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History of Logic from Aristotle to Gödel by Raul Corazzon | e-mail: rc@ontology.co


Bibliography on Language and Logic in Ancient China. Fourth part Mae - Z

Studies in English (Mae - Z)

  1. Maeder, Erik W. 1992. "Some Observations on the Composition of the "Core Chapters" of the Mozi." Early China no. 17:27-82.

  2. Makeham, John. 1989. "The Chien-pai Sophism: Alive and Well." Philosophy East and West no. 39:75-81.

  3. ———. 1989. "Mohist Marginalia: A New Interpretation and Translation of Canon and Explanation B 67 in the Neo-Mohist Summa." Papers on Far Eastern History no. 39:167-176.

  4. ———. 1990. "Mohist Marginalia’—Addenda and Corrigenda." Papers on Far Eastern History no. 42:125-130.

  5. ———. 1991. "Names, Actualities, and the Emergence of Essentialist Theories of Naming in Classical Chinese Thought." Philosophy East and West no. 41:341-363.

    "In this paper the author advances the thesis that by the late Third century b.C., discussions of the name and actuality/object, iming-shid, relationship by classical Chinese thinkers evidence a shift from nominalist theories of naming to essentialist theories of naming. According to the former, it is man who arbitrarily or conventionally determines which imingd should be applied to which ishid. According to the latter, there is a proper or correct correspondence between a given imingd and a given ishid, determined, variously, by what is ordained by 'heaven' or by what is 'naturally so'/'so of itself' (izirand)."

  6. ———. 1994. Name and Actuality in Early Chinese Thought. Albany: State University of New York Press.

  7. ———. 2003. "Names, School of (Ming Jia, Ming Chia)." In Encyclopedia of Chinese Philosophy, edited by Cua, Antonio S., 491-497. New York: Routledge.

    "The members of the ming jia (mingjia), or “school of names”—like the ancient Greek sophists after whom they are sometimes called (they are also, variously, called dialecticians, nominalists, and logicians)—were not an actual school of thinkers bound by a common philosophy or having a common founder. Rather, they were individual thinkers who have been retrospectively identified as a school by virtue of a perceived common eristic approach to disputation or discrimination (bian).

    It was for their skills in disputation that in pre-Qin times they were sometimes known as bian zhe, “those who argue out alternatives.” The Mohist Summa explains proper disputation in the following terms:

    One calling it “ox” and one calling it “not ox”; this is to contend over “that.” This being the case, they are not both appropriate. Since they are not both appropriate, one is necessarily appropriate. (Explanation A.74)" (p. 491)

  8. Mei, Tsu-Lin. 1961. "Chinese Grammar and the Linguistic Movement in Philosophy." The Review of Metaphysics no. 14:135-175.

  9. Mei, Yi-Pao. 1953. "The Work of Kung-sun Lung Tzu, with a Translation into English." Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies no. 16:404-437.

  10. ———. 1956. "Some observations on the Problems of Knowledge among the Ancient Chinese Logicians." Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies no. 1:114-121.

    "This is a relatively short and concise presentation of various pre-Chin philosophical views on the problems of knowledge and their interrelationships. " Chung-Ying Cheng, Inquiries into Classical Chinese Logic, Philosophy East andf West, 15, 1965, p. 214.

  11. Meyer, Andrew Seth. 2017. "The Frontier between Chen and Cai: Anecdote, Narrative, and Philosophical Argumentation in Early China." In Between History and Philosophy: Anecdotes in Early China, edited by van Els, Paul and Queen, Sarah A., 63-92. Albany: State University of New York Press.

  12. Meyer, Dirk. 2015. "Truth Claim with no Claim to Truth: Text and Performance of the "Qiushui" Chapter of the Zhuangzi." In Literary Forms of Argument in Early China, edited by Gentz, Joachim and Meyer, Dirk, 297-340. Leiden: Brill.

  13. Meynard, Thierry. 2019. "What the “Failure” of Aristotelian Logic in Seventeenth Century China Teaches Us Today: A Case Study of the Mingli Tan " Frontiers of Philosophy in China no. 14.

    Abstract: "The Mingli Tan is recognized as the first Chinese-language treatise introducing Western logic in China. First published in the final years of the Ming dynasty, the work was presented to Emperor Kangxi in 1683. Despite its sophisticated thought and innovation, the work failed to gain support among intellectuals and court officials. By analyzing the objectives of the Mingli Tan in tandem with its companion work, the Coimbra commentary, this paper explores some of the important philosophical, pedagogical, and historical reasons that can help to explain this failure. Through this historical failure, we can gain some insights about the nature of logic and its current position in China."

  14. Ming, Thomas, and Aaron, Lai. 2016. "Fixing the White Horse Discourse: Zhuangzi’s Proof of “A White Horse Is not a Horse”." Philosophy East and West no. 66:271-289.

  15. Moller, Hans-Georg. 1997. "The Chinese Theory of Forms and Names ("Xingming Zhi Xue") and Its Relation to "Philosophy of Signs"." Journal of Chinese Philosophy no. 24:179-190.

  16. Møllgaard, Eske J. 2020. "Problems of Language and Logic in Daoism." In Dao Companion to Chinese Philosophy of Logic, edited by Fung, Yiu-ming, 369-387. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.

  17. Mou, Bo. 1998. "An Analysis of the Ideographic Nature and Structure of the Hexagram in "Yijing": From the Perspective of Philosophy of Language." Journal of Chinese Philosophy no. 25:305-320.

    "I present an analysis of the ideographic nature and semantic structure of the hexagrams of the "Yijing" ("the book of changes") from the perspective of the philosophy of language. My purpose is twofold: first, i take this as a good case for analysis leading to an understanding of the ideographic semantic structure of an ideographic language like Chinese; second, I take this understanding as a significant aspect in comprehending the "Yijing" philosophy. In the paper, I first examine the ideographic construction of the hexagrams, then suggest an interpretation of the triple ideographic semantic structure, and finally discuss the denotational meaning of the hexagrams in terms of a collective-noun hypothesis."

  18. ———. 1999. "The Structure of the Chinese Language and Ontological Insights: A Collective-Noun Hypothesis." Philosophy East and West no. 49:45-62.

    "Through a comparative case analysis regarding the Chinese language, it is discussed how the structure and functions of a natural language would bear upon the ways in which some philosophical problems are posed and some ontological insights shaped. Disagreeing with Chad Hansen's mass-noun hypothesis, a collective-noun hypothesis is argued for: (1) the denotational semantics and relevant grammatical features of Chinese nouns are like those of collective nouns; (2) their implicit ontology is a mereological ontology of collection-of-individuals with both part-whole and member-class structure; and (3) encouraged and shaped by the folk semantics of Chinese nouns, classical Chinese theorists of language take this kind of mereological nominalism for granted."

  19. ———. 2006. "Chinese Philosophy: Language and Logic." In Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Borchert, Donald M., 202-215. Chicago: Thomson-Gale/Macmillan Reference.

  20. ———. 2007. "A Double-Reference Account: Gongsun Long's "White-horse-not-horse" Thesis." Journal of Chinese Philosophy no. 34:493-513.

  21. ———. 2007. "Introduction: Methodological Notyes." Journal of Chinese Philosophy no. 34:465-470.

    Abstract: "The theme of this special issue is to discuss Gongsun Long’s “whitehorse-not-horse (bai ma fei ma)” thesis and his relevant thoughts in view of their relevance and significance to contemporary philosophy.

    This introduction consists of two parts. In the first part, I will briefly introduce the basic views of four contributors’ distinct accounts of Gongsun Long’s thesis and arguments; I then will briefly explain the engaged approaches adopted by this volume. In the second part, I shall draw readers’ attention to the two emphases as a whole and their related methodological orientations and reflective purposes. My focus is on the second part when making some methodological notes concerning the reflective examination of Gongsun Long’s philosophy and its relevance and significance to contemporary philosophy."

  22. ———. 2009. Substantive Perspectivism: An Essay on Philosophical Concern with Truth. Dordrecht: Springer.

    Chapter 5: A Cross-Tradition Examination – Philosophical Concern with Truth in Classical Daoism, pp. 125-158.

  23. ———. 2016. "How the Validity of the Parallel Inference is Possible: From the Ancient Mohist Diagnose to a Modern Logical Treatment of Its Semantic-Syntactic Structure." History and Philosophy of Logic no. 37:301-324.

  24. ———, ed. 2018. Philosophy of Language, Chinese Language, Chinese Philosophy: Constructive Engagement. Leiden: Brill.

  25. ———. 2020. "How Gōngsūn Lóng’s Double-Reference Thought in His “White Horse Not Horse” Argumentation Can Engage with Fregean and Kripkean Approaches to the Issue of Reference." In The Gongsun Longzi and Other Neglected Texts: Aligning Philosophical and Philological Perspectives, edited by Suter, Rafael, Indraccolo, Lisa and Behr, Wolfgang, 169-204. Berlin: De Gruyter.

