History of Logic

website logic logoeBook version

My other websites:

Theory and History of Ontology

website ontology logoeBook version 



website bibliographia logoeBook version  

History of Logic from Aristotle to Gödel by Raul Corazzon | e-mail: rc@ontology.co


Selected Bibliography on Indian Logic and Ontology. First Part: A - L

Bibliography (studies in English A - L)

  1. Aklujkar, Ajok. 2001. "The Word is the World: Nondualism in Indian Philosophy of Language." Philosophy East and West no. 51:452-473.

  2. ———. 2016. "Grammarians’ Leaving Logic at the Door." In Logic and Belief in Indian Philosophy, edited by Balcerowicz, Piotr, 395-414. Warsaw: Indological Studies.

  3. Bagchi, Sitansusekhar. 1953. Inductive Reasoning: A Study of Tarka and Its Role in Indian Logic. Calcutta: Calcutta University.

  4. Balcerowicz, Piotr. 2001. "The Logical Structure of the Nyāya Method of the Jainas." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 29:379-403.

  5. ———. 2003. "Some Remarks on the Naya Method." In Essays in Jaina Philosophy and Religion, edited by Balcerowicz, Piotr, 37-68. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

  6. ———, ed. 2016. Logic and Belief in Indian Philosophy. Warsaw: Indological Studies.

    Second Revised Edition.

    First edtion Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 2010.

  7. ———. 2019. "Is There Anything Like Indian Logic? Anumāna, ‘Inference’ and Inference in the Critique of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa." Journal of Indian Philosophy.

  8. Bandyopadhyay, Nandita. 1982. "The Concept of Similarity in Indian Philosophy." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 10:239-275.

  9. ———. 1988. "The Concept of Contradiction in Indian Logic and Epistemology." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 16:225-246.

    "The article seeks to introduce to the students of philosophy the concept of contradiction in Indian philosophy. contradiction and contrariety fall under the common class of opposition called "Virodha". the former means "pervasion of mutual negation by two predicates," the latter means "pervasibility of two predicates by their mutual negation." Vontradiction is a purely logical relation, while contrariety is semilogical. The author suggests that contradiction and contrariety should better be called, respectively, "absolute contradiction" and "relative contradiction", both being based on contradiction of identity. Some formidable Indian philosophers argue that contradiction (including contrariety) is a purely logical category, for contradiction of facts is impossible."

  10. Barlingay, Surendra Sheodas. 1965. A Modern Introduction to Indian Logic. Delhi: National Publishing House.

  11. Bharadwaj, Krishna Datta. 1958. The Philosophy of Ramanuja. New Delhi: Sir Shankar Lall Charitable Trust Society.

  12. Bharadwaja, Vijay K. 1982. "The Jaina Concept of Logic." Indian Philosophical Quarterly no. 9:363-375.

  13. ———. 1987. "Implication and Entailment in Navya-Nyāya Logic." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 15:149-154.

    "It is argued against the claim that there exist in the concept of "Vyapti" and "Paramarsa" the two notions of implication and entailment in the Navya-Nyāya logic. Also, it is suggested that the "Pancavayava-Vakya" form of "Anumana" does not represent the deductive model of inference."

  14. ———. 1990. Form and Validity in Indian Logic. Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study.

  15. Bhatta, V. P. 2001. Nyāya Theory of Verbal Cognition A Critical Study of Vyutpatti Vada of Gadadhara. Delhi: Eastern Books Linkers.

    Two volumes.

  16. Bhattacharya, Chandrodaya. 1960. The Elements of Indian Logic and Epistemology (A portion of Annambhatta's Tarka-Samgraha and Dipaka). Calcutta: Modern Book Agency Private.

  17. Bhattacharya, Kamaleswar. 2001. "A Note on Formalism in Indian Logic." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 29:17-23.

  18. ———. 2010. "On Two Questions of the New Logic of India." In Logic in Religious Discourse, edited by Schumann, Andrew, 34-43. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

    Abstract: "Formal logic was born in two – and only two – cultural spheres: the western and the Indian. There was a ‘formalism,’ too, in Indian logic. The last phase of this logic, the ‘new logic,’ created a new language which, as with the ‘new logic’ of the West, became the language of other disciplines as well. But, while the new logic of the West followed the mathematical model, that of India followed the linguistic model: in that they followed two distinct traditions. Unlike the western, the Indian new logic did not construct an ‘artificial language,’ consisting in a system of symbols, but formulated its definitions and solved various logical problems with different combinations of concepts in natural language. Very little work has been done so far on the subject in western and Indian languages. The present paper deals with two questions which have been the subjects of discussion in recent years."

  19. Bhattacharya, Ramkrishna. 2022. "Charvaka (Cārvāka)." In Handbook of Logical Thought in India, edited by Sarukkai, Sundar and Chakraborty, Mihir Kumar, 1-23. Dordrecht: Delhi.

