Volume I of SR took us as far as Aristippus' pupil, Theodorus of Cyrene (IV H), in 315 pages; volume I of SSR takes us only to the school of Elis (II), in 521 pages. Volume II of SR took us to the last of the "Socratics" - the late descendant of Socrates in the line of Antisthenes (VA) and Diogenes of Sinope (VB), the Cynic Menedemus (VN), making a total of 778 pages; volume II of SSR takes us back to the first generation of the Socratics and Socrates' companions and associates who, for the most part, were Socratic only in their behavior and dress-Chaerephon, Apollodorus, and Aristodemus, in 778 pages, which brings the new collection of testimonia to a total of 1,173 pages.

    Volume III of SSR contains a Bibliography of 85 pages and indices of sources and names. Volume IV contains a series of 56 essays modestly entitled "Note," which present economical and carefully considered accounts of some of the major Socratics, the last of these being Aeschines of Sphettos (who was excluded from SR). The most relevant of these notes is the first which sets out the criteria for inclusion in this collection." (Diskin Clay, "Review of Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae by Gabriele Giannantoni", The Classical Journal , 88, 1993, pp. 296-299)

Studies in English A - F

  1. Allen, James. 2001. Inference from Signs. Ancient Debates About the Nature of Evidence. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Study III: The Stoics on Sign-Inference and Demonstration pp. 147-193, Appendix: The Evidence for a Dialectical Origin of the Stoic Theory of Signs (pp. 188-193).

    "The existence of a Dialectical school distinct from the Megarian school is controversial. The case in favour is made by D. Sedley,(33) doubts have been raised by K. Döring.(34) I am not concerned here with this wider controversy, but only with T. Ebert’s contention that the Stoic theory of the sign had its origin in the Dialectical school.

    The principal piece of evidence for this thesis is a passage in chapter 9 of the pseudo-Galenic Historia philosopha, where, as we have already had occasion to observe, a definition of the sign essentially the same as that in Sextus is preserved, but commemorative and indicative signs are represented as species of the genus sign determined by this definition." (pp. 188-189)

    (...)

    "But the burden of my argument in this study is that the distinction and the definition do not form a unity and that, if we must look for the origin of the distinction outside the Stoa, the most likely place is not the Dialectical school but in medicine. If this is right, it is possible to agree with Ebert that the distinction between commemorative and indicative signs is not Stoic without agreeing that it must be Dialectical or that its source and that of the definition of the sign must be sought in the same place." (p. 193)

  2. ———. 2019. "Megara and Dialectic." In Dialectic after Plato and Aristotle, edited by Bénatouil, Thomas and Ierodiakonou, Katerina, 17-46. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

    "I spoke of the philosophers traditionally regarded as members of a Megaric school. In a 1977 article on Diodorus Cronus, David Sedley argued (among other things) that, instead of the single Megaric school of

    tradition, there were at least two distinct schools, the Megaric and the Dialectical (and possibly a third, the Eristical).(10) After setting out this view, I shall rehearse some objections to it and eventually sketch a position that can, I think, be viewed as one of tentative and qualified agreement.

    This is the occasion for another caution, however. Suppose that a certain amount of cold water is thrown on the idea of a distinct Dialectical school.

    It would be a mistake, I maintain, to think that that there ought to be a presumption in favour of the traditional one-school view. Questions about whether and in what way there was such a thing as a Megaric school can and have also been raised.(11) Doubts about the existence of a distinct Dialectical school should not necessarily be seen as confirming the traditional conception of a unitary Megaric school. In an effort to avoid prejudging the issue, I shall refer to a ‘dialectical group’." (p. 21)

    (10) Sedley 1977, summary and comments in Giannantoni 1990 SSR 4.46-8 (possibly anticipated by Schmid, whose view I know only from the summary in Giannantoni 4.43).

    (11) Cambiano 1977; Giannantoni 1990 SSR 4.45-6. Cautions about the use of the term ‘school’: Döring 1972, 1989; Muller 1985: 9-10 (Muller 1988 is,, however, more sympathetic to the idea of a Megaric school).

    References

    Cambiano, G. (1977) ‘Il problema dell’ esistenza di una scuola Megarica’, in Scuole socratiche minori e filosofia ellenistica, ed. G. Giannantoni. Bologna: 1977.

    Döring, K. (ed.) (1972) Die Megariker: Kommentierte Sammlung der Testimonien. Amsterdam.

    _____ (1989) ‘Gab es eine Dialektische Schule?’, Phronesis 34: 293-310.

    Giannantoni, G. (ed.) (1983–1990) Socratis et socraticorum reliquiae. 4 vols. Naples.

    Muller, R. (trans.) (1985). Les Mégariques. Fragments et témoignages, with comm. Paris.

    _____ (1988) Introduction à la pensée des Mégariques. Paris and Brussels.

    Sedley, D. (1977) ‘Diodorus Cronus and Hellenistic philosophy’ PCPS 23: 74-120.

  3. Bailey, Dominic T. J. 2012. "Megaric Metaphysics." Ancient Philosophy no. 32:303-321.

    "I examine two startling claims attributed to some philosophers associated with Megara on the Isthmus of Corinth, namely:

    M1 . Something possesses a capacity at t if and only if it is exercising that capacity at t.

    M2. One can speak of a thing only by using its own proper λόγος.[*]

    In what follows , I will call the conjunction of M1 and M2 ‘Megaricism’(1) The literature on ancient philosophy contains several valuable discussions of M1 and M2 taken individually.(2) But there is no discussion of them together, much less of their logical relations. I intend to remedy that lack, and to show why it is a lack worth remedying."

    (1) I adopt the convention of using ‘Megarian’ for a citizen of Megara, ‘Megaric ’ for a follower ofthe philosophical trend. But in speaking of ‘Megaricism’ or ‘the Megarics’ , I do not intend to imply that there was anything coming from Megara so robustly unified or interconnected as to deserve the name of ‘school’ . I do not deny it either. See , most recently , Muller 1988. One of our main sources for M2 is a report from Aristotle’ s Metaphysics, in which the position is attributed to the philosopher Antisthenes. Antisthenes was not from Megara (he was an Athenian contemporary of Plato). But some of his recorded claims are close enough to those attributed to bom and bred Megarians such as Euclides and Stilpo for me reasonably to include him, for my purposes, under the Megaric banner.