    "The purpose of this chapter is to explore how Gōngsūn Lóng’s double-reference approach in his argument in support of the “white horse not horse” (bái mǎ fēi mǎ 白馬非馬) thesis (which I will refer to below as the “white horse not horse” argumentation, for short) can contribute to our understanding and treatment of the issue of how reference is possible. It will engage with two approaches which are representative of the discussion of this problem in contemporary philosophy of language, namely the Lockean-Fregean and the Millian-Kripkean approaches. My basic view is this: first, it is philosophically significant that, through his “white horse not horse” argumentation, Gōngsūn Lóng applies the double-reference character of a referring name in the (declarative) subjectpredicate sentential context of what I call “the basic employment of language” to the effect that something is said of an object; second, his double-reference thought4 allows us to engage with the two major approaches to reference in contemporary philosophy of language. It shows how the convincing aspects of both can be brought together, while other issues neglected by both can be constructively complemented.

    This chapter will address the issue as follows: In part 1, I will present a double-reference account of Gōngsūn Lóng’s “white horse not horse” thesis. In part 2, I will explain how a double-reference account of Gōngsūn Lóng’s “white horse not horse” thesis can complement current approaches to reference and enhance our understanding of how reference is possible." (pp. 169-170, notes omitted)

  26. ———. 2020. "Naming, Reference and Truth." In Dao Companion to Chinese Philosophy of Logic, edited by Fung, Yiu-ming, 33-70. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.

    "With the foregoing notes, my strategy is this. First, in Sect. 1, I will explain several basic points as revealed by the rich resources in the classical text Gong-Sun-Long-Zi, focusing on the relevant points in the “Bai-Ma-Lun” [The White Horse Dialogue], “Zhi-Wu-Lun” ["Discourse on Pointings and Things", chapter 3 of Gong-Sun-Long-Zi] and “Ming-Shi-Lun” ["Discourse on Names and Actualities", chapter 6 of Gong-Sun-Long-Zi]. Second, in Sect. 2, I will analyze how, essentially in line with Gongsun Long’s relevant point in the “Bai-Ma-Lun”, the Later Mohists significantly show their semantic sensitivity to the due identities of the referents in reasoning, as primarily suggested in the Later Mohist text Xiao-Qu) [the “Small Selection” of the Mozi], Third, in Sect. 3, I will look at how, essentially in line with Gongsun Long’s general point on the due-place actuality in the “Ming-Shi-Lun”, Confucius’ account of name rectification (as suggested in the Analects) together with Xun Zi’s and Wang Chong’s further developments addresses the issue of reference in moral reality. Fourth, in Sect. 4, I will explain how Lao Zi makes interesting and engaging points concerning the relationship between language engagement and the ultimate concern and between the “speakable” and the “unspeakable” as suggested in the Dao-De-Jing. Fifth, in Sect. 5, I will briefly examine a relatively recent debate on the relation of the structure of Chinese nouns to Chinese thought from the referential point of view: I will focus on how the mass-noun-semantics part of Hansen’s mass-noun hypothesis are challenged by some competing accounts in view of the referential relation between Chinese nouns and referents. Sixth, in Sect 6, I will address the intrinsic connection between the two basic semantic notions, reference and truth and briefly explain to what extent the content of this essay on the issue of reference is intrinsically related to an account of how (semantic) truth is possible in any intellectual inquiries into “how things are”, generally speaking, and in logic, specifically speaking." (p. 36)

  27. Mou, Zongsan. 2015. Nineteen Lectures on Chinese Philosophy: A Brief Outline of Chinese Philosophy and the Issues It Entails. San José (CA): Foundation for the Study of Chinese philosophy and Culture.

    Translated by Esther C. Shu.

    Lecture Ten: The Pre-Quin School of Names: A Summary of Its Character and Content.

  28. Needham, Joseph. 1956. Science and Civilisation in China, vol. 2: History of Scientific Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  29. Paul, Gregor. 1991. "Reflections on the Usage of the Terms 'Logic' and 'Logical'." Journal of Chinese Philosophy no. 18:73-87.

  30. ———. 1992. "Against Wanton Distortion: A Rejoinder to David Hall’s and Roger Ames’ Criticism of My Reflections on Logic and Confucius." Journal of Chinese Philosophy no. 19:119-122.

  31. ———. 1993. "Equivalent Axioms of Aristotelian, or Traditional European, and Later Mohist Logic: An Argument in Favor of the Universality of Logic and Rationality." In Epistemological Issues in Classical Chinese Philosophy, edited by Lenk, Hans and Paul, Gregor, 119-135. Albany: State University of New York Press.

  32. Perleberg, Max. 1952. The Work of Kung-sun Lung-tzu = Kung-sun Lung-tzu, with a translation from the parallel Chinese original text, critical and exegetical notes, punctuation and literal translation, the Chinese commentary, prolegomena, and index. Hongkong: Local printing Press.

    Reprint: Westport, Conn., Hyperion Press, 1973.

  33. Pogonowski, Jerzy. 2010. "Remarks on Ancient Chinese Logic." In Logic in Religious Discourse, edited by Schumann, Andrew. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

  34. Qiao, Liqing, and Min, Shangchao. 2009. "A Study on Confucius’ Views on Language Functions." Polyglossia: the Asia-Pacific's voice in language and language teaching:69-75.

    Abstract: "Confucius, one of the most important educationalists, thinkers and philosophers in the Chinese history, has great impacts on Chinese people’s life and is gaining increasing popularity worldwide. A great number of researches into the thoughts of Confucius have been conducted at home and abroad, most of which are from the perspectives of philosophy, culture, religion, etc. But his views on language, especially on the role of language in social life, have not been paid due attention to. This paper aims to examine thoroughly Confucius’ thoughts on language functions and make a comparison between Confucius’ views on language functions and some western theories of language functions. We find that language functions mainly fall into three categories including communicative function, ethical function and political function. We also find that both Confucius and Western scholars share the view that language bears a close relationship with politics while they still hold some different opinions. Confucius places more emphasis on a higher and more specific level of language functions while western scholars focus more on the general and objective level."

  35. Qin, Shurang. 2019. "A New Theory of the Historical Development of Chinese Logic in the Pre-Qin Era 先秦邏輯新論." Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy no. 18:313-317.

  36. Qingtian, Cui. 2005. "Processes and Methods in Researching the History of Chinese Logic." Asian and African Studies no. 9:15-25.

  37. ———. 2021. "Researching the History of Chinese Logic. The Role of Wen Gongyi in the Establishment of New Methodologies." Asian Studies no. 9:105-120.

  38. Qingtian, Cui, and Xiaogung, Zhang. 2005. "Chinese Logical Analogism." Asian and African Studies no. 9:14-24.

  39. Raphals, Lisa. 1998. "On Hui Shi." In Wandering at Ease in the Zhuangzi, edited by Ames, Roger T., 143-161. Albany: State University of New York Press.

  40. Reding, Jean-Paul. 1986. "Greek and Chinese Categories: A Reexamination of the Problem of Linguistic Relativism." Philosophy East and West no. 36:349-374.

    Reprinted in: J. P. Reding, Comparative Essays in Early Greek and Chinese R ational Thinking, Aldershot: Ashgate 2004, pp. 65-92.

  41. ———. 1986. "Analogical Reasoning in Early Chinese Philosophy." Asiatische Studien = Études asiatiques no. 40:40-56.

  42. ———. 2002. "Gongsun Long on What Is Not: Steps Toward the Deciphering of the Zhiwulun." Philosophy East and West no. 52:190-206.

    "The Zhiwulun, chapter 3 of the Gongsunlongzi, attributed to the Sophist Gongsun Long (third century B.C.), is generally interpreted as a theoretical treatise on the relations between words and things. A new reading proceeds from the hypothesis that the Zhiwulun, like the White Horse Treatise, is another logical puzzle. Its theme is the problem of pointing out things that do not exist in the world or, put in modern terms, the problem of negative existentials. The Zhiwulun is a dilemma whose purpose is to show that the pointing that points at things that do not exist points without pointing."

  43. ———. 2004. Comparative Essays in Early Greek and Chinese Rational Thinking. Aldershot: Ashgate.

    Contents: Acknowledgements VII; Introduction 1; 1. 'Contradiction is Impossible' 17; 2. The Origin of Logic in China 31; 3. Philosophy and Geometry in Early China 49; 4. Greek and Chinese Categories 65; 5. Words for Atoms - Atoms for Words: Comparative

    Considerations on the Origins of Atomism in Ancient Greece and on the Absence of Atomism in Ancient China 93; 6. Light and the Mirror in Greece and China: Elements of Comparative Metaphorology 127; 7. ‘To Be’ in Greece and China 167; ('hinese Characters and Texts 195; Bibliography 207; Index 223-229.