    Abstract: "The Charvaka (Cārvāka)-s are the last known materialists in India. They appeared in or around the eighth century CE and, for some unknown reason, disappeared after the twelfth century CE. The earlier materialists flourished at least from the time of the Buddha (6th/5th BCE). They were found both in north and south India, bearing such names as Bhūtavāda, Lokāyata, etc. They believed perception to be the only means of knowledge. The Cārvākas, however, admitted inference to some extent as the second source, insofar as the inference was based on or followed from perception. It was in connection with the materialists’ denial of the Other World that their opponents developed their own form of arguments. The materialists were challenged by the opponents with the help of inference by analogy and verbal testimony. The Veda was the ultimate source of such testimony. The Buddhists and the Jains, too, were at one with the materialists in denying the status of the Veda. Thus, the philosophical systems of India were divided into two opposing camps – the āstikas (affirmativists) and the nāstikas (negativists). The contribution of the Cārvākas in particular to the logical thought in India lies in the distinction made by them between two kinds of inference: the first based on perception or verifiable facts, and the second, arguments based on scriptures. Their atheism and satire against vedic sacrificial rites made them stand out as heretics. Their opponents also complained that they were opposed to caste and gender discriminations. These traits also made the Cārvākas appear as the ultimate rationalists in pre-modern India."

  20. Bhattacharya, Sibajiban, and Potter, Karl H., eds. 2011. Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. 13: Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Philosophy from 1515 to 1660. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

    Contents: List of Contributors 5; In memoriam: Sibajiban Bhattacharyya 21; Abbreviations 31;

    Part One: Sibajiban Bhattacharyya: Introduction 33

    I. Metaphysics 35; II. Epistemology 102; III. Theory of Inference 129; IV. Some Aspects of the Navya-Nyāya Theory of Language 145;

    Part Two: Summaries of Works 179;

    Glossary - Index 591-658.

  21. Bhattacharyya, Hari Mohan. 1994. Jaina Logic and Epistemology. Calcutta: K.P. Bagchi & Co.

  22. Bhattacharyya, Sibajiban. 1955. "Daniel H. H. Ingalls on Indian Logic." Philosophy East and West no. 5:155-162.

  23. ———. 1958. "The Concept of Logic." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research no. 18:326-340.

  24. ———. 1974. "Some Features of Navya-Nyāya Logic." Philosophy East and West no. 24:329-342.

    "Navya-Nyāya developed a technical (non-symbolic) language tied to a realistic ontology, but this became the language of all serious discourse in India -- of all philosophies, grammar, law, medicine. The problem is primarily to explain how this was possible. The answer suggested is that Navya-Nyāya developed a language for 'describing' cognitions by stating not merely the objects recognized, but also the 'mode of cognition of the object'. This necessitated the development of special concepts like the concept of limitor (Avacchedaka). in ontology, Navya-Nyāya made extensive use of Occam's razor to decide which abstract terms stood for abstract entities, and which, though abstract grammatically, still denoted entities identifiable as concrete objects."

  25. ———. 1990. "Some Features of the Technical Language of Navya-Nyāya." Philosophy East and West no. 40:129-149.

    "The technical language of Navya-Nyāya uses concepts like limitor, determiner, etc., to deal with sentences expressing cognition like perception, inference, memory, belief, doubt, supposition. As such sentences are not extensional, Navya-Nyāya distinguishes between what is cognised and the mode under which what is cognised is cognised. Limitor, in the technical language, determines the mode of cognition and is also used to express quantity of cognition, universality, particularity, etc. The concept of determiner is used to show what predicate is asserted of what subject in the same cognition."

  26. ———. 1997. "Gadadhara's Theory of Meaning of Pronouns." In Relativism, Suffering and Beyond. Essays in Memory of Bimal K. Matilal, edited by Bilimoria, Purusottama and Mohanty, Jitendra Nath, 16-31. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

    "In order to explain Gadadhara's theory of meaning of pronouns, it is necessary first to briefly state his theory of word meaning. In Indian philosophy in general and in Navya-nyaya in particular, theories of meaning of sentences are regarded as a part of theories of origin of true cognition. Hence in discussing theories of meaning, Indian philosophical systems almost exclusively consider how a hearer acquires information second-hand from what a speaker tells him. Indian theories of meaning refer to the speaker's intention only in so far as it is necessary for the hearer to cognize truly what the speaker says.

    According to Navya-nyaya, a word means an object only under a mode of presentation. Anyone who knows the meaning of the word knows the object under this mode on hearing, remembering, or otherwise cognizing, the word. The problem of meaning of words is the problem of explaining how the hearer knows the object under the particular mode.

    The mode of presentation of an object, according to Navya-nyaya, must be a property of the object. A property is anything which may be said to be in the object. According to Navya-nyaya, this is the case if and only if what is to be regarded as a property of an object is related to the object by an occurrence-exacting relation. Anything related to an object by such a relation will be its property."

  27. Bhowmik, Subrata. 2014. "A Glimpse of Rule of Logic in Gautama's Nyāya Sūtra." Indian Journal of History of Science no. 49:50-51.

  28. Bilimoria, Purusottama. 1985. "Jñāna and Pramā: the Logic of Knowing - A Critical Appraisal." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 13:73-102.