    For arguments intimately connecting Antisthenes ’ general views on language with those of actual Megarians, see Denyer 1991 , 27ff.

    (2) For M1 see Makin 1996; Makin 2006, 60- 81; Beere 2009, 91-117. For M2 see Denyer 1991.

    [*] Text for M1: Aristotle, Metaphysics, IX, 3.1046b29-33, 1047a4-7; Text for M2: Aristotle, Metaphysics, V, v 29.1024b29-34.

    References

    Beere, J. 2009. Doing and Being : An Interpretation of Aristotle' s ‘Metaphysics’ Theta. Oxford: Oxford University Press .

    Denyer , N. 1991, Language Thought and Falsehood in Ancient Philosophy. London: Routledge.

    Makin, S. 1996. ‘Megarian Possibilities’ Philosophical Studies 83: 253-276.

    Makin, S . 2006. Aristotle' s ‘Metaphysics’ Theta. Oxford: Oxford University Press .

    Muller , R . 1988. Introduction à la Pensée des Megariques. Paris: Libraire J. Vrin.

  4. Barnes, Jonathan. 1993. "A big, big D?" The Classical Review no. 63:304-306.

    Reprinted with the title: Logic and the dialecticians as Chapter 16 of J. Barnes, Logical Matters: Essays in Ancient Philosophy II, edited by Maddalerna Bonelli, Oxford: Clarendon Press 2012, pp. 479-484.

    " 'As Aristotle invented predicate logic, so Chrysippus invented propositional Iogic. Unlike Aristotle, Chrysippus had precursors; but his debt to them was slight — and in any event we know little or nothing about them.(1)

    Thus, in caricature, an orthodoxy. Theo Ebert has urged heresy: Chrysippus, he suggests, owed a very great deal to his precursors — and we can itemize at least some parts of the debt. For substantial parts of Chrysippean logic were based, directly or indirectly, on the work of the Dialecticians (Diodorus Cronus, Philo, and their associates), and it is the Dialecticians whom we should honour as the inventors of propositional logic.(1) In doing so we shall not merely pay just tribute to the eminent dead: we shall come to a better understanding of the course and career of logic itself.

    Ebert’s thesis is sustained by meticulous analyses of familiar texts, most of them in Sextus; and a thorough consideration of it would occupy a volume here — ολίγα από πολλών — I voice two general doubts and sketch two particular disagreements." (p. 479 of the reprint)

    (...)

    "In sum, Ebert has not yet converted me to his heresy.** Nonetheless, I give his book four hearty cheers. It is a rattling good read; it is lucid and open and honest; it essays sharp and subtle interpretations of texts which other scholar have merely blustered through; and in the course of discussing the theories of signs and of proof, the classification of types of proposition, the analyse of fallacies and sophisms, it often throws new and brilliant light on a portfolio of documents which are central to our understanding of Hellenistic logic." (p. 484 of the reprint)

    (1) Ebert denies any share of honour to Theophrastus and the Peripatetics: pp. 15-19, 73 n. 8.

    * Λ review of T. Ebert, Dialektiker und friihe Stoiker bei Sextus Empiricus: Untersuchungen zur Entstehung der Aussagenlogik, Hypomnemata 95 (Gottingen, 1991) originally published in CR 43,1993, 304-306, under the title ‘A big, big D?’. (Some readers of which forgot that the answer to the question, is: ‘Well, hardly ever’.)

    ** He has replied to the chief parts of this review on pp. 283-293 of his ‘Defence’. [T. Ebert, In Defence of the Dialectical School, in: Francesca Alesse (ed.), Anthropine Sophia. Studi di filologia e storiografia filosofica in memoria di Gabriele Giannantoni, Napoli: Bibliopolis 2008, pp. 275-293.]

  5. Bobzien, Susanne. 1993. "Chrysippus' Modal Logic and its Relation to Philo and Diodorus." In Dialektiker und Stoiker. Zur Logik der Stoa und ihrer Vorläufer, edited by Döring, Klaus and Ebert, Theodor, 63-84. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.

    On Philo the Dialectician: "Philo’s modal definitions are the least well reported and their exact meaning cannot be reconstructed with certainty. Only Boethius gives all four Philonian modal definitions (in Int. 234.10-22). The other three sources, all Aristotle commentators as well (Alex. Aphr. in APr. 183f; Phlp. in APr. 169; Simp. in Cat. 195f), confine themselves to Philo’s notion of possibility, contrasting it with others; and it is not always clear what is part of the definition and what is part of the contrast. I will rely primarily on Boethius. According to his report, a proposition is Philonian possible, iff it is capable of truth according to the proposition's own nature or as far as the proposition itself is concerned; otherwise it is impossible. Thus, it seems, what is required for Philonian possibility is some sort of intrinsic consistency of the proposition. The propositions ‘(this) piece of wood bums’ (Simp. in Cat. 196.1), ‘Diodes is alive’, ‘it is night’ would all be consistent in this sense.

    The evidence is too sparse and heterogeneous to allow one to give a clear account of the type of consistency Philo had in mind. As it is also not essential for what follows, I leave the concept of consistency uninterpreted.

    Consistency seems to be a common and reasonable criterion for possibility; still, due to the temporalized concept of truth, it works a little differently for Hellenistic propositions than for atemporal propositions." (p. 67, notes omitted)

    On Diodorus Cronus: "As in the case of Philo, for Diodorus the full set of modal definitions is only reported by Boethius (in Int. 234.22-6). Yet, the definition of possibility is confirmed in some other sources (Alex. Aphr. in APr. 183f.; Phlp. in APr. 169; Simp, in Cat. 195; Boeth. in Int. 412), and we have further valuable information about Diodorus’ modal theory in Epictetus, Cicero, and Plutarch (Epict. Diss. 2.19.1-5; Cic. De fato 12, 13, 17 and Fam. 9.4; Plu. De Stoic,.rep. 1055E-F).

    For Diodorus, a proposition is possible iff it either is true or will be true."(p. 69, note omitted)

  6. ———. 1998. Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Chapter 3.1.2 Diodorus and necessitarianism, pp. 102-108.