    Acknowledgements: 1. ‘“Contradiction is Impossible’” is a previously unpublished contribution; 2. ‘The Origin of Logic in China’ is an original contribution. Part of its research material goes back to an earlier paper that appeared in Études Asiatiques 40/1 (1986), 40-56, under the title ‘Analogical Reasoning in Early Chinese Philosophy’; 3. ‘Philosophy and Geometry in Early China’ is a completely rewritten and expanded version of a paper that appeared in Études Asiatiques 47/4 (1993), 623-44, under the title ‘Les philosophes-geometres de la Chine ancienne’ (in French); 4 ‘Greek and Chinese Categories’ appeared first in Philosophy East and West 36/4 (1986), 349-74. The present version is updated, corrected and enlarged; 5. ‘Words for Atoms - Atoms for Words: Comparative Considerations on the origins of Atomism in Ancient Greece and on the Absence of Atomism in Ancient China’ is a previously unpublished contribution. It originated as a series of lectures (‘Warum gibt es keinen Atomismus im alten China?') delivered at the University of Zurich in 1990/91. An earlier version of it was presented at the conference ‘Thinking through Comparisons’ in Eugene, Oregon (May 1998); 6. 'Light and the Mirror in Greece and China: Elements of Comparative Metaphorology’ was first presented at the Asian Studies Annual Meeting in Honolulu, Hawaii (April 1996), and also later in the same year at the annual meeting of the ‘Societeromande de philosophic’ at Rolle, Switzerland (June 1996). A shorter and less technical French version has appeared in the Revue de theologie et de philosophie 129 (1997), 1-30, under the title ‘L’utilisation philosophique de la métaphore en Grece et en Chine. Vers une metaphorologie comparee’ (in French). The present version has not been published before; 7. ' "To Be” in Greece and China’ is a previously unpublished contribution.

  44. Ren, Yuan, and Lui, Yuyu. 2019. "A Pro-Realist Account of Gongsun Long’s “White Horse Dialogue”." Philosophy East and West no. 69:464-483.

  45. Resnik, Michael David. 1968. "Logic and Scientific Methodology in the Writings of Mencius." International Philosophical Quarterly no. 8:212-230.

  46. Reu, Wim de. 2006. "Right Words Seem Wrong: Neglected Paradoxes in Early Chinese Philosophical Texts." Philosophy East and West no. 56:281-300.

  47. Rieman, Fred. 1977. "On Linguistic Skepticism in Wittgenstein and Kung-sun Lung." Philosophy East and West no. 27:183-193.

  48. ———. 1980. "Kung-Sun Lung, Designated Things and Logic." Philosophy East and West no. 30:305-319.

  49. ———. 1981. "Kung-sun, White Horses and Logic." Philosophy East and West no. 31:415-447.

  50. Robins, Dan. 2000. "Mass Nouns and Count Nouns in Classical Chinese." Early China no. 25:147-184.

  51. ———. 2010. "The Later Mohists and Logic." History and Philosophy of Logic no. 31:247-285.

    Abstract: "This article is a study of the Later Mohists’ ‘Lesser Selection (Xiaˇoquˇ)’, which, more than any other early Chinese text, seems to engage in the study of logic. I focus on a procedure that the Mohists called mo´u . Arguments by mo´u are grounded in linguistic parallelism, implying perhaps that the Mohists were on the way to a formal analysis of argumentation. However, their main aim was to head off arguments by mo´u that targeted their own doctrines, and if their argument succeeds then it entails that linguistic parallelism can never ground a cogent argument. In a way, this committed them to the view that formal logic cannot work, but the fact that they did not pursue this line of investigation was by no means inevitable. One consequence of this study is that the Later Mohists conducted their logical work by studying the behaviour of terms and verb phrases, and did not identify the sentence as a significant linguistic unit. This tends to confirm Chad Hansen’s generalisation that early Chinese philosophers did not posit sentences or other sentence-like entities such as propositions, beliefs, or laws. Focusing on subsentential expressions did not stop the Mohists from addressing genuinely logical issues, but it may help explain the fact that they never developed a conception of logical structure. This study includes the complete Chinese text of the ‘Lesser Selection’ and a translation in English."

  52. ———. 2012. "Names, Cranes, and the Later Moists." Journal of Chinese Philosophy no. 39:369-385.

  53. Rosemont Jr., Henry. 1974. "On representing Abstractions in Archaic Chinese." Philosophy East and West no. 24:71-88.

  54. ———. 1992. "Remarks on the Quasi-Syllogism." Philosophy East and West no. 42:31-35.

  55. Rošker, Jana S. 2011. "The theoretical shift in the Wei Jin period and the birth of the structural semantic (名理)." In The Yields of Transition: Literature, Art and Philosophy in Early Medieval China, edited by Rošker, Jana S. and Suhadolnik, Nataša Vampelj, 9-28. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

  56. ———. 2014. "Specific Features of Chinese Logic: Analogies and the Problem of Structural Relations in Confucian and Mohist Discourses." Synthesis Philosophica no. 57:23-40.

    Abstract: "The article follows the presumption according to which analogical inferences in Chinese tradition followed a structure that connected all elements within a particular kind. This structure functioned as the basic element of analogies. Another crucial characteristic of classical Chinese analogies is the method of combining meanings. The composition of classical Chinese sentences tends towards the intrinsic connection among the individual parts of the sentence, and rarely applies morphological signs. This particular feature of the Chinese language also influenced the prevailing methods of thought that manifested themselves

    in the processes of inferences, based upon proximity, similarity and identity. Focusing uponearly Confucian and Mohist philosophy, the author shows how and why these methods could lead to the creation of a specifically Chinese type of analogism.""

  57. ———. 2015. "Classical Chinese Logic." Philosophy Compass no. 19:301-309.

    Abstract: "The present article provides an introduction to classical Chinese logic, a term which refers to ancient discourses that were developed before the arrival of significant external inf luences and which flourished in China until the first unification of China, during the Qin Dynasty (221 BC). Taking as its premise that logic implies both universal and culturally conditioned elements, the author describes the historical background of Chinese logic, the main schools of Chinese logical thought, the current state of research in this area and the crucial concepts and methods applied in classical Chinese logic. The close link between

    Chinese logic and the Chinese language is also stressed."

  58. ———. 2017. "Structural Relations and Analogies in Classical Chinese Logic." Philosophy East and West no. 677:841-863.

    "The present article aims to expose some aspects of the specific features of classical Chinese analogisms. First, it exposes the supposition that this type of analogism did not focus exclusively on forms without considering their content, that is, that it was linguistically and semantically determined. Second, it also aims to show that classical Chinese analogies are based on structural relations between the objects in question,

    which constitute the similarity of two types (or kinds) of things that share certain attributes. This article additionally sheds light on the question of how and why the structure underlying these relations represents a semantic and axiological referential framework that functions as the methodological foundation of the tight connection between logic and ethics in ancient China." (p. 841)

  59. ———. 2021. Interpreting Chinese Philosophy: A New Methodology. New York: Bloomsbury Academic.

    Chapter 3: Chinese Logic as a Basis of Classical Chinese Theory, pp. 73-99.

    "3.1 Semantic Nature of Chinese Logic

    In China, logical reasoning was closely connected to language, especially with respect to semantic issues and was determined by its tight relation to ethics (e.g., Mozi s.d., Jing xia, 155). However, this does not mean that in classical texts which are not immediately identifiable with metaphysical and ethical discourses there were not also forms of logical and methodological thought.

    Although Chinese philosophy developed in connection with ethical ideas and metaphysical concepts, there was a close relationship between moral and metaphysical thought, on the one hand, and logical reasoning, on the other.(3)

    Classical Chinese logical thought never neither elaborated any explicitly systematic and comprehensive formulation of the laws of reason nor produced a coherent system of symbolism for abstract reasoning. Prior to the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Chinese thinkers had rarely encountered a systematic and well-formulated logical work. But as Cheng Chung-Ying (1965, 196) points out, this does not mean that classical Chinese thought lacked logical depth or consistency." (p. 74)


    "3.2 Chinese Analogies

    The present chapter aims to expose some aspects of the specific features of classical Chinese analogisms, which form a very important thought pattern prevailing in the entire Chinese intellectual tradition.(27)

    Firstly, I would like to reveal that this type of analogism did not focus exclusively on forms without considering their content, that is, that it was linguistically and semantically determined. Secondly, it also aims to show that the classical Chinese analogies are based upon structural relations between the objects in question, which constitute the similarity of two types (or kinds) of things that share certain attributes. This chapter additionally sheds light upon the question of how and why the structure underlying these relations represents a semantic and axiological referential framework that functions as the methodological foundation of the tight connection between logic and ethics in ancient China." (p. 83)

    (3) The reasons for the decline of the latter in early medieval China are multiple and linked mainly to complex historical events and processes that shaped specific social conditions that proved to be unfavorable for the evolution of scientific thought and methodologies.

    (27) This chapter includes a reworked version of my article “Structural Relations and Analogies in Classical Chinese Logic,” which was originally published in Philosophy East & West, Vol. 67, No. 3 (2017), 841–3.