    "The thrust of this paper is to investigate the relative difference between "Jnana" and "Prama", two crucial concepts in Indian epistemology, since more recent treatment of them would seem to be confused. Utilizing the framework developed by Nyāya and Advaita, it is argued that the former describes a wide range of cognitive processes, such as 'cognition', 'judgment', 'remembering', 'doubting', etc., while the latter defines the bounds of cognition in respect of its truth-value. A theory of knowledge is developed that accounts for the rise of 'true' knowledge in terms of the 'psyche-activity' involved and the set of criteria ("Pramanya") that renders a "Jnana" as a "Prama". The intensional structure of such a judgment, it is argued, involves a complex qualified-qualifier relation in conformity with the property-content relation of the objective correlate."

  29. Bronkhorst, Johannes. 1981. "Meaning Entries in Panini's Dhātupātha." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 9:335-357.

  30. ———. 2011. Language and Reality: On an Episode in Indian Tought. Leiden: Brill.

    Translated from the French by Michael S. Allen and Rajam Raghunathan.

    Revised and with a new appendix

  31. Butzenberger, Klaus. 1996. "On Doubting What There Is Not: The Doctrine of Doubt and the Reference of Terms in Indian Grammar, Logic and Philosophy of Language." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 24:363-406.

  32. Chakrabarti, Arindam. 1997. Denying Existence. The Logic, Epistemology and Pragmatics of Negative Existentials and Fictional Discourse. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

    See the Appendix: "The Problem of the Nonexistent in Indian Philosophy of Logic and Language", pp. 211-245.

  33. ———. 2000. "Against Immaculate Perception: Seven Reasons for Eliminating Nirvilkalpaka Perception from Nyāya." Philosophy East and West no. 50:1-8.

    "Besides seeing a rabbit or seeing that the rabbit is grayish, do we also sometimes see barely just the particular animal (not as an animal or as anything) or the feature rabbitness or grayness? Such bare, non-verbalizable perception is called "indeterminate perception" (nirvikalpaka pratyaksa) in Nyāya. Standard Nyāya postulates such pre-predicative bare perception in order to honor the rule that awareness of a qualified entity must be caused by awareness of the qualifier. After connecting this issue with the Western debate concerning the "myth of the given," seven distinct arguments are presented showing that the very notion of such indeterminate perception is epistemically otiose and that the Nyāya theory of perception is better off without it."

  34. ———. 2001. "Reply to Stephen Phillips." Philosophy East and West no. 51:114-115.

  35. Chakrabarti, Kisor Kumar. 1976. "Some Comparisons Between Frege's Logic and Navya-Nyāya Logic." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research no. 36:554-563.

  36. ———. 1977. The Logic of Gotama. Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii.

  37. ———. 1978. "The Nyāya-Vaisesika Theory of Negative Entities." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 6:129-144.

    "The paper consists in three parts. The first part criticizes the attempt of some major Indian and Western philosophers like Plato, Cook Wilson, the Buddhists, the Prabhakaras, etc., to dispense with negative entities and builds up the case for them. The second part is devoted to their classification and contains additional arguments in favour of negative entities of particular kinds. The third part discusses some problems of a specialized nature such as the criteria for distinguishing one negative entity from another."

  38. ———. 1985. "Some Remarks on Indian Theories of Truth." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 12:339-356.

    "Some of the points sought to be established are (1) an overly pragmatic reading of the concept of truth in Indian philosophy should be avoided; (2) notions similar to that of knowledge as justified true belief and to the distinction between analytic and synthetic truths are found in Indian philosophy; (3) confirmation of truth through an inferential process, when properly analyzed, does not lead to an infinite regress and that (4) in some cases truth is known immediately."

  39. ———. 1989. "Contraposition in European and Indian Loigc." International Philosophical Quarterly no. 29:121-127.

    Abstract: "This paper consists of five sections. In the first two sections the presence and recognition of the law of contraposition of the universal affirmative categorical proposition (traditionally called an A proposition) is traced in Greek, Latin, and Sanskrit logical writings. In the third section it is pointed out that in both traditional European and Indian logic the universal proposition is understood to have existential import. The fourth section shows that the above law is invalid under the traditional interpretation. The fifth section deals with the views of Uddyotakara, a famous Indian logician, on this subject and takes notice of a number of logical notions introduced by him in this connection."

  40. ———. 1995. Definition and Induction: A Historical and Comparative Study. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

  41. ———. 2003. "Response to Roy W. Perrett's Review of Classical Indian Philosophy of Mind: The Nyaya Dualist Tradition." Philosophy East and West no. 53:593-598.

  42. ———. 2010. Classical Indian Philosophy of Induction: The Nyāya Viewpoint. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

  43. Chakrabarty, Debasish. 2000. "Kanada's Vaisesika Sutra: A Translation." In Signs and Signification. Vol. II, edited by Gill, Harjeet Singh and Manetti, Giovanni, 311-336. New Delhi: Bahri Publications.

  44. Chakraborty, Krishna. 1978. "Determination of Universal Concomitance." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 5:291-310.

  45. ———. 1978. "The Nyāya Concept of Svābhāvika Sambandha: A Historical Retrospect." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 5:385-392.

  46. Chakraborty, Mihir K., Lowe, Benedikt, Mitra, Madhabendra Nath, and Sarukkai, Sundar, eds. 2008. Logic, Navya-Nyāya and Applications: Homage to Bimal Krishna Matilal. London: College Publications.