    "We can hence conclude—fully in accord with the surviving passages —that Diodorus' modal notions were not criticized for leading to universal necessitarianism, i.e. to the theory that 'everything is necessary'—for that it is day, for instance, is not Diodorean necessary. Rather what was found unacceptable was that whatever in fact never happens is impossible (or alternatively that all false propositions about what happens in the future are impossible). This was the only straightforward way, within Hellenistic logic, to express the thought that Diodorus' modalities preclude counterfactual possibilities. But this is surely enough to worry not only a libertarian but also a 'soft determinist' such as Chrysippus. So Chrysippus, since he wanted to retain 'counterfactual possibilities', had to reject Diodorus' modal concepts. And he did this, as is well known, by attempting to refute the Master Argument, i.e. the argument with which Diodorus established his notion of possibility as the (only) right one.(26) Still, the question remains: what concept of possibility should Chrysippus adopt instead? One choice he had was Philo's." (p. 108)

    (26) For Chrysippus' refutation of this argument see e.g. Bobzien 1986 [Die stoische Modallogik (Würzburg)], 105-13.

  7. ———. 1999. "Logic. II. The 'Megarics'." In The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, edited by Algra, Kempe, Barnes, Jonathan, Mansfeld, Jaap and Schofield, Malcolm, 83-91. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    "Apart from the various logical puzzles and sophisms, there are only two topics on which we can be sure of a positive contribution to logic(25) by the ‘Megarics’.(26) These are the positions of Diodorus Cronus and of Philo on the theory of conditionals and on modal logic. Why the discussion of these topics came down to us, we can only divine. Certainly both involve notorious difficulties. Again, they were topics which were extensively and intensely discussed in Hellenistic logic; so much so that the disputes became part of the general knowledge of the intelligentsia of the time (e.g. Sextus Empiricus M [Adversus mathematicos] 1.309–10). In addition, the theory of modalities was believed to have far-reaching results for other areas of philosophy." (p. 83)

    (25) Logic in the narrow sense, i.e. not including contributions to the study of ambiguity.

    (26) On the extent to which it is legitimate to speak of a ‘Megaric’ (or Dialectical), ‘school’, see above, p. 47 n. 105.

    P. 47, note 105: On the existence and name of this school, cf. Cambiano 1977 and Sedley 1977. Against this, see Döring 1989. Like Giannantoni 1990, iv 41–50, I am inclined to accept Sedley’s hypothesis

    regarding the ‘Dialectical’ school. For the chronology of these philosophers I follow Sedley 1977, 107 n. 23. Cf. also the useful chronological table ibid. 82.

    References

    Cambiano, G. (1977) ‘Il problema dell’ esistenza di una scuola Megarica’, in Scuole socratiche minori e filosofia ellenistica, ed. G. Giannantoni. Bologna: 1977.

    Döring, K. (ed.) (1989) ‘Gab es eine Dialektische Schule?’, Phronesis 34: 293-310.

    Giannantoni, G. (ed.) (1983–1990) Socratis et socraticorum reliquiae. 4 vols. Naples.

    Sedley, D. (1977) ‘Diodorus Cronus and Hellenistic philosophy’ PCPS 23: 74-120.

  8. Bochenski, Joseph. 1951. Ancient Formal Logic. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

    Chapter V. The Stoic-Megaric School, pp. 77-102.

    "The development of formal logic in Antiquity reached its peak in the works of the thinkers belonging to the Megaric and Stoic Schools. Unfortunately, none of those works are preserved and our information concerning them supplied by later sources is desperately scarce. It is sufficient, however, to show that among both Megaricians and Stoics there were very great logicians and that the general level of the formal rigour obtained by those schools was remarkable - indeed, superior in some respects to that of our own today. Among the discoveries which may safely be attributed to them, are the following: invention and statement in form of an axiomatic system (which seems to have been both consistent and complete) of a logic of propositions; invention of truth-tables and thorough discussions of the meaning of implication;

    subtle semiotical doctrines, including a sharp distinction between the logical laws and the metalogical rules of inference, and a clear distinction between intension and extension.

    We shall expound here, after a historical survey (13), their logic in four chapters, dealing respectively with semiotics (14), the theory of propositional functors (15) the rules of inference or syllogisms (16) and the paradoxes, including the famous Liar (17)." (p. 77)

  9. ———. 1961. A History of Formal Logic. Notre Dame: Indiana University Press.

    Translated from the German edition "Formale Logik" (1956) by Ivo Thomas.

    Reprinted New York, Chelsea Publishing Co., 1970.

    Chapter III. The Megarian-Stoic School, pp. 105-133.

    "In reading the Megarian-Stoic fragments one's first impression is that here is something different from Aristotelian logic: terminology, laws, the very range of problems, all are different. In addition we are confronted with a new technique of logic. The most striking differences are that the Megarian-Stoic logic is firstly not a logic of terms but of propositions, and secondly that it consists exclusively of rules, not of laws - as does the Prior Analytics. The question at once arises, what was the origin of this logic.

    The answer is complex. First of all one cannot doubt that the Megarians and Stoics, who as we have seen ( cf. 18.03) found an only too frequent delight in refutation, had a tendency to do everything differently from Aristotle. Thus for example they introduce quite new expressions even where Aristotle has developed an excellent terminology.

    Yet it should not be said that their logical thought could have developed uninfluenced by Aristotle. On the contrary, they appear to have developed just those ideas which are last to appear in the Organon. We. find, for instance, a more exact formulation of the rules which Aristotle used in axiomatizing the syllogistic, and himself partially formulated. Nor can it be denied that they developed his theory of 'syllogisms from hypotheses', chiefly on the basis of the preparatory work of Theophrastus. And generally speaking they everywhere show traces of the same spirit as Aristotle's, only in a much sharper form, that spirit being the spirit of formalized logic." (p. 108)

  10. Brancacci, Aldo. 2005. "The Double Daimon in Euclides the Socratic." Apeiron no. 38:143-154.

    "According to Diogenes Laertius, Euclides of Megara wrote six dialogues: Lamprias, Aeschines, Phoenix, Criton, Alcibiades, and Erotikos.(1) That they were Socratic dialogues as can clearly be seen from the titles,(2) is confirmed by Panaetius, in a passage worth quoting at the outset: 'Panaetius thinks that of all the Socratic dialogues, those by Plato, Xenophon, Antisthenes and Aeschines, are genuine (aletheis); he is in doubt about those ascribed to Phaedo and Euclides; but he rejects the others one and all'.(3)

    (...)