    Cheng, Chung-Ying. 1965. “Inquiries into Classical Chinese Logic.” Philosophy East and West 15(3–4): 195–216.

  60. ———. 2022. "Comparing Logical Paradoxes through the Method of Sublation: Hui Shi, Zeno and the “Flying Arrow Problem”." Asian Studies no. X (XXVI):299-312.

    Abstract: "This article addresses some basic methodological problems in the field of transcultural post-comparative studies of ancient logic by comparing the famous flying arrow paradox of Hui Shi (370–c. 310 BCE) with an apparently similar paradox attributed to Zeno of Elea (495–430 BCE). The article proceeds from a general introduction to the basic framework of semantically determined classical Chinese logic, to an illumination of Hui Shi’s specific contributions to the field, and finally to a preliminary explanation that emerges from a contrastive analysis of Zeno’s and Hui Shi’s respective views on the problem of motion and stasis as manifested in their corresponding paradoxes. The contrastive analysis, based on an exposition of some basic problems in the field of transcultural methodology and a description of the so-called sublation method, points to the importance of considering different paradigms and frames of reference in identifying differences between apparently similar theses."

  61. ———. 2022. "Asian Studies and the History of Chinese Logic: A Long and Fruitful Journey." Asian Studies no. X (XXVI):7-10.

    "Chinese logic has always been the focus of interest of this journal in the field of Chinese thought and philosophy.


    This special issue outlines the process of the introduction of logic in 20th century China. It describes the institutional as well as the conceptual and theoretical dimensions of this process, and presents the work of numerous eminent intellectuals who devoted their lives to promoting and introducing a public discourse of logic during this period. It also presents the Chinese institutional background that enabled the development of logic in China, such as academies, university departments, journals, and academic societies." (p. 7)

  62. Roth, Harold D. 2003. A Companion to Angus C. Graham's Chuang Tzu. The Innner Chapters. Honolulu: University of Hawai's Press.

  63. Saunders, Frank. 2014. "Semantics without Truth in Later Mohist Philosophy of Language." Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy no. 13:215-229.

  64. Schaberg, David. 2002. "The Logic of Signs in Early Chinese Rhetoric." In Early China /Ancient Greece: Thinking through Comparisons, edited by Shankman, Steven and Durrant, Stephen W., 155-186. Albany: State University of New York Press.

  65. Schilling, Dennis. 2020. "Place as a Category in the ‘Treatise on Name and Reality’ (Míngshí lùn名實論)." In The Gongsun Longzi and Other Neglected Texts: Aligning Philosophical and Philological Perspectives, edited by Suter, Rafael, Indraccolo, Lisa and Behr, Wolfgang, 207-239. Berlin: De Gruyter.

    "The ‘Treatise on Name and Reality’ (Míngshí lùn 名實論, hereafter the Treatise)(1) opens with a categorical schema that aims to expose the principle of “rectifying names” (zhèng míng 正名) – that is, the correct usage of names. The application of these conditions for designations becomes the subject of further treatment in the subsequent passages. The schema first introduces the categories “to be a ‘thing’” (wù 物, here denoting to the name ‘thing’) and “to be solid” (shí 實), then presents the category “to be in a place” (wèi 位), and finally leads to the judgment “to be right” (zhèng 正).

    [Chinese texct omitted]

    [1] ‘Heaven’ and ‘earth’ and what is born by them inside are ‘things’.

    [2] [The name] ‘thing’ is solid as [it applies the name] ‘thing’ [to] what is [named] ‘thing’ and does not go beyond that.

    [3] A ‘solid’ (i.e. the name applied to the object) is in a place as [it] fills out what is [named to be] filled out without leaving a void inside.

    [4a] [Names] that step out where they [should] be placed do not constitute a place.

    [4b] [Names] that are placed where they [should] be placed are right.

    A very short, general summary of these four statements could proceed as follows: Names are related to things. Naming things makes names ‘solid’, as they become visible and recognizable for us in objects. And finally, naming places objects in positions relative to other positions, which enables us to evaluate their realization. ‘Names’ and ‘naming’ (míng 名) are the overall topic of the schema even though the word míng is not mentioned directly. Yet names appear in different forms in reality at the same time: a name can be a designation (‘thing’), an expression of meaning (‘solid’), and an assignment (‘place’). These forms are interrelated, and the schema exposes their various relations. I use the term ‘category’ to refer to these relations, since they are constitutive for making a predication (wèi謂)." (pp. 208-209, some notes omitted)

    (1) The ‘Treatise about Name and Reality’ (Míngshí lùn 名實論; abbreviated as MSL in the footnotes) belongs to the transmitted corpus of the Gōngsūn Lóngzǐ 公孫龍子(abbreviated as GSLZ).

  66. Schleichert, Hubert. 1993. "Gong-sun Long on the Semantics of ‘World’." In Epistemological Issues in Classical Chinese Philosophy, edited by Lenk, Hans and Paul, Gregor, 113-117. Albany: State University of New York Press.

  67. She, Shiqin. 2022. "Critique of “Judgment” in Gongsun Long’s “Zhiwu Lun”—A Comparative Reading in the Light of Hölderlin’s “Judgment and Being”." Asian Studies no. X (XXVI):269-298.

    Abstract: "This paper has attempted to characterize “Zhiwu lun” as the presentation of the incapacity of object-oriented knowledge to represent the realm of “things”, highlighting Gongsun Long’s epistemological and ontological value beyond a logical one. This paper proposes that only based upon this assumption does “Zhiwu lun” allow a thorough interpretation of “Mingshi lun”, whereby the intuitive function of “names” provides a better solution to the cognitive limits imposed by object-oriented (self-)consciousness. Methodologically, this paper mainly considers the Heidelberg School’s interpretation of Hölderlin’s critique of

    judgment in “Judgment and Being” to be both a complementary justification and reconstruction of the implicit structures of Gongsun Long’s view. This paper has presupposed the interpretation of Gongsun Long’s key concept of 指 as “judgment” in Hölderlin’s sense, in contrast to “things” (物) and “name” (名), then verified this hypothesis, as well as the relationships amongst these translations, by a close textual analysis and new translation of “Zhiwu lun”."

  68. Shi, Ningzhong. 2010. "Proposition, Definition and Inference in Ancient Chinese Philosophy." Frontiers of Philosophy in China no. 5:414-431.

  69. Smith, Huston. 1980. "Western and Comparative Perspectives on Truth." Philosophy East and West no. 30:425-437.

    Abstract: "My article consists of four parts. Beginning with the comparative side of our symposium theme, I divide this into a temporal, historical comparison (Part I) and a geographical, spatial comparison(Part II). In Part III, I turn expressly to our Western handling of the truth issue, reserving Part IV for pulling these various strands together."

  70. Solomon, Bernard S. 1969. "The Assumptions of Hui-Tzu." Monumenta Serica. Journal of Oriental Studies no. 28:1-40.

  71. ———. 1981. "Kung-Sun Lung Tzu 公孫籠子 IV and VI." Monumenta Serica. Journal of Oriental Studies no. 35:235-273.

  72. ———. 2012. On the School of Names in Ancient China. Sankt Augustn: Institut Monumenta Serica.

  73. Staal, Frits. 1979. "Oriental Ideas on the Origin of Language." Journal of the American Oriental Society no. 99:1-14.

  74. Stephens, Daniel. 2017. "Realism and Conventionalism in Later Mohist Semantics." Dao. A Journal of Comparative Philosophy no. 16:521-542.

    Abstract: "In this essay, I argue in favor of a novel interpretation of the semantic theory that can be found in the Later Mohist writings. Recent interpretations by Chad Hansen and Chris Fraser cast the Later Mohist theory as a realist theory; this includes attributing to the Later Mohists what we can call “kind-realism,” the idea that there is some correct scheme of kind-terms that carves the world at its joints. While I agree with Hansen and Fraser that the Later Mohist theory is realist in various ways, I offer challenges to their kind-realist interpretations, and argue instead for a kind-conventionalist interpretation on which there is no fixed, correct set of kinds, leaving schemes of kind terms to be determined by conventional decisions that occur during disputation (bian 辯)."

  75. Stevenson, Frank. 1991. "Meaning is not Meaning: World, Thing, and Difference in Kung-sun Lung’s Chih Wu Lun." Tamkang Review no. 21:297-322.

  76. ———. 1991. "South Has (No) Limits: Relative and Absolute Meaning in Hui Shi’s Ten Points." Tamkang Review no. 21:325-346.

  77. Sun, Siao-Fang. 1963. "Chuang-Tzu's Theory of Truth." Philosophy East and West no. 3 (2):137-146.

  78. Sun, Weimin. 2009. "Chinese Logic and the Absence of Theoretical Sciences in Ancient China." Dao. A Journal of Comparative Philosophy no. 8:403-423.