    Contents: Preface VII; Jonardon Ganeri: Bimal Krishna Matilal and his contribution to the study of Indian logic and Navya-Nyaya XI-XVII; Mohua Banerjee, Md. Aquil Khan: Rough set theory: A temporal logic view 1;

    Johan van Benthem: Natural logic: A view from the 1980s 21; Purushottama Bilimoria: Abhāva: Negation in logic, real non-existent, and a distinctive pramāńa in the Mīmāṃsā 43; Amita Chatterjee, Mihir K. Chakmborty: "Marry your daughter to a handsome person": The Nyaya technique of precisification 65; Anuj Dawar: Computational Complexity and the expressive power of logics 81; Jonardon Ganeri: Towards a formal regimentation of the Navya-Nyaya technical language I 105; Jonardon Ganeri: Towards a formal regimentation of the Navya-Nyaya technical language II 123; Eberhard Guhe: George Bealer's property theories and their relevance to the study of Navya-Nyaya logic 139; Wilfrid Hodges: Tarski on Padoa's method: A test case for understanding logicians of other traditions 155; Hisayasu Kobayashi: Other minds in Buddhist epistemology 171; Kamal Lodaya: Marking time 185; Shinya Moriyama: Sense data and ākāra 205; Hideyo Ogawa: Kaundabhatta on the śakyatāvacchedaka of a meaning of a verb ending 217; Biswambhar Pahi: On relating two traditions of logic 235; R. Ramanujarn, Sunil Simon: Reasoning in games 261; Sundar Sarukkai: A semiotic interpretation of Indian logic 287-304.

  47. Chatterjee, Amita. 2022. "Logic in India." In Handbook of Logical Thought in India, edited by Sarukkai, Sundar and Chakraborty, Mihir Kumar, 1-21. Dordrecht: Delhi.

    Abstract: "This chapter aims at providing a broad overview of Indian logic pursued in the classical Indian philosophical systems as well as in contemporary India. It will be seen that traditional systems of logic do share some features, yet diverge from each other due to the differences in their ontology and practice. During the colonial period, logic was pursued mainly within a comparative framework. However, the perception of Indian logicians changed entirely as they came into contact with modern symbolic logic. The chapter is divided into five sections. The first section deals mainly with the distinction between Western and Indian conception of logic. The second section provides the structure of inference in classical Indian philosophical systems. The third section analyzes the concepts of negation available in the Nyāya, Buddhist, and Jaina logic and links different concepts of negation to the metaphysical presuppositions of the systems. The fourth section lays bare the nature of contradiction as conceived in these systems, and the final section gives a brief account of the developments in Indian logic during the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries."

  48. Chatterjee, Satischandra. 1939. The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge. A Critical Study of Some Problems of Logic and Metaphysics. Calcutta: University of Calcutta.

    Reprinted 1950, 1965 and 1978.

  49. Chinchore, Mangala. 1988. Vādanyāya: A Glimpse of Nyāya-Buddhist Controversy. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications.

  50. Clavel, Anne. 2022. "Logic of Syād-Vāda." In Handbook of Logical Thought in India, edited by Sarukkai, Sundar, 1-22. Dordrecht: Springer.

    Abstract: "The syād-vāda (“doctrine of syāt”), also called “sevenfold predication” (sapta-bhaṅgī), constitutes a cornerstone of the Jaina doctrine of multilateralism, since it prevents a predicate from being attributed absolutely to a subject. According to Jainism, in order to consider a single state of affair as exhaustively as possible, one has to submit every predicative relation between a subject and a predicate to a structural rule made up of seven propositions, which are not conceived of as alternative truths but are all endowed with the same truth-value. A thorough understanding of the syād-vāda raises tricky issues, such as the meaning of the adverb syāt in the context of this logical pattern, the compatibility of Jaina logic with basic logical principles, or the oddness of the number of propositions – why seven?"

  51. Clerbout, Nicolas, Gorisse, Mari-Hélène, and Rahaman, Shahid. 2011. "Context-Sensitivity in Jain Philosophy: A Dialogical Study of Siddharsigani's "Commentaryon the Handbook of Logic"." Journal of Philosophical Logic no. 40:633-662.

    Abstract: "In classical India, Jain philosophers developed a theory of viewpoints (naya-vāda) according to which any statement is always performed within and dependent upon a given epistemic perspective or viewpoint. The Jainas furnished this epistemology with an (epistemic) theory of disputation that takes into account the viewpoint in which the main thesis has been stated. The main aim of our paper is to delve into the Jain notion of viewpoint- contextualisation and to develop the elements of a suitable logical system that should offer a reconstruction of the Jainas' epistemic theory of disputation. A crucial step of our project is to approach the Jain theory of disputation with the help of a theory of meaning for logical constants based on argumentative practices called dialogical logic. Since in the dialogical framework the meaning of the logical constants is given by the norms or rules for their use in a debate, it provides a meaning theory closer to the Jain context-sensitive disputation theory than the main-stream formal model-theoretic semantics.