    "Taking into account the existence of this dialogue [Erotikos] by Euclides, and the terms in which the association between the daimones Sleep and Death is developed, the conclusion of the Apology of Socrates can be better understood as can the way in which Plato constructed it. I am referring to the well-known section dealing with Socrates' two hypotheses on death. The first — which I believe is very close to the historical Socrates — is based on the assumption that dying 'is like being nothing anymore' (Ap 40c5-6), while the second — where Plato lets his own point of view creep in, which was to be further developed in the Phaedo — starts out from the assumption of Orphic-Pythagorean origin that dying is, 'as people say, a kind of change and migration of the soul from this place down here to another place' (Ap 40c7-9).

    1 Cf. DL II 108 (= SSR II A 10). The ancient sources concerning Euclides and the Socratics are quoted in this paper from the edition SSR by Giannantoni 1990.

    2 Cf. Hirzel 1895, I 110 n3.

    3 DL II64 (= Panaetius fr 126 van Straaten)

    References

    DL = Diogenes Laertius

    Hirzel 1895 = Der Dialog. Ein literarhistorischer Versuch, Leipzig: S. Hirzel

    van Straaten =Panetius, sa vie, ses écrits et sa doctrine. Avec une edition des fragments. Amsterdam: Paris, 1946

  11. ———. 2017. "Socratism and Eleaticism in Euclides of Megara." In Socrates and the Socratic Dialogue, edited by Stavru, Alexandru and Christopher, Moore, 161-178. Leiden: Brill.

    "Foreword. The sources for Euclides of Megara are scarce, and it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to reconstruct his philosophy fully. The aim of this paper is to reassess the main evidence about Euclides and answer a pair of questions.

    These are indeed the two fundamental questions posed by his thought: the nature of Euclides’ Socratism, and the problem of his adherence to Eleaticism.

    Although these issues are largely independent, they are still to some extent linked. In fact, a survey of the sources related to the Socratism of Euclides is not of secondary importance for considering whether he was somehow also connected to the Eleatic tradition.

    The difficulty of this survey is related to the imbalance between the complexity of these issues and the scarcity of the extant documentary framework.

    In this chapter I will first determine the most reliable data emerging from the ancient texts and then reconstruct the overall character of Euclides’ thought. I will relate these data to a broader theoretical and historical-philosophical context.

    I will thereby refrain from giving drastic or prejudicial answers to either question, in contrast to what has occasionally been done before. Although I will neither cite nor discuss in detail the wide bibliography on Euclides and the Megarian school, I will deal with the contributions that have most influenced the study of those two issues." (p. 161)

  12. Byrd, Michael. 1978. "Megarian Necessity in Forward-Branching, Backward-Linear Time." Noûs no. 12:463-469.

    "Studies by Mates [4], Hintikka [3], Prior [5], and Rescher [7] have drawn attention to the importance of temporally defined modalities in the writings of Aristotle, Aquinas, and other ancient and medieval philosophers. The most widely known concepts of this sort are the Diodorean and the Megarian-Aristotelian treatments of necessity. According to the former, a statement is necessary now just in case it is true now and will be true at all future times. According to the latter, a statement is necessary now in case it is true now and at all earlier and later times.

    A major concern of the initiators of tense logic was the question of what modal structure these two conceptions of necessity possessed. Arthur Prior's interest centered on the Diodorean view." (p. 463)

    (...)

    "Investigation of Megarian necessity has been much less thorough; this is surprising in view of its centrality in the works of figures like Aristotle and Aquinas. Now, it is clear that if time is conceived as linear, then Megarian necessity is the system S5. However, it is not at all evident what the correct logic is if time is treated as branching toward the future but linear toward the past. To my knowledge, no serious attempt has yet been made to solve this problem.(1) Moreover, this failure is serious: important proponents of Megarian necessity-Aristotle, for instance-can be plausibly represented as having held the view that time is forward-branching and backward-linear."

    (1) Michael Byrd, "On the Addition of Weakened L-Reduction Axioms to the Brouwer System," forthcoming [Mathematical Logic Quarterly 24 (25‐30): pp. 405-408 (1978)].

    References

    [3] Jaakko Hintikka, "Aristotle and the 'Master Argument' of Diodorus," American Philosophical Quarterly 1(1964): 101-14.

    [4] Benson Mates, Stoic Logic (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953).

    [5] Arthur Prior, "Diodorean Modalities," The Philosophical Quarterly 5 (1955): 202-13.

    [7] Nicholas Rescher, Temporal Modalities in Arabic Logic (Dordrecht/Boston: Reidel, 1966).

  13. Calvert, Brian. 1976. "Aristotle and the Megarians on the Potentiality-Actuality Distinction." Apeiron no. 10:34-41.

    "In the third chapter of Metaphysics IX, Aristotle considers an objection to his distinction between actuality and potentiality."

    (...)

    "In what follows, I shall attempt to show that, while Aristotle is quite right to indicate the consequences which follow from the Megarian position, his response is inadequate as a refutation of that position, because it consists in little more than an affirmation of the reality of such processes as movement and becoming. As I shall seek to make clear, the Megarian position contends that these processes are logically impossible; and so it is no answer to it merely to affirm the realities which it denies, any more than it would be an adequate answer to Zeno merely to assert the reality of motion. In short, Aristotle's case fails because he does not try to uncover the logic of the Megarian argument, nor does he consider the possibility that the Megarians, like him, were perfectly aware of the absurdities, on a common sense level, that stemmed from their argument. .If their argument is to be countered, it has to be done so on a level different from that on which Aristotle operates.

    In the remainder of this paper, what I shall do is to offer a reconstruction of the argument, and to suggest where its error lies. The reconstruction will certainly, in parts, be rather speculative—this mainly being due to the paucity of direct evidence. Nonetheless, my claim would be that even where my account does become speculative, it is not inconsistent with what evidence we do have, and, at the very least, it offers a new way of looking at the dispute." (p. 34)

  14. Ciuni, Roberto. 2009. "The Search for the Diodorean Frame." Humana Mente no. 3:47-65.

    Abstract: "Diodorean modalities are logical notions that specify, in a precise way, how sentences may be true with respect to time: a sentence is diodoreanly necessary at a given instant iff it is true since that instant on.