    Abstract: "In this essay, I examine the nature of Chinese logic and Chinese sciences in the history of China. I conclude that Chinese logic is essentially analogical, and that the Chinese did not have theoretical sciences. I then connect these together and explain why the Chinese failed to develop theoretical sciences, even though they enjoyed an advanced civilization and great scientific and technological innovations. This is because a deductive system of logic is necessary for the development of theoretical sciences, and analogical logic cannot provide the deductive connections between a theory and empirical observations required by a theoretical science. This also offers a more satisfactory answer to the long-standing Needham Problem."

  79. Sun, Zhongyuan. 2007. "Meta-research in Chinese logic." Frontiers of Philosophy in China no. 2:50-69.

    Abstract: "This paper discusses the topics, goals, values and methods of Chinese logic. It holds that the goal of the research in Chinese logic is to reveal its structure, content, rules, and essential character, as well as to reveal both similarities and differences between Chinese and foreign logic. The value of the research is to carry forward and develop the outstanding heritage of Chinese logic. Its method is to annotate original works of Chinese ancient logic with the tools of modern language and logic in order to reveal both the particular nature and the universal qualities of Chinese logic. The method also explores the differences and similarities between Chinese and foreign logic. In recent years, research in Chinese logic has developed considerably; it has also logged many important achievements.

    But there are many different views about the complexity and long-term goals of the research. Future research will build on the merits of different kinds of logic, promote Chinese logic, and increase communication between Chinese logic and foreign logic."

  80. Sun, Zhenbin. 2013. "Cracking the white horse puzzle." Journal of East-West Thought no. 3:97-106.

  81. ———. 2015. Language, Discourse, and Praxis in Ancient China. Dordrecht: Springer.

  82. Sun, Zhiqiang, and Liu, Fenrong. 2020. "The Inference Pattern Mou in Mohist logic - A Monotonicity Reasoning View." Roczniki Filozoficzne no. 68:257-270.

  83. Sung, Z. D. 1934. The Symbols of Yi King or The Symbols of the Chinese Logic of Changes. Shangai: The China Modern Education Co.

  84. Suter, Rafael. 2020. "Buddhist Murmurs? – Another Look at the Composition of the Gongsun Longzi." In The Gongsun Longzi and Other Neglected Texts: Aligning Philosophical and Philological Perspectives, edited by Suter, Rafael, Indraccolo, Lisa and Behr, Wolfgang, 429-558. Berlin: De Gruyter.

    "This chapter follows the research of A. C. Graham (1919–1991) and Shěn Yǒudǐng 沈有鼎 (1908–1993) on the textual history of the Gōngsūn Lóngzǐ 公孫龍子(hereafter GSLZ). After a few introductory remarks in the first section, the second section illustrates the secondary nature of the GSLZ by giving a concise overview of the various ways its compilers drew on the “dialectical chapters” of the Mòzǐ (Mohist ‘Canons’). In the third section, I gather evidence for the medieval renaissance of Mohist dialectics, which was closely associated with the figure of Gōngsūn Lóng from its beginning, in order to suggest that it was in the light of this renewed interest in language and argument that the extant GSLZ was composed.

    If the GSLZ is indeed as late as this, its compilation would coincide with a period during which Buddhist scholastics enjoyed increasing influence in China. Thus the main part of the chapter is dedicated to disclosing traces of a Buddhist impact on the argument, structure, and compilation of the GSLZ, or some of its parts." (p. 429)

  85. Suter, Rafael, Indraccolo, Lisa, and Behr, Wolfgang, eds. 2020. The Gongsun Longzi and Other Neglected Texts: Aligning Philosophical and Philological Perspectives. Berlin: De Gruyter.

    Contents: Rafael Suter, Lisa Indraccolo and Wolfgang Behr: Preface and Acknowledgements V-VI;

    The Gōngsūn Lóngzǐ and Other Neglected Texts – Aligning Philosophical and Philological Perspectives: An Introduction 1;

    I History

    Traditions of Scholarship in China

    1 Wang Ping and Ian Johnston: The Gōngsūn Lóngzǐ: A Historical Overview 25; 2. Ian Johnston and Wang Ping: Notes on the Relationship between the Gōngsūn Lóngzǐ and the Dialectical Chapters of the Mòzǐ 45; 3. Zhōu Chāngzhōng 周昌忠 : The ‘Discourse on the White Horse’: A Concrete Analytical Philosophy of Language – with a Coda on the Authenticity of the Received Gōngsūn Lóngzǐ 87;

    II Philosophy

    Contemporary Analytic Approaches

    4 Yiu-ming Fung馮耀明 : Reference and Ontology in the Gōngsūn Lóngzǐ 119; 5 Bo Mou: How Gōngsūn Lóng’s Double-Reference Thought in His “White Horse Not Horse” Argumentation Can Engage with Fregean and Kripkean Approaches to the Issue of Reference 169;

    Philosophical Readings of the Gōngsūn Lóngzǐ

    6 Dennis Schilling: Place as a Category in the ‘Treatise on Name and Reality’ (Míngshí lùn 名實論) 207; 7 Liú Tǐshèng 劉體勝 : A New Interpretation of the Gōngsūn Lóngzǐ’s ‘Zhǐwù lùn’ (Discourse on Pointings and Things) and ‘Míngshí lùn’ (Discourse on Names and Actualities) 241; 8 Jiāng Xiàngdōng 蔣向東 : A New Interpretation of ‘Báimǎlùn’ (Discourse on White and Horse) 289;

    III Philology

    Perspectives on Language and Terminology

    9 Thierry Lucas: Logically Significant Words in the Gōngsūn Lóngzǐ 313; 10 Lukáš Zádrapa: Linguistic Affinites of the Yǐnwénzǐ Text in the Light of Basic Corpus Data 347;

    Textual Resonances and Questions of Authenticity

    11 Ernst-Joachim Vierheller: Gōngsūn Lóng and the Zhuāngzǐ: On Classifying (Declassifying) Things Zhǐ (Qí) Wù Lùn指〔齊〕物論 399; 12 Rafael Suter: Buddhist Murmurs? – Another Look at the Composition of the Gōngsūn Lóngzǐ 429;

    Indices: 1 Terms 559; 2 Source Texts 569; 3 Persons 572-575.

  86. ———. 2020. "The Gōngsūn Lóngzǐ and Other Neglected Texts – Aligning Philosophical and Philological Perspectives: An Introduction." In The Gongsun Longzi and Other Neglected Texts: Aligning Philosophical and Philological Perspectives, edited by Suter, Rafael, Indraccolo, Lisa and Behr, Wolfgang, 1-19. Berlin: De Gruyter.

    "The Gōngsūn Lóngzǐ 公孫龍子(Master Gongsun Long) is traditionally attributed to the so-called “School of Names”. It stands out in the intellectual landscape of early China due to its marked interest in the relation between language and reality and its overall neglect of moral and political issues that are usually so characteristic of the thought of its time. Since the late nineteenth century, this philosophical orientation has invited modern scholars to study the text from the perspective of academic disciplines such as logic and philosophy. To the present day, most of the – increasing, yet still comparatively scarce – publications on the text appear in journals on Chinese and comparative philosophy, and thus continue this tendency." (p. 1)


    "The contributions to this volume are grouped thematically, according to the three broad categories of history, philosophy, and philology. It goes without saying that their boundaries are not clear-cut, nor are the categories themselves mutually exclusive or uncontested in a sinological context. They are merely descriptive and serve the practical purpose of facilitating the reader’s orientation." (p. 11, a note omitted)

  87. Sypniewski, Bernard Paul. 2001. "Notes Comparing Aristotelian Reasoning with that of the Early Confucian School." Journal of Chinese Philosophy no. 28:257–274.

  88. Tanak, Koji. 2004. "The Limit of Language in Daoism." Asian Philosophy no. 14:191-205.

    Abstract: "The paper is concerned with the development of the paradoxical theme of Daoism. Based on Chad Hansen’s interpretation of Daoism and Chinese philosophy in general, it traces the history of Daoism by following their treatment of the limit of language. The Daoists seem to have noticed that there is a limit to what language can do and that the limit of language is paradoxical. The ‘theoretical’ treatment of the paradox of the limit of language matures as Daoism develops. Yet the Daoists seem to have noticed that the limit of language and its paradoxical nature cannot be overcome. At the end, we are left with the paradoxes of the Daoists. In this paper, we jump into the abyss of the Daoists’ paradoxes from which there is no escape. But the Daoists’ paradoxes are fun!"

  89. Tanaka, Koji. 2011. "Inference in the Mengzi 1A: 7." Journal of Chinese Philosophy no. 38:444-454.

  90. Tang, Paul C. L. 1997. "On the Special Logic Thesis in Chinese Philosophy." Metaphilosophy no. 28:371-384.

  91. Tang, Paul C. L., and Schwartz, Robert David. 1988. "The Limits of Language: Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Lao Tzu’s Tao Te Ching." Journal of Chinese Philosophy no. 15:15-34.