  52. Croce, Benedetto. 1953. "Benedetto Croce on Indian Logic." East and West no. 4:30.

    Abstract: "We believe we are paying our tribute of respect to the memory of Renedetto Croce, the great Italian thinkerr who died recently, by reprinting here a passage from his "Logic as the Science of pure Concept" (Logica come scienza del concetto puro) taken from his work La Filosofia dello Spirito (Tl, Chap. JV), in which he shows a fine intuition of that essential logic, of a superior order, which is at the centre of Indian philosophy. In this case we may well speak of the science of thought rather than of the science of logic, for thought is here taken at its source, springing from the mystery of the forces that support the Universe. Thus understood, the science of thought that comes to us from India may be considered as the logic of every age, the logic superior to all formal

    dialectics, and therefore the very logic of all future knowledge."

  53. D'Amore, Bruno. 2005. "Association Secondary School Students' Mathematical Argumentation and Indian Logic (Nyaya)." For the Learning of Mathematics no. 25:26-32.

  54. Dasgupta, Probal. 1981. "Modern Indian Work at the Logic-Linguistics Boundary." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 9:217-225.

    "The mainstream Western logico-linguistic assumption that wh-words ("who", "when",...) in constituent questions manifest a wh-quantifier reflects features of Western languages, which position wh-words clause-initially. Languages like Sanskrit, Hindi, and Bangla form indefinite expressions systematically by adding an existential element to interrogative K-words, suggesting that K expresses a variable and not a quantifier. Further probing indicates that existential and universal quantifiers are based respectively on free and bound variables. Independent linguistic arguments show that these proposals work better than the quantifier theory of questions even for Western languages. Frege and Felix Cohen have, on logical grounds, already argued for a variable theory."

  55. Davis, Lawrence. 1981. "Tarka in the Nyāya Theory of Inference." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 9:105-120.

  56. Daye, Douglas Dunsmore. 1979. "Circularity in the Inductive Justification of Formal Arguments (Tarka) in the Twelfth-Century Indian Jaina Logic." Philosophy East and West no. 29:177-188.

  57. Deshpande, Madhav M. 1992. The Meaning of Nouns. Semantic Theory in Classical and Medieval India. Dordrecht: Springer.

    Nāmārtha-nirṇaya of Kauṇḏabhaṭṭa translated and annotated.

  58. Dixit, Krishna Kumar. 1975. Indian Logic: Its Problems as Treated by Its Schools. Vaishali (Muzaffarpur): Research Institute of Prakrit, Jainology, and Ahimsa.

  59. Franco, Eli. 1983. "Studies in the Tattvopaplavasiṃha I. The Criterion of Truth." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 11:149-166.

  60. ———. 1984. "Studies in the Tattvopaplavasiṃha II. The Theory of Error." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 12:105-137.

  61. Frauwallner, Erich. 1961. "Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic." Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens und Archiv für indische Philosophie für das indologische Institut der Universität Wien no. 5:125-148.

  62. Friedman, David. 1955. "Aspects of Indian Epistemology, Logic and Ontology." Philosophia Reformata no. 20:49-58.

  63. Gajendragadkar, Veena. 1980. "The Vaisesika Categories: A Logical Perspective." Indian Philosophical Quarterly:107-119.

  64. Ganeri, Jonardon. 1986. "The Hindu Syllogism: Nineteenth-Century Perceptions of Indian Logical Thought." Philosophy East and West no. 46:1-16.

    "Following H. T. Colebrooke's 1824 'discovery' of the Hindu syllogism, his term for the five-step inference schema in the Nyāya-Sutra, European logicians and historians of philosophy demonstrated considerable interest in Indian logical thought. This is in marked contrast with later historians of philosophy, and also with Indian nationalist and neo-Hindu thinkers like Vivekananda and Radhakrishnan, who downgraded Indian rationalist traditions in favor of 'spiritualist' or 'speculative' texts. This article traces the role of these later thinkers in the origins of the myth that Indian thought is spiritual and a-rational. The extent to which Nineteenth-century European philosophers were aware of Colebrooke's 'discovery' is documented, and then their criticisms of the Hindu syllogism and its defense by orientalists like Ballantyne and Muller are examined."

  65. ———. 1995. "Vyadi and the Realist Theory of Meaning." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 23:403-428.

    "Vyadi, a celebrated Indian linguist, endorses a version of the realist theory of meaning, that the meaning of a word is the object for which it stands. As applied to generic nominals like "(the) cow", Vyadi's thesis faced two much rehearsed objections: 1) if, for each token utterance, a separate meaning rule must be given, then the number of such rules will be "limitless", and the word will be radically homonymous; 2) if only some finite set is given, use of the word to refer outside this set will be "aberrant". These arguments significantly resemble certain Davidsonian constraints on a theory of meaning. The application of Vyadi's theory to proper names is also examined."

  66. ———. 1996. "Meaning and Reference in Classical India." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 24:1-19.

    "In another paper, I discussed the grammarian Vyadi's realist' theory of meaning, and showed how its failure to distinguish between the concepts of meaning' and reference' laid open his theory to a series of powerful objections. Later grammarians and Naiyayikas were forced to seek new, more sophisticated, accounts of the semantics of proper names and nominals, and in doing so introduced important innovations in the theory of meaning. I would like in this paper to discuss the contributions of these authors, especially to our understanding of the relation between the meaning of a term and its reference, and to the semantics of context-sensitive expressions."