    Arthur Prior has treated them as sentential operators and built up a logic for such modalities (DIOD) conjecturing that the frame for such a logic (the "diodorean frame") was the frame for S4. The Conjecture was soon proved false, through a number of counterexamples that played a role in the research on modal logics between S4 and S5. The present paper aims at showing that (i) the search for the diodorean frame benefited from such a research, and that (ii) there has been a mutual interaction between the search of the diodorean frame and some characterisation results. The paper is divided into five parts. In section 1, I will introduce diodorean modalities, while in Section 2 I will be focusing on Prior's reconstruction of the Master Argument and his characterisation of DIOD. In section 3, I present a conjecture Prior advanced about the characterisation of DIOD and some counterexamples to it. The notions of "frame" and "frame for" will be also introduced. In section 4 I summarise the connections between the search of the diodorean frame and some researches in modal logic. Section 5 presents a short conclusion."

    References

    Prior Arthur N. (1955), Diodoran Modalities, The Philosophical Quarterly, 32/8: 226-230.

    Prior Arthur N. (1958), Diodorus and Modal Logic: a Correction, The Philosophical Quarterly, 20/5: 205-213.

  15. Crivelli, Paolo. 1994. "The Stoic Analysis of Tense and of Plural Propositions in Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos X 99." Classical Quarterly no. 44:490-499.

    "Adversus Mathematicos (M.) x is the second book dedicated by Sextus to the discussion of the physical doctrines put forward by dogmatic philosophers. An extensive section (M. X 85-120) deals with Diodorus Cronus' arguments concerning movement.

    M. X 99 occurs within the report of a debate on motion and time between Diodorus and some unnamed opponents. The passage is probably corrupt (as was already noticed by Heintz) and contains some observations on plural propositions and tense which have not yet been satisfactorily explained. In this paper I argue that Diodorus' critics are Stoics, propose a new emendation of the text, and attempt a plausible

    account of the remarks on plural propositions and tense. Thereby some light is shed on a hitherto unexplored region of Stoic logic." (p. 490)

    References

    W. Heintz, Studien zu Sexius Empiricus (Halle, 1932; Schriften der Konigsberger Gelehrten Gesellschaft - Sonderreihe, 2).

  16. Decleva-Caizzi, Fernanda. 2006. "Minor Socratics." In A Companion to Ancient Philosophy, edited by Gill, Mary Louise and Pellegrin, Pierre, 119-135. London: Blackwell.

    Euclides, pp. 132-134.

    "The so-called Megarian school was never a genuine institution nor did it consist in a unified philosophical position. Alongside the label “Megarians,” we find also “Dialecticians” and “Eristics.” It is difficult to say whether these terms are used to characterize distinct groups. Besides Euclides’ and Stilpo’s common origin from Megara, the aim of tracing the tradition of Pyrrhonist Skepticism back to Socrates probably also

    played a determining role in the Hellenistic construction of the Megarian succession and “school” (cf. D.L. 9.61). In light of these data and of what we know of the orientations of Hellenistic historiography, the evaluation of possibly Eleatic themes ought to follow investigation of Euclides’ primary cultural relationship with Socrates, not be a point of departure for the reconstruction of Euclides’ philosophy in its entirety." (p. 132-133)

    (...)

    "Regarding his thought, the principal testimony is in Diogenes Laertius (2.106 = SSR II A 30 = 24 Döring): “He held the good to be one (hen to agathon), called by many names: sometimes wisdom, sometimes god, sometimes intelligence, and so on. All that is contradictory to the good he used to reject, maintaining that it has no existence.” To this we may add D.L. 2.161 (SSR II A 32 = 25 Döring), from which we learn that, for

    the Megarians, virtue is one thing, called by many names. Cicero (Acad. II. [Lucullus] 42.129, cited above) writes that the Megarians said “the sole good is that which is always one and alike and the same. These authors also took much from Plato” (trans. Rackham)." (pp. 133-134)

  17. Denyer, Nicholas. 1981. "The atomism of Diodorus Cronus." Prudentia no. 13:33-45.

  18. ———. 1998. "Philoponus, Diodorus, and Possibility." Classical Quartelry no. 48:327.

    Abstract: "The definition here ascribed to Philo [*] is entirely in line with what we know of Philo from else where: Alexander Aphrodisensis, in Analityca Priora 184.6–10; Simplicius, in Categorias 195.33–196.5; Boethius, in de Interpretatione 234.10–15. The same is not true of the definition here ascribed to Diodorus. For Diodorus, we are told elsewhere, defined the possible as that which either is or will be so: Cicero, de Fato 13, 17; Plutarch, De Stoicorum repugnantiis 1055d-e; Alexander Aphrodisensis, in Analityca Priora 183.42–184.5; Boethius, in de Interpretatione 234.22–4,412.16–7. Something has therefore got garbled."

    [*] Phlp. in APr. 169.17-21. This is fr. 136 in the collection of K. Doring, Die Megariker

    (Amsterdam, 1972); and part of ft. II F 27 in the collection of G. Giannantoni, Socratis et

    Socraticorum Reliquiae (Naples, 1990). Both Doring, pp. 39-43, and Giannantoni, i.429-33,

    reprint all the other passages here cited.

  19. ———. 2002. "Neglected Evidence for Diodorus Cronus." Classical Quarterly:597-600.

    "There are two standard compilations of the evidence relating to Diodorus Cronus and the Megaric school of philosophers.(1) Neither contains Eustathius, Ad Hom. Od. 28.46–29.2, part of his note on Odyssey 1.107." (p. 597)

    (...)