  92. Tavor, Ori. 2014. "Naming/Power: Linguistic Engineering and the Construction of Discourse in Early China." Asian Philosophy: An International Journal of the Philosophical Traditions of the East no. 24:313-329.

  93. Teng, Norman Y. 2006. "The Relatively Happy Fish Revisited." Asian Philosophy no. 16:39-47.

    Abstract: "The anecdote of Zhuangzi and Hui Shi’s brief discussion on a bridge above the Hao river gives us a nice piece of reasoning in ancient Chinese texts that may serve as a platform for a productive philosophical exchange between the East and the West. The present study examines Hansen’s inferential analysis of Zhuangzi and Hui Shi’s discussion in this spirit. It is argued that Hansen’s analysis founders. To do justice to both Hui Shi and Zhuangzi, the present study proposes that we apply the logic developed in the later Mohist text, the Lesser Pick, to an analysis of their discussion. The re-analysis shows that the intricate dialectic of the reasoning in which Zhuangzi and Hui Shi engage, neatly accords with the pattern of discourse expounded in the Lesser Pick, and gives us global insight into Zhuangzi’s final statement in the anecdote, which is notoriously recondite, or confusing."

  94. Thompson, Kirill Ole. 1995. "When a "White Horse" Is Not a "Horse"." Philosophy East and West no. 45 (4):481-499.

    "Is the White Horse Paradox just a sleight of hand, or is it indicative of some truths about words, language, and logic? The paradox underscores some differences in the significance and implications of terms when considered in the context of mention rather than use. Moreover, the paradox shows that insights into how words and phrases operate in language can be gained by considering them in the context of mention. The paradox also causes us to think of the instrumental value of words, as opposed to thinking of their roles just in referring and in judgments and inferences."

  95. Tiles, Mary, and Yuan, Jinmei. 2004. "Could the Aristotelian Square of Opposition Be Translated into Chinese?" Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy no. 4:137-149.

  96. ———. 2016. "Recognizing the Existence of Chinese Logic." International Communication of Chinese Culture no. 3:305-323.

  97. Trauzettel, Rolf. 1999. "A Sophism by the Ancient Philosopher Gongsun Long: Jest, Satire, Irony--or is there a Deeper Significance?" Journal of Chinese Philosophy no. 26:21-35.

  98. Van Norden, Bryan W. 1993. "Hansen on Hsün-Tzu." Journal of Chinese Philosophy no. 20:365-382.

  99. ———. 2011. Introduction to Classical Chinese Philosophy. Indianapolis: Hackett.

    Chapter 4: Mohist Consequentialism 51-68; Chapter 7: Language and Paradox in the "School of Names" 102-119.

  100. Vierheller, Ernst-Joachim. 1993. "Object Language and Meta-Language in the Gongsun Long Zi." Journal of Chinese Philosophy no. 20:181-209.

    "The Gongsun Long Zi is a text of the ancient Chinese School of Logicians. An attempt is made to provide a coherent interpretation of the logical content of the chapter "bBi ma lun". The analysis based on a new look on the logical function of the negated copula "Fei" yields a reading of the text as being directed toward elucidating the distinction of meta-/object-language and of extension/intension of a concept. This fact could enhance the appreciation of the level of language analysis reached at an early premodern state of Chinese philosophy. "

  101. ———. 2011. "Language and Logic in the Zhuangzi: Traces of the Gongsun Longzi." Oriens Extremus no. 50:29-46.

  102. Vierheller, Ernst Joachim. 2020. "Gōngsūn Lóng and the Zhuāngzǐ: On Classifying (Declassifying) Things Zhǐ (Qí) Wù Lùn 指〔齊〕物論." In The Gongsun Longzi and Other Neglected Texts: Aligning Philosophical and Philological Perspectives, edited by Suter, Rafael, Indraccolo, Lisa and Behr, Wolfgang, 399-428. Berlin: De Gruyter.

    "In the collection of texts dealing with the logic of language and compiled under the name of the logician Gōngsūn Lóng 公孫龍(c. 320–250 BCE), one of the chapters is ‘Zhǐwù lùn’ 指物論, which roughly translates as: “On Classifying Things”. The text opens with an enigmatic statement which literally says: “No thing is not a finger, but a finger is not a finger” (物莫非指而指非指). This statement has been the object of many studies which aim to establish its meaning. Another text of approximately the same era, ‘Qíwù lùn’ 齊物論, which roughly translates as: “On Equalizing Things”, is the second chapter of the Taoist anthology Zhuāngzǐ 莊子, compiled under the name of Zhuāng Zhōu 莊周(c. 370–285 BCE). In this text, the statement quoted above is not only alluded to, but actually applied to support a line of argument. This chapter shows how the author of the Zhuāngzǐ is making use of the statement from the Gōngsūn Lóngzǐ and establishes the meaning he attributes to it. Given the two texts’ proximity in time, the interpretation thus arrived at may have a sufficient measure of authority to add a conclusive perspective to the study of the text of the Gōngsūn Lóngzǐ, of which an annotated translation is provided as an appendix." (p. 399)

  103. Volkov, Alexei K. 1992. "Analogical Reasoning in Ancient China: Some Examples." Extrême-Orient Extrême-Occident no. 14:15-48.

  104. ———. 2020. "Analogy." In Dao Companion to Chinese Philosophy of Logic, edited by Fung, Yiu-ming, 143-160. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.

  105. Vrhovski, Jan. 2020. "From Mohism to the school of names, from pragmatism to materialist dialectics: Chinese interpretations of Gongsun Longzi as a text and source of Chinese logic, 1919–1937." International Communication of Chinese Culture no. 7:511-538.

    Abstract: "This article aims at providing a general overview of the development of interpretational discourse on Gongsun Longzi (公孫龍子) as a text in Chinese logic in the timeframe between the May Fourth events in 1919 and the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937. In my attempt to highlight the main interpretational approaches to the text and philosophy of Gongsun Long (公孫龍, 320 BC-250 BC) I will, on one hand, focus on the question whether or how the Western philosophies and notions of logic, such as for instance that of pragmatism, analytic philosophy and dialectical materialism, influenced the above-mentioned interpretations. On the other hand, aside from its contextual evolution I will also try to cast some new light on the main milestones of its textual re-emergence and development in the early Republican period."

  106. Vrubliaiskaité, Aušra. 2014. "Language in Zhuangzi. How to Say Without Saying." International Journal of Area Studies no. 9:75-90.

  107. Wang, Kexi. 2005. "The ancient Chinese and Informal Logic in Ancient China." Asian and African Studies no. 9:55-67.

  108. Wang, Lu. 1997. "Logic in China." In Structures and Norms in Science: Volume Two of the Tenth International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Florence, August 1995, edited by Dalla Chiara, Maria Luisa, Doets, Kees, Mundici, Daniele and van Bentham, Johan, 463-472. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

    On the history of logic see Section III, pp. 468-471.

    "Since China is historically one of the three sources of logic, the history of Chinese logic is a very important subject. It is generally recognized that the "Mo-Jing" (Mohist Canon) logic is the high point in the development of logic in ancient China. So research into the history of Chinese logic is mainly that of "Mo-Jing". There have been a great number of books and papers published in this field over the past twenty years. In my view it can be divided in two periods: before and after the end of the eighties. In the first period great effort was devoted to sorting out the material, digging out the logical problems, and making scientific assessments. In the second period, a reflection is made on the conclusions of the first period, including sharp criticism. In order to make

    the introduction easier, I will concentrate on the argumentation in this field.

    "Mo-Jing" logic is said to be the first scientific and complete system of logic in ancient China, to be as good as Aristotle's logic, and to have achievements comparable to that in Greek Antiquity, etc. There are also some people querying these points of view. There are two problems here. One is about the interpretation of Mo-Jing logic; the other is about the comparison between Mo-Jing logic and Aristotle's logic." (pp. 468-469)

  109. Wang, Ping, and Johnston, Ian. 2020. "The Gōngsūn Lóngzǐ: A Historical Overview." In The Gongsun Longzi and Other Neglected Texts: Aligning Philosophical and Philological Perspectives, edited by Suter, Rafael, Indraccolo, Lisa and Behr, Wolfgang, 25-44. Berlin: De Gruyter.

    "The Gōngsūn Lóngzǐ 公孫龍子(GSLZ), attributed to the late Warring States scholar Gōngsūn Lóng公孫龍(330–242 BCE, hereafter GSL), is one of the more remarkable works in the history of early Chinese literature. As it has been preserved in the Dàozàng 道藏(DZ, Daoist Canon), it is a short text comprising five brief essays or arguments plus an introduction, presumed to be a later addition. There is, we would argue, an overall thread identifiable in the five essays; it is an examination of the relationship between names (míng 名) and entities (shí 實, actuality/reality) with the purpose of establishing the correct relationship between the two – the program of zhèng míng正名. This is taken to be the central and defining interest of the Míngjiā (名家) or “School of Names”. In pursuing this central interest, the GSLZ necessarily touches upon some of the ontological and epistemological ramifications of such an endeavor. Along with the other works of the School and related texts,1 it is comparable in focus to aspects of the more or less contemporary

    “Organon” of Aristotle and some of the Stoic writings on logic, now lost." (p. 25)

    (1) The writings of the “School of Names” and important related texts (including the Later Mohist dialectical chapters, the ‘Qíwù Lùn’ 齊物論in the Zhuāngzǐ 莊子, and the ‘Zhèng Míng’ 正名 chapter in the Xúnzǐ荀子) have been collected and translated in Johnston/Wang 2019.