  67. ———. 1999. Semantic Powers. Meaning and the Means of Knowing in Classical Indian Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

  68. ———, ed. 2001. Indian Logic: A Reader. Richmond: Curzon.

    Contents: Preface VII-IX; Jonardon Ganeri: Introduction: Indian Logic and the Colonization of Reason 1; Chapter 1: Henry T. Colebrooke: The Philosophy of the Hindus: On the Nyāya and Vaisesika Systems (1824) 26; Chapter 2: Max Muller: On Indian Logic (1853) 59; Chapter 3: H. N. Randle: A Note on the Indian Syllogism (1924) 75; Chapter 4: Stanislaw Schayer: Studies in Indian Logic (1932-3) 93; Chapter 5: Stanislaw Schayer: On the Method of Research into Nyāya (1933) 102; Chapter 6: Daniel H. H. Ingalls: Logic in India (1955) 110; Chapter 7: I. M. Bochenski: The Indian Variety of Logic (1956) 117; Chapter 8: J. F. Staal: The Concept of Paksa in Indian Logic (1973) 151; Chapter 9: Sibajiban Bhattacharyya: Some Aspects of the Navya-Nyāya Theory of Inference (1987) 162; Bimal Krishna Matilal: Chapter 10: Introducing Indian Logic (1998) 183; Readings in Indian Logic 216-221.

  69. ———. 2002. "Jaina Logic and the Philosophical Basis of Pluralism." History and Philosophy of Logic no. 23:267-281.

  70. ———. 2003. "Ancient Indian Logic as a Theory of Case-Based Reasoning." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 31:33-45.

  71. ———. 2003. "Hinduism and the Proper Work of Reason." In The Blackwell Companion to Hinduism, edited by Flood, Gavin, 411-446. Malden: Blackwell Publishing.

  72. Gangopadhyay, Mrinal Kanti. 1971. "The Concept of Upadhi in Nyāya Logic." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 1:146-166.

  73. ———. 1984. Indian Logic in its Sources: On Validity of Inference. New Delhi: Munhsiram Monoharlal.

  74. Gerow, Edwin. 1984. "Language and Symbol in Indian Semiotics." Philosophy East and West no. 34:245-260.

  75. Gillon, Brendan S. 1997. "Negative Facts and Knowledge of Negative Facts." In Relativism, Suffering and Beyond: Essays in Memory of Bimal K. Matilal, edited by Bilimoria, Purusottama and Mohanty, Jitendra Nath, 128-149. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

    Abstract: "Negative facts have perplexed Western philosophers ever since the time of Plato. But the philosophers of Europe and America have not been the only philosophers to have been perplexed by them; classical Indian philosophers too have pondered their nature. My interest here is to explore how the reflections of these classical Indian philosophers, transposed into the contemporary philosophical idiom, might enrich current metaphysical thinking about negative facts; and what I shall conclude is that at least one of these philosophers has a view of negative facts and knowledge of them, which, when so transposed, is very plausible indeed.

    I shall begin by asking the fundamental ontological question of whether or not negative facts exist and then sketch various replies which European and American philosophers have given to it. Since these replies have not led to any decisive answer to the question, I shall then ask two other questions: the more specific ontological question of whether or not absences-surely paradigmatic examples of negative facts-exist; and the related epistemological question of what is known when the absence of something is said to be known. Answers to these questions comprise an important part of classical Indian philosophy; and I shall outline their answers to them, concluding that the most plausible answers to these questions are those of Jayanta Bhatta, who maintained that absences do indeed exist and that they are known not only by inference but also by perception."

  76. Gillon, Brendan S., and Lile Love, Martha. 1980. "Indian Logic Revisited: Nyāyapraveśa Reviewed." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 8:349-384.

  77. Glashoff, Klaus. 2004. "On Stanislaw Schayer's Research on Nyāya." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 32:295-319.

  78. ———. 2004. "Using Formulas for the Interpretation of Ancient Indian Logic." Hōrin: Vergleichende Studien zur japanischen Kultur / Comparative Studies in Japanese Culture no. 11:9-21.

  79. Gokhale, Pradeep P. 1982. "The Terms Padartha and Prameya in the Context of Nyayasutra." Philosophy East and West no. 32:207-211.

    "In this paper an attempt has been made to show that the Vaisesika concept of "padartha" as 'a type of object in this world' is not properly applicable to the sixteen terms mentioned by Gautama in Nyāya-Sutra III. Traditionally "artha" (in Gautama's list of "prameyas") was identified with "padartha" of Vaisesika's. But identification of Gautama's "prameya" or "artha" with Vaisesika "padartha" is misleading. The sixteen terms of Nyāya are also not 'categories' in the technical sense. Gautama's definition of 'padartha' has linguistic import rather than ontological."

  80. ———. 1992. Inference and Fallacies Discussed in Ancient Indian Logic with Special Reference to Nyāya Buddhism. New Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications.

  81. Gorisse, Marie-Hélène. 2022. "The Opponent: Jain Logicians Reacting to Dharmakīrti’s Theory of Inference." In Handbook of Logical Thought in India, edited by Sarukkai, Sundar, 1-22. Dordrecht: Springer.