    "The second thing we learn about Diodorus Cronus from this neglected passage is that as early as c. A.D. 100 someone—Suetonius—actually called him a Megaric. This is without parallel in our other sources. When other sources apply to Diodorus what might be a label for his school, they uniformly call him διαλεκτικός, and the διαλεκτικόί (perhaps it should be printed with a capital delta) were rivals from whom Megarics are reported to have recruited pupils (D.L. 2.113). It has been proposed in consequence that we should abandon the recent practice of describing Diodorus as a Megaric, and call him a Dialectician instead(2) The proposal can still be adopted, even though we now have direct evidence of someone in antiquity calling Diodorus a Megaric. For supporters of the proposal can maintain that Suetonius too fell victim to the same confusion that has led more recent scholars to describe Diodorus as a Megaric rather than as the Dialectician that in fact he was. Nevertheless, in the light of the neglected passage of Eustathius, the proposal is perhaps less attractive than it originally looked." (p. 598)

    (2) D. Sedley, ‘Diodorus Cronus and Hellenistic philosophy’, PCPS 203 (n.s. 23) (1977), 74–120, at 74–7. Sedley’s proposal was rejected by Giannantoni, who placed Diodorus testimonia in his section on Megarics. It was treated with some disdain by K. Döring, ‘Gab es eine Dialektische Schule?’, Phronesis 34 (1989) 293–310, and taken up enthusiastically by Theodor Ebert, Dialektiker und frühe Stoiker bei Sextus Empiricus: Untersuchungen zur Entstehung der Aussagenlogik (Göttingen, 1991) = Hypomnemata 95, and N. Denyer, ‘Diodorus Cronus’, in E. J. Craig (ed.), The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London, 1998), 2.83–6. The most recent discussion is F. De Mattia, ‘Diodoro Crono: testimonianze antiche ed esegesi moderna’, unpublished dissertation (Bologna, 2000), 15–39.

  20. Dorandi, Tiziano. 1999. "Chronology." In The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, edited by Algra, Kempe, Barnes, Jonathan, Mansfeld, Jaap and Schofield, Malcolm, 31-54. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    "The Dialectical (or ‘Megaric’) school(105) was given its name by Dionysius of Chalcedon, whose floruit can be placed at 320; he was more or less the contemporary of Euphantus, born before 348. More important are Diodorus Cronus, active in Athens and Alexandria between 315 and c. 284 (106) (his contemporary was Aristides the Dialectician), and Stilpo, who lived c. 360–280. Alexinus (c. 339–265), a younger figure, is well known for a debate on rhetorical questions with the Epicurean Hermarchus, dated – with certainty – to 267/6, and for his attacks on Zeno of Citium.

    Philo the Dialectician was a student of Diodorus Cronus between 310 and 300, and a contemporary of Zeno of Citium. Between 280 and 275 Panthoides, whose lectures were attended by the Peripatetic Lycon, was active; while the floruit of Aristotle and Artemidorus is put at around 250.

    The first is known for having contributed to the overthrow of the rule of Abantidas of Sicyon, the second for attacking the Stoic Chrysippus." (p. 47)

    (105) On the existence and name of this school, cf. Cambiano 1977 and Sedley 1977. Against this, see Döring 1989. Like Giannantoni 1990, iv 41–50, I am inclined to accept Sedley’s hypothesis regarding the ‘Dialectical’ school. For the chronology of these philosophers I follow Sedley 1977, 107 n. 23. Cf. also the useful chronological table ibid. 82.

    (106) This chronology is reconstructed in Sedley 1977, 78–80 and 107–9.

    References

    Cambiano, G. (1977) ‘Il problema dell’esistenza di una scuola Megarica’, in Giannantoni, G., ed., Scuole socratiche minori e filosofia ellenistica (Bologna) 25–53

    Döring, K. (1989) ‘Gab es eine Dialektische Schule ?’, Phronesis 34, 293–310

    Giannantoni, G., ed. (1990) Socratis et Socraticorum reliquiae, 4 vols., Elenchos 18 (Naples)

    Sedley, D. N. (1977) ‘Diodorus Cronus and Hellenistic philosophy’, PCPhS [Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society] 23, 74–120

  21. Drozdek, Adam. 2005. "Euclides of Megara: God = Phronesis = The Good." Acta Antiqua no. 45:27-34.

    Summary: "The paper investigates reasons for which Euclides of Megara equates God, phronesis, and the good. The reasons include the importance of ethics in Socratic philosophy, the role of phronesis in Platonism, and absolutism of the Eleatic school."

    "Euclides explicitly mentions God by making God one of the names of the good, of being. But what else, theologically, can that mean than pantheism? There is nothing beyond being and that being is called God, which is a pantheistic solution, pure and simple.(24) With his mention of God, Euclides’ system becomes a theological commentary on the Parmenidean ontology. Parmenides never calls his being God although

    attributes of that being are divine (eternity, perfection) and thus being is God.(25) Euclides just makes this theological aspect explicit. Mentioning God after phronesis as a possible name for the good may also mean that Euclides did not follow Socrates in giving high – the highest – status to theology.(26) Theology seems to have been for him of secondary importance, turning ethics to ontology and intelligence – phronesis – of the resulting being was his primary concern. Theology fits rather well in that image, but, in a way, it is a happy accident that being can also be called God.(27) This signifies the devaluation of theological and religious issues by the Megarians, which is carried to the extreme by Cyrenaics and Cynics. Only Antisthenes and particularly Plato continue among the Socratics to give theology the prominent position in their works." (p. 34)

    ( 24) Henne says in a roundabout fashion very much the same by stating that Euclides is a father of realism (Henne: École de Mégare. Paris 1843, 225) and that realism originates in timid pantheism which is transformed into

    declared pantheism (p. 238).

    (25) Drozfek, A.: Parmenides’ theology. Eranos 99 (2001) 12–14.

    (26) By itself, the order: phronesis – God – mind does not have to mean that phronesis is most important, God less important, mind even less. Cf. Paul’s statement, “there remain these three: faith, hope and love, but the greatest of these is love” (1 Cor. 13.13) although love is listed at the end.

    (27) It is thus justified to say that for the Megarians, God is a secondary form, just a name of a unity, as phrased by Henne: op. cit. 223.

  22. Ebert, Theodor. 1987. "The Origin of the Stoic Theory of Signs in Sextus Empiricus." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 5:83-126.