    Johnston, Ian / Wang, Ping (2019): The Mingjia and Related Texts. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press.

  110. Wang, Yueqing, Bao, Qinggang, and Guan, Guoxing. 2020. History of Chinese Philosophy Through Its Key Terms. Nanjing: Nanjing University Press.

    Name and Corresponding Object (mingshi, 名实), pp. 307-315.

    "Name and corresponding object are a key conceptual pair in traditional Chinese philosophy.

    Name means designation and concept. Corresponding object means reality, things and affairs or the object situation of the thing or affair. The relationship between name and corresponding object is roughly equivalent to the concept and the objective reality that the concept reflects. In Chinese philosophy, the issue of name and corresponding object contains the following four main contents. One, that which the name is based on, two, the rule for producing names, three, the categorization of names and four, the relationship between names and corresponding object. With regard to the relationship between names and reality, it can be further divided into question of whether the name or the object came first. This means whether the name determines the object or vice versa, as well as whether names accurately reflect reality, that is, whether names and objects can correspond with each other."

    Language and Meaning ( yanyi, 言意). pp. 413-424.

    "“Yanyi” is a key concept is Chinese epistemology. “Yan” refers to one’s words (言辞), nouns (名词), concept (概念), exposition and argument (论说) and writings (著述). In traditional Chinese philosophy, “yi” contains two dimensions of meaning, one means intention and the other means ideal (理想), the argument of a speech or essay (义理) and purpose (宗旨). When the two terms are united, “yi” refers to idea, argument and purpose. Key to the concept of “yanyi” is the relationship between “yan” and “yi,” and this relationship differed throughout different historical epochs and at the hands of different philosophers. Due to their different understandings of “yanyi,” therewere also differences in their understanding of the relationship between “yan” and “yi.”"

  111. Wang, Zuoli. 2010. "New Investigations in the School of Names." Asian and African Studies no. 14:85-101.

  112. Wenzel, Christian Helmut. 2007. "Chinese Language, Chinese Mind?" In Cultures. Conflict - Analysis - Dialogue, edited by Kanzian, Christian and Runggaldier, Edmund, 295-314. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

    Proceedings of the 29th International Wittgenstein Symposium 2006, Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria.

    "This article focuses on two questions. One is about the so-called Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, which says that language plays a role in how we perceive and understand the world. To put it strongly: Language determines thought. The other question is more specific. It is about the Chinese language. Is Chinese, with its grammar and its writing system, fundamentally different from Western languages such as Greek, Latin, German, Spanish or English? And does this difference account for cultural differences in perception and understanding? We all live in one world. But individually and culturally, we also live in different worlds. One easily notices this when one lives abroad. What is the role of language in this? What is its influence on perception, thought and culture? I am interested in influences that are due not just to vocabulary (which should be obvious), but, more fundamentally and systematically, to grammar and writing system. Words can easily be added to a language, one by one and step by step, and they do indeed reflect thought and culture. But grammar goes deeper. In what ways it reflects thought and culture is a more difficult but more interesting question, so it seems to me."

  113. Williams, John R. 2018. "Two Paradigmatic Strategies for Reading Zhuang Zi's "Happy Fish" Vignette as Philosophy: Guo Xiang's and Wang Fuzhi's Approaches." Comparative Philosophy no. 9:93-104.

    Abstract: "One of the most beloved passages in the Zhuang-Zi text is a dialogue between Hui Zi and Zhuang Zi at the end of the “Qiu-shui”chapter. While this is one of many vignettes involving Hui Zi and Zhuang Zi in the text, this particular vignette has recently drawn attention in Chinese and comparative philosophy circles. The most basic question concerning these studies is whether or not the passage represents a substantial philosophical dispute, or instead idle chitchat between two friends. This vignette has not only received much attention as of late, but commentators from at least Guo Xiang onward have taken the conversation as substantial rather than merely charming. Of the traditional readings that take the passage as substantial, there are two main strategies for taking Zhuang Zi as “winning” a substantial dispute: (1) One that argues Zhuang Zi is undermining Hui Zi’s position without offering a positive position, and (2) another that argues that Zhuang Zi is undermining Hui Zi’s position by offering a positive position. Guo Xiang’s “official commentary” is paradigmatic of the first “negative” strategy, while Wang Fuzhi’s reading is paradigmatic of the second “positive” strategy. The goal in the present article is to present these two strategies for reading the passage by translating and analyzing Guo’s and Wang’s annotations, thereby showing how the passage might be and has been taken as more than frivolous chitchat."


    "Zhuangzi: A New Translation of the Sayings of Master Zhuang as Interpreted by Guo Xiang", translated and with an Introduction by Richard John Lynn, New York: Columbia University Press 2022.

  114. Willman, Marshall D. 2008. "Searle, de re Belief and the Chinese Language." In Searle’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy: Constructive Engagement, edited by Mou, Bo, 247-263. Leiden: Brill.

  115. ———. 2010. "Logical Analysis and Later Mohist Logic: Some Comparative Reflections." Comparative Philosophy no. 1:53-77.

    Abstract: "Any philosophical method that treats the analysis of the meaning of a sentence or expression in terms of a decomposition into a set of conceptually basic constituent parts must do some theoretical work to explain the puzzles of intensionality. This is because intensional phenomena appear to violate the principle of compositionality, and the assumption of compositionality is the principal justification for thinking that an analysis will reveal the real semantical import of a sentence or expression through a method of decomposition.

    Accordingly, a natural strategy for dealing with intensionality is to argue that it is really just an isolable, aberrant class of linguistic phenomena that poses no general threat to the thesis that meaning is basically compositional. On the other hand, the later Mohists give us good reason to reject this view. What we learn from them is that there may be basic limitations in any analytical technique that presupposes that meaning is perspicuously represented only when it has been fully decomposed into its constituent parts. The purpose of this paper is to (a) explain why the Mohists found the issue of intensionality to be so important in their investigations of language, and (b) defend the view that Mohist insights reveal basic limitations in any technique of analysis that is uncritically applied with a decompositional approach in mind, as are those that are often pursued in the West in the context of more general epistemological and metaphysical programs."

  116. Wong, David B. 2002. "Reasons and Analogical Reasoning in Mengzi." In Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Mengzi, edited by Liu, Xiusheng and Ivanhoe, Philip J., 187-220. Indianapolis: Hackett.

  117. Wu, Joseph S. 1969. "Chinese Language and Chinese Thought." Philosophy East and West no. 19 (4):423-434.

    "The main task of this paper is an exposition of some subtle common traits of Chinese thought through an examination of some major characteristics of the Chinese language. First, the author presents the main structures of the Chinese written characters and some notable syntactical features of the classical Chinese. Second, he exposes some essential characteristics of Chinese thinking as revealed by the nature of the language. In the conclusion, he justifies the thesis that the Chinese language is a language for poetry."

  118. Xie, Yun. 2019. "Argument by Analogy in Ancient China." Argumentation no. 33:323-347.

    Abstract: "Argument by analogy has long been regarded as the characteristic way of arguing in ancient Chinese culture. Classic Chinese philosophers not only prefer to use analogy to argue for their own views, but also take efforts to theorize it in a systematic way. This paper aims to provide a careful study on the relevant ideas in ancient China in order to reconstruct the ancient Chinese theory of argument by analogy,

    and then to reveal some of its distinctive features through a comparison with the Western counterpart account as developed by Aristotle. It is indicated that in ancient China analogical argument was conceived primarily as a way of arguing based on classification, with a unique mechanism of taking and giving according to kind.

    On that basis, it is argued that although such a characterization captures the logical structure of analogical argument in a similar way to Aristotle, the ancient Chinese theory stresses the foundational role of a particular notion of kind, thus makes the construction and application of analogical arguments become highly flexible and context-sensitive. Moreover, it is also contended that in ancient China the rationale of analogical arguments is explained from a general perspective of kind, relying upon the universal knowledge pertaining to the forming of kinds. Then it is further revealed that, unlike Aristotle who emphasizes the causal links between attributes in the physical world, ancient Chinese thinkers justify analogical argument by appealing to some normative metaphysical and epistemological principles."

  119. Xu, Xeqian. 1997. "The Unique Features of Hui Shi's Thought: A Comparative Study Between Hui Shi and Other Pre-Quin Philosophers." Journal of Chinese Philosophy no. 24:231-253.