    Abstract: "The goal of this chapter is to present the contribution made by Jaina philosophers in the conception of inference in the classical paradigm of philosophy in India. In this perspective, the attacks and defenses that Jaina philosophers in the lineage of Akalaṅka performed against the Buddhist thinker Dharmakīrti are precious witnesses, not only of the development of the Jaina conceptions but also of their contribution to the general constitution of the framework of debate. This chapter is moreover conceived to clarify the consequences of argumentative, epistemic, and more formal considerations at important transition periods of the development of these conceptions of inference."

  82. Gorisse, Marie‑Hélène. 2021. "Jain Philosophers in the Debating Hall of Classical India." Argumentation no. 35:35-49.

    Abstract: "The practice of rational debate between philosophers from different traditions, especially between Hindu—Naiyāyika and Mīmāṃsaka—, Buddhist and Jain philosophers, is unique in classical India. Around the 7th c., a pan-Indian consensus was

    achieved on what counts as a satisfactory justification. The core of such discussions is an inferential reasoning whose structure is such that it ensures that its conclusions are recognised as knowledge statements, irrespective of the obedience of the interlocutor. In this line, stories of conversion following those philosophical debates are commonplace in the narratives of the different traditions and regularly involve the conversion of a royal patron. Beside the influence of argumentative practices on social and political changes, theories of argumentation have deeply influenced the whole edifice of philosophy in pre modern India, since no philosopher can claim a thesis without being committed to defend it in this highly regulated dialogical framework. Moreover, the characterisation, as well as the methods to test the validity of this justification, raised the question of the existence of shared principles and was a battlefield for the different traditions to establish their own conceptions on the constitution of the world and on our ability to know it. The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of the contribution of the minority tradition that is Jainism to the framework of philosophical disputation in India."

  83. Gosh, Ragunath. 2022. "Logical Aspects of Grammar: Pāṇini and Bhartṛhari." In Handbook of Logical Thought in India, edited by Sarukkai, Sundar and Chakraborty, Mihir Kumar, 1-23. Dordrecht: Delhi.

    Abstract: "The present entry addresses the problem that between language and grammar which one is prior and the relation between them with special reference to Indian tradition in order to understand the importance of grammar. Secondly, an address will be made to the chief contributions of the grammarians to the philosophy of language as such. By way of rounding off these questions some evaluative and critical points will be put forth.

    The present entry will deal with the arguments behind the first problem mentioned earlier. Secondly, an address will be made to the reasonings for which they are considered as chief contributions of the grammarians to the philosophy of language as such. Grammar has been taken as an aid to detect corrupt word (apaśabda), formation of word, meaningfulness of null-class, akhaṇḍa-vākyārtha-vāda, anvitābhidhāna-vāda, division of Vāk, Sphoṭa theory, and some epistemological reflections of them. It should be borne in mind that all these theories are interrelated. There are certain reasonings which are related to each other. As the grammarians believe in Sphoṭa theory of Vāk, i.e., the primordial originating point of a word is Sphoṭa, it gives rise to the theory of holistic meaning which again is related to anvitābhidhāna theory. By virtue of being originated from one source its meaning comes into existence in one burst which is indivisible. Due to its indivisibility it becomes sentence-related contextualism, i.e., meaning of the sentence comes into being at the first flash giving rise to word-meaning afterwards. The grammarians do not always admit that their job is only to show the path of rectifying or purifying language. Ultimate goal of them is also to direct a man to reach in the realm of metaphysics which is beyond all cognitions. In Vākyapadīya grammar is taken as the entrance of heaven and also royal road to liberation. That is why they have given much importance to Vedas whether there is no room for corrupt word and misunderstanding of the statement. To Bhartṛhari liberation may not be considered as the ultimate goal to someone yet through the instrumentality of Vāk he attains a great poetic pleasure generated through the light of the lights (jyotiṣāṁ jyotiḥ) of sound overcoming darkness (tamasaḥ parastāt), which is not at all ignorable in this world."

  84. Gradinarov, Plamen. 1989. "Laugākṣi Bhāskara on Inference: Problems of Generalizing Ideation in ComparativeLight." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 17:225-264.

  85. Guha, Dinesh Chandra. 1968. Navya Nyāya System of Logic. (Some Basic Theories and Techniques). Varanasi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakasan.

    Second revised edition with the title: Navya Nyāya System of logic: theories and techniques, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1979.

  86. Guhe, Eberhard. 2022. "The Logic of Late Nyāya: A Property-Theoretic Framework for a Formal Reconstruction." In Handbook of Logical Thought in India, edited by Sarukkai, Sundar and Chakraborty, Mihir Kumar, 1-23. Dordrecht: Delhi.

    Abstract: "Late Nyāya and Navya-Nyāya are renowned for their affinity to Western formal logic. The interest of modern interpreters has especially been sparked by the technical language of the Navya-Naiyāyikas and by their attempt to formulate theorems about properties by means of these peculiar linguistic tools. The aim of the present contribution is to provide a property-theoretic framework for a formal reconstruction of Navya-Nyāya logic. “The Logic of Late Nyāya: Problems and Issues,” published in the same book, demonstrates its utility by referring to some pertinent examples."

  87. ———. 2022. "The Logic of Late Nyāya: Problems and Issues." In Handbook of Logical Thought in India, edited by Sarukkai, Sundar and Chakraborty, Mihir Kumar, 1-29. Dordrecht: Delhi.