    "In his critical discussion of the dogmatic philosophers Sextus Empiricus expounds a Stoic doctrine which has conveniently been labelled 'the theory of signs'. This chapter of Stoic philosophy offers a blend of logic and epistemology, a mixture bound to attract the interest of present-day 'ancient philosophers'. Hence, with the growing discussion focusing on the philosophy of the Hellenistic period, this part of Stoicism was to get a fair share of attention. Controversy has been flourishing over the merits and weaknesses of this theory; it has been compared with tenets about the topic of signs held by earlier and later philosophers, yet in these discussions it has almost universally been taken for granted that there is a single theory of signs and that it can be attributed unqualifiedly to the Stoics. (2)

    Part of what I want to do in this paper is to challenge this assumption. I shall argue that the material relating to the theory of signs which is preserved in Sextus does not reflect Chrysippan teaching, but goes back to Stoics antedating Chrysippus. To have a convenient term, I shall refer to the pre-Chrysippan Stoics as 'early Stoics'. I shall further argue that the theory of signs of the early Stoics was a harvest not grown in the fields of Stoic philosophy, but that it originated from the 'Dialecticians', a group of philosophers confused for a long time with the Megarians and rediscovered as a group in its own right by David Sedley.(4) I shall further try to point out some modifications which this theory underwent as it was integrated into the epistemology of the early Stoics. I shall not discuss the doctrine of signs advocated by the opponents of the Epicureans in Philodemus' de Signis - almost certainly Stoic philosophers - a doctrine which has been ably discussed by David Sedley in a recent paper.(5)" (pp. 83-84, two notes omitted)

    (2) The only exception known to me is D. Sedley who wants to 'put into abeyance the widespread belief that Stoic doctrine is under discussion by Sextus Empiricus throughout M VIII. 141-298 and PH II. 97-133 (Sedley, 'On Signs', in Science and Speculation: Studies in Hellenistic Theory and Practice, ed. Barnes et al. (Cambridge/Paris, 1982), 239-72.

    (4) Cf. D. Sedley, 'Diodorus Cronus and Hellenistic Philosophy', Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society, CCIII, NS 23 (1977), 74-120.

    (5) Cf. D. Sedley, 'On Signs', cit.

  23. ———. 1993. "Dialecticians and Stoics on the classification of propositions." In Dialektiker und Stoiker. Zur Logik der Stoa und ihrer Vorläufer, edited by Döring, Klaus and Ebert, Theodor, 111-127. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.

    "In his discussion and refutation of the logical theories of dogmatist philosophers in Adversus Mathematicos (M.) 8, Sextus Empiricus treats us, among other things, to an account of a classification of propositions (M. 8.93-129). The doctrine reported on here is usually taken to form part of Stoic logic.(1) Together with its apparent counterpart in Diogenes Laertius (D.L.) 7.68-76, this Sextian report is used to reconstruct a theory supposedly held by Stoic philosophers. In what follows I shall try to refute this view and I shall argue that Sextus’ report encapsulates a doctrine worked out not by the Stoic, but by the Dialectical school whose most prominent members seem to have been Diodorus Cronus and Philo.(2)

    First I shall try to show that the two reports by Sextus and by Diogenes resp. are quite different indeed as to their systematic content and that, therefore, both reports must be drawn from different sources. In a second step it is then argued that Sextus’ account is based on Dialectical material. Finally, I shall compare the Dialectical classification to be found in Sextus to the Stoic one in Diogenes with an eye to exploring these two divisions as different phases within the development of propositional logic." (p. 111)

    (1) Cp. Mates (1953) 30f., 54, Kneale (1962) 146, 148f., Mignucci (1965) 131, Egli (1967) 37f., Mueller (1969) 185, Frede (1974a) 49-62 passim, Brunschwig (1984) 9ff.; already v. Arnim put this text, omitting some parts, among the logical fragments of Chrysippus: SVF fr. 205, 211, 216.

    (2) Cp. D. Sedley (1977).

    References

    H. v. Arnim, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta. 3 Bde. Leipzig 1903-1905; Bd. 4: Indices v. Μ. Adler. Leipzig 1924

    Brunschwig, J. (1984). Remarques sur la théorie stoïcienne du nom propre. In: Histoire, Épistémologie, Langage 6 (1984) 3-19

    Egli, U. (1967). Zur stoischen Dialektik. Diss. Basel 1967

    Frede, M. (1974a) Die stoische Logik. Göttingem 1974

    Kneale, M./Kneale W. The development of logic. Oxford 1962, 71978

    Mates, B. (1953). Stoic logic. Berkeley 1953, 21961

    Mignucci, Μ. (1965). Il significato della logica stoica. Bologna 1965, 21967

    Mueller, I. (1969). Stoic logic and Peripatetic logic. In: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 51 (1969) 173-187

    Sedley, D. N. (1977). Diodorus Cronus and Hellenistic philosophy. In: Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 203 (N.S. 23) (1977) 74-120

  24. ———. 2008. "In Defence of the Dialectical School." In Anthropine Sophia. Studi di Filologia e Storiografia Filosofica in Memoria di Gabriele Giannantoni, edited by Alesse, Francesca, Aronadio, Francesco, Dalfino, Maria Cristina, Simeoni, Luca and Spinelli, Emidio, 275-293. Napoli: Bibliopolis.

    "In 1977, David Sedley published a paper in which, among other things, he argued that the Dialectical and the Megarian school were not, as had hitherto been assumed, two names for the same sect, although at different periods, but that both were distinct groups of Hellenistic philosophers.(1) The received opinion, attacked by Sedley, based its claim on a passage in Diogenes Laertius (Diog. Laert.) concerning the disciples of Euclides of Megara, one of the minor Socratics:

    His followers were called Megarians after him, then Eristics, and at a later date Dialecticians, that name having first been given to them by Dionysius of Chalcedon ... (Diog. Laert. II 106 = Giannantoni, SSR II A 22)(2)

    The source of this text is probably Alexander Polyhistor, whose Successions of Philosophers is mentioned in the sentence preceding the one just quoted. Alexander lived around 100 B.C. Against this passage Sedley draws attention to a different piece of evidence in Diog. Laert., namely a verbatim quotation from Philippus the Megarian, who gives a list of people whom Stilpo won over to his own school, i.e. the Megarians; after having mentioned two persons whom Stilpo had made to secede from Theophrastus and two more who came from Aristotle the Cyrenaic philosopher, Philippus continues:

    From the Dialecticians he won over as devoted disciples Paeonius from Aristides, moreover Diphilus of Bosphorus, the former follower of Euphantes as well as Myrmex the son (or “follower”) of Exaenetus, both of whom had come to refute him (Diog. Laert. II 113 = SSR II O 3).