  120. Yan, Xiaofeng. 2001. "Disputes Over Words and Meanings in the History of Chinese Philosophy." Contemporary Chinese Thought no. 32:18-31.

  121. Yang, Wujin. 2011. "Valid Reasoning in Ancient China from the Perspective of Modern Logic." Studies in Logic no. 4:115-125.

  122. ———. 2020. "Reasoning (Pi 譬, Mou 侔, Yuan 援, Tui 推)." In Dao Companion to Chinese Philosophy of Logic, edited by Fung, Yiu-ming, 161-169. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.

  123. Yang, Wujin, and Zhang, Wanqiang. 2020. "Classes (Lei 類) and Individuals." In Dao Companion to Chinese Philosophy of Logic, edited by Fung, Yiu-ming, 203-212. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.

  124. Yang, Xiaomei. 2019. "How Do We Make Sense of the Thesis “Bai (White) Ma (Horse) Fei (Is Not) Ma (Horse)"?" Dao. A Journal of Comparative Philosophy no. 18:163-181.

    Abstract: "In this article, I introduce a new interpretation of the puzzling thesis “bai 白 (white) ma 馬 (horse) fei 非 (is not) ma 馬 (horse)” argued by Gongsun Long 公孫龍 in his essay “On White Horse (Bai Ma Lun 白馬論).” I argue that previous interpretations, which can be grouped under the name of “attribute-object interpretations,” are not satisfactory, and that the thesis on the new interpretation is not about attributes or objects, but about names. My argument focuses on the disagreement over inseparability of white (shou bai zhi zheng 守白之爭) between Gongsun Long and his interlocutor in the text of “On White Horse.” On my interpretation or the name interpretation, the disagreement is about whether constituents of a syntactically complex or multi-term name are separable or have their contextually independent meanings. Gongsun Long’s thesis makes perfect sense on my interpretation, and is supported by the text and other preserved texts collected in GongsunLong Zi 公孫龍子. The name interpretation can also make sense of some puzzling expressions of sophists in the classic period."

  125. Yi, Byeong-uk. 2014. "Numeral Classifiers and the White Horse Paradox." Frontiers of Philosophy in China no. 9:498-522.

  126. ———. 2019. "Two Syllogisms in the Mozi: Chinese Logic and Language." The Review of Symbolic Logic no. 12:589-606.

  127. Yu, Anthony C. 2002. "Cratylus and Xunzi on Names." In Early China /Ancient Greece: Thinking through Comparisons, edited by Shankman, Steven and Durrant, Stephen W., 235-250. Albany: State University of New York Press.

  128. Yuan, Jinmei. 2002. "Exploring the Logical Space in the Patterns of Classical Chinese Mathematical Art." Journal of Chinese Philosophy no. 29:519-531.

  129. ———. 2005. ""Kinds, Lei" in Ancient Chinese Logic: A Comparison to "Categories" in Aristotelian Logic." History of Philosophy Quarterly no. 22:181-199.

  130. ———. 2006. "The Role of Time in the Structure of Chinese Logic." Philosophy East and West no. 56:136-152.

  131. ———. 2010. "ZHAI, jincheng 翟錦程, the study of the theories of Ming 名 (name) in the pre-Qin period 先秦名家研究." Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy no. 9:253-255.

  132. ———. 2012. "Analogical Propositions in Moist Texts." Journal of Chinese Philosophy no. 39:404-423.

  133. ———. 2012. "Aristotelian Logic in China. A Case Study of the Chinese Transtion of Euclid's Elements." Journal of East-West Thought no. 2:81-94.

  134. ———. 2021. "Exploring an Alternative Pre-Qin Logic." In One Corner of the Square: Essays on the Philosophy of Roger T. Ames, edited by Sullivan, Ian M. and Mason, Joshua, 190-200. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press.

  135. Zádrapa, Lukáš. 2020. "Linguistic Affinites of the Yǐnwénzǐ Text in the Light of Basic Corpus Data." In The Gongsun Longzi and Other Neglected Texts: Aligning Philosophical and Philological Perspectives, edited by Suter, Rafael, Indraccolo, Lisa and Behr, Wolfgang, 347-396. Berlin: De Gruyter.

    "The text known as Yǐnwénzǐ 尹文子has traditionally been attributed to the Warring States philosopher Yǐn Wén 尹文(traditionally c. 360–280 BCE), who lived in the state of Qí and was active in the environment of the so-called Jìxià academy. Generally, it is among the most neglected ancient texts, even in comparison with the Gōngsūn Lóngzǐ 公孫龍子." (p. 347, a note omitted)



    The linguistic evidence I have presented in this chapter provides many good reasons to doubt that the extant transmitted version of the Yǐnwénzǐ can be a Warring States composition. The combination of some important syntactic evidence and certain lexical phenomena support the hypothesis of a later date of composition. As I argued in the introduction to this survey, it is self-evident that one can always try to dismiss these findings out of hand with reference to the influence of a post-classical editor. I will not repeat the discussion here – suffice it to say that in such a case, one would have to carefully explain how and why the editor happened to revise and transmit the text in a style characterized by a noticeably colloquial and, at the time, modern flavor instead of preserving its original ancient appearance, as was the case with practically all genuinely pre-Qín texts in the course of their transmission." (p. 387)

    Primary sources

    Gāo Liúshuǐ高流水/ Lín Héngsēn林恒森(1996): Shènzǐ, Yǐnwénzǐ, Gōngsūn Lóngzǐ quányì 慎子、尹文子、公孫龍子全譯[Shènzǐ, Yǐnwénzǐ, and Gōngsūn Lóngzǐ with a Complete Translation]. Guìyáng 貴陽: Guìzhōu Rénmín 貴州人民.

    Harbsmeier, C. / Jiǎng Shàoyú蔣紹愚(eds.) (online): Thesaurus Linguae Sericae. http://tls.uni-hd.de (acc. 08/ 20/2014).

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  136. Zhai, Jincheng, and Liu, Yongqiang. 2022. "The History, Present and Future of the Study of Chinese Logic." Asian Studies no. 10:105-117.

  137. Zhang, Chunpo, and Zhang, Jialong. 1997. "Logic and Language in Chinese Philosophy." In Companion Encyclopedia of Asian Philosophy, edited by Carr, Brian and Mahalingam, Indira, 562-575. New York: Routledge.

  138. Zhang, Jialong, and Liu, Fenrong. 2007. "Some Thoughts on Mohist Logic." In A Meeting of the Minds: Proceedings of the Workshop on Logic, Rationality and Interaction, Beijing 2007, edited by van Bentham, Johan, Shier, Ju and Veltman, Frank, 85-102. London: College Publicaitons.

  139. Zhou, Changzhong. 2020. "The ‘Discourse on the White Horse’: A Concrete Analytical Philosophy of Language – with a Coda on the Authenticity of the Received Gongsun Longzi." In The Gongsun Longzi and Other Neglected Texts: Aligning Philosophical and Philological Perspectives, edited by Suter, Rafael, Indraccolo, Lisa and Behr, Wolfgang, 87-114. Berlin: De Gruyter.

    "Gōngsūn Lóng’s 公孫龍(c. 325–250 BCE) ‘Discourse on the White Horse’ (‘Báimǎ lùn’, 白馬論; henceforth BML) has always been considered an example of sophistry. But just as the tracks of single particles in an aerosol chamber can only be recognized by an expert physicist, so it is only with a full grasp of its analytical philosophy of language and its epistemological nature that one is able to realize the essence of BML: its character as a concrete analytical philosophy of language. At the same time, this insight presupposes a solid understanding of the spirit and the atmosphere of the time, of the thought and scholarly culture from which this theory has emerged – namely, the point which the Zhuāngzǐ 莊子has characterized as the splitting up of the unified “Art of the Way” into the “Hundred Schools” of thought. And only together with firm evidence from ancient books and records, including bibliographical lists, are we able to evaluate and ascertain the authenticity of the received Gōngsūn Lóngzǐ (henceforth GSLZ), in which BML has been transmitted." (p. 87)

  140. Zhou, Qi. 2009. "Study on the Logical Ideas in Chinese Ancient Mathematics from “Liu Hui’s Commentary of the Chiu Chang Suan Shu”." Asian Social Science no. 5:9-13.

  141. Zong, Desheng. 2000. "Studies of Intensional Contexts in Mohist Writings." Philosophy East and West no. 50:208-228.

    "The Mohist School's logical study focuses mainly on the following inference rule: suppose that N and M are coextensive terms, or N a subset of M; it follows that if a verb can appear in front of N, it can also appear in front of M. That is, if 'VM' then 'VN', where V is some extensional verb. Such an approach to logical inference necessitates the study of logical relations among nouns, verbs, and the relations between these two types of words. Evidence is offered here that the Mohists clearly distinguished extensional verbs from intensional verbs, and that this insight enabled them to say, among other things, that VN does not follow from VM, even in cases where N is M or contained in M, as long as the V in question is an intensional verb."