    Sedley concluded from this text that Megarians and Dialecticians could hardly be the same sect; the competition presupposed in this quotation from a contemporary of Stilpo clearly shows, thus Sedley, that Megarians and Dialecticians were seen as distinct schools by their contemporaries. As to the passage in Diog. Laert. II 106, this is, as Sedley argues, probably a doxographical construction of a διαδοχή, a succession of philosophers; it is not the description of a school, or αϊρεσις (4)." (pp. 275-276, note 3 omitted)

    (...)

    "The claim made by Sedley distinguishing the Dialecticians from the Megarians and the one made by me attributing source material in Sext. Emp. which had been used for the Stoics to the Dialectical school, in general met with a friendly reception(6). Yet neither claim has gone undisputed. Klaus Döring, to whom we owe our first comprehensive collection of the material relating to the Megarians(7), launched an attack on Sedley’s contention(8); Döring sees no need to think of the Dialecticians as a separate school, distinct from the Megarians.(9) Even before Döring’s 1989 paper, Robert Muller did not accept Sedley’s separation of the Dialecticians from the Megarians (9). The attribution of the material in Sext. Emp. to the Dialecticians, for which I had argued, was flatly denied by Jonathan Barnes (10). Hence, it may be worthwhile to look at the available evidence again in order to see whether Sedley’s and my original contentions can survive the criticisms of Döring and Barnes." (p. 277)

    (1) D. Sedley, Diodorus Cronus and Hellenistic Philosophy, “Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society”, 203, N.S. 23 (1977) pp. 74-120.

    (2) I quote from the second edition of Gabriele Giannantoni’s monumental collection: Socratis et Socraticorum reliquiae, Napoli 1990, abbreviated as SSR.

    (4) D. Sedley, Diodorus Cronus, cit., p. 75

    (6) Thus, Giannantoni states that Sedley’s conclusions “sono meritevoli della massima considerazione” [are deserving of the utmost consideration] (SSR IV p. 48). As to my monograph, cf. the reviews by A. Graeser, “Zeitschrift f. philos. Forschung”, 46 (1992) pp. 443-447; K. Hulser, “Phronesis”, 38 (1993) pp. 337-344; and in particular R. Chiaradonna, “Elenchos”, 16 (1995) pp. 387-400.

    (7) K. Döring, Die Megariker, Kommentierte Sammlung der Testimonien, Amsterdam 1972.

    (8) K. Döring, Gab es eine Dialektische Schule?, “Phronesis”, 34 (1989) pp. 293-310.

    (9) R. Muller, Introduction à la pensée des Megariques, Paris 1988, p. 44 n. 24.

    (10) J. Barnes, in his review of Th. Ebert, Dialektiker, cit., “Classical Review”, 43 (1993) pp. 304-306 (quoted as Barnes).

  25. Fine, Kit. 2011. "Aristotle's Megarian Manœuvres." Mind no. 120:993-1034.

    "Towards the end of Theta, 4 of the Metaphysics (1047b14-b30), Aristotle attempts to establish two modal principles. The passage (with my paragraphing and square bracketing) goes as follows:

    [Principle 1] At the same time it is clear that if, when A is B must be, then, when A is possible B also must be possible.

    [Argument for Principle 1] For if B need not be possible, there is nothing to prevent its not being possible. Now let A be supposed possible. Then, when A is possible, nothing impossible would follow if A were supposed to be; and then B must of course be. But we supposed B to be impossible. Let it be impossible, then. If, then, B is impossible, A also must be. But A was supposed possible; therefore B is also possible. If then A is possible, B also will be possible, if they were so related that if A is B must be. If, then, A and B being thus related, B is not possible on this condition, A and B will not be related as supposed.

    [Principle 2] And if when A is possible B must be possible, then if A is B must also be.

    [Argument for Principle 2] For to say that B must be possible if A is possible means that if A is both at the same time when and in the way in which it was supposed capable of being, B also must then and in that way be.

    This passage raises severe exegetical problems. One of these problems is that the second principle seems obviously to be incorrect; and so it is not clear why Aristotle would have wanted to endorse it. For suppose that a fair coin is tossed and turns up heads. It is then plausible to maintain that when it is possible that the coin is fair and turns up heads it must be possible that it turn up tails and hence not turn up heads. By the principle it follows that when the coin is fair and turns up heads then it must not turn up heads; and from it follows that it is not true that it is both fair and turns up heads, contrary to our original supposition. (1)" (pp. 993-994)

    (1) As a referee pointed out, the premiss of this inference already appears to be in conflict with Aristotle’s denial that not-A can necessarily follow from A (Prior Analytics 57b13–14) and so the supposition that a fair coin is tossed and turns up heads is not even required. Let me also note that we can give a highly abstract counter-example to the principle, based simply on the assumption that there is a description of how things are (theorem 5 of the appendix)

  26. Furley, David J. 1967. Two Studies in the Greek Atomists. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Study I: Indivisible Magnitudes; Study II: Aristotle and Epicurus on Voluntary Action.

    Study I, Chapter 9: Epicurus and Diodorus Cronus, pp. 131-135.

    "Some sort of theory of indivisibles was advanced by the Megarian philosopher Diodorus Cronus."

    (...)

    "Diodorus held a theory of" minimum, partless bodies." According to Dionysius of Alexandria (quoted by Eusebius Praeparatio Evangelica 14.23) it was a common opinion that Diodorus was responsible for substituting the name "partless bodies" for "atoms."

    Whether or not there is any truth in the implication that Diodorus was a conscious innovator in this matter, it seems to be agreed among the doxographers that the use of the term "partless bodies" distinguished Diodorus from Democritus and Epicurus. The same is said by Sextus Empiricus (Against the Mathematicians 9.363 and Outlines of Pyrrhonism 3.32) and by Stobaeus (Eclogae 1 p. 128.10); "partless bodies" are attributed to Diodorus, without any explicit contrast with the Atomists, by Alexander (De Sensu 122.23 and 172.29) and Simplicius (Physics 926.20).

    The most interesting point about Diodorus is that he apparently held a theory of motion remarkably like the Epicurean theory. It is reported at length by Sextus Empiricus (Against the Mathematicians 10.37-154). Sextus distinguishes three views which may be held about motion: that it exists, that it does not exist, and that "it exists no more than it does not exist." Those who hold the second view he says, are Parmenides and Melissus - and Diodorus Cronus, "unless it ought to be said that according to him a thing has moved though nothing is moving." (pp. 131-132)