    Abstract: "The purpose of the present chapter is to demonstrate the utility of the property-theoretic framework for a formal reconstruction of Navya-Nyāya logic which was introduced in Guhe 2016 (Computer Science Journal of Moldova 24/3 (72): 312–334). Some pertinent examples have been selected, namely the Navya-Naiyāyikas’ operations applied to properties and relations, their discovery of theorems related to these operations, their account of the reference of number words, and the definition of the concept of pervasion. Several alternative methods of formalization in secondary sources are noted and critically examined."


    E. Guhe, “The absence of the difference from a pot is potness” – Axiomatic Proofs of Theorems Concerning Negative Properties in Navya-Nyāya. Computer Science Journal of Moldova, vol. 24/3 (72) (2016), pp. 312–334.

  88. Gupta, Bina. 1980. "Are Hetvabhasas Formal Fallacies?" Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 8:135-147.

    "The first part of the paper examines the "Hetvabhasas" of the Nyāya school. The second part analyzes the differences between Indian and Western conceptions of fallacy and deals with the question whether the Indian account of the "Hetvabhasas" is totally devoid of the notion of formal fallacy as it is understood in the West. I have suggested that though the "completed" Nyāya inference includes the properties of formal validity, the notion of "Hetvabhasa" presents only the necessary conditions for satisfactorily completing such an inferential process. Thus, while the Nyāya inference adequately accounts for the validity of the final "product" of inference, the Nyāya "Hetvabhasas" account for the inferential process leading up to a sound product of inference."

  89. Hamlin, Edward. 1983. "Discourse in the Lankāvatāra-sūtra." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 11:267-313.

  90. Houben, Jan E. M. 1997. "The Sanskrit Tradition." In The Emergence of Semantics in Four Linguistic Traditions, edited by Van Bekkum, Wout, Houben, Jan E. M., Sluiter, Ineke and Versteegh, Kees, 49-145. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

    9: Bhartṛhari’s discussion of linguistic and semantic theories: major issues and parameters, pp. 110-119.

  91. Houben, Jan E.M. 2000. "Language and Thought in the Sanskrit Tradition." In History of the Language Sciences. An International Handbook on the Evolution of the Study of Language from the Beginnings to the Present. Vol. 1, edited by Auroux, Sylvain, Koerner, E.F.K., Niederehe, Hans-Josef and Versteegh, Kees, 146-156. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

  92. Ingalls, Daniel Henry Holmes. 1951. Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

  93. ———. 1955. "A Reply to Bhattacharya." Philosophy East and West no. 5:163-166.

  94. Jayaraman, Thanga. 2022. "Logic in Tamil Didactic Literature." In Handbook of Logical Thought in India, edited by Sarukkai, Sundar and Chakraborty, Mihir Kumar, 1-19. Dordrecht: Delhi.

    Abstract: "Demonstrating that there had been an ancient logical tradition native to the Tamil society, Nirmal Selvamony has, in a paper entitled, “The Syllogistic Circle in tolkāppiyam” (The syllogistic circle in tolkāppiyam. 65th Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress. Madurai-Kamaraj University, Madurai, 27–29 Dec. Unpublished Paper, 1990; Journal of Tamil Studies 57 & 58: 117–134, 2000), identified the five-member syllogism central to the tradition. He has also shown that kāṇṭikai had perfect application to Tamil didactic texts and was significantly different from the universally adopted Aristotelian three-member syllogism. The early tendency of the Tamils was to identify logic with philosophy and religion. Taking a departure from this tendency, he recovers the original definition of kāṇṭikai from iḷampūraṇār’s commentary on tolkāppiyam. This chapter tries to identify the structure of arguments in Tamil didactic verses employing the kāṇṭikai form. The application of kāṇṭikai to diverse Tamil texts as an analytic tool has no hermeneutic intent, but the tool gets itself defined in the process. The argument of this chapter is that the efficiency of the different members of kāṇṭikai can be better appreciated when their correspondence to those of the jurisprudential model of argument, described by Stephen Toulmin, is traced. Taking a clue from Toulmin, it is also argued that many Tamil didactic texts have what Collingwood calls “absolute presuppositions” and that these presuppositions have correspondence to “warrants” in the jurisprudential structure of argument. The ubiquitous analogy and recursive analogical reasoning found in Tamil texts can also be accommodated in this model of argument when the features of an analogy are seen as the “datum” in the jurisprudential model. This helps us overcome the problem in claiming application of logic to didactic texts of preceptorial tone, the arguments of which, though often seen as assertions and affirmations on authority, do have warrants and also backing for their warrants. The arguments of Tamil didactic verses, when cast in the kāṇṭikai form of argument thus eclectically constructed, allow us to clearly see the unstated presupposition of every one of them."

  95. Jha, Ujjwala. 2002. Mimamsa Philosophy of Language. Delhi: SRI Satguru Publications.

  96. Jha, Vashishtha Narayan. 1985. "Problem of Error: the views of the Grammarians." Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute:231-238.

    Reprinted in V. N. Jha, Studies in Language, Logic, and Epistemology, Delhi: Pratibha Prakashan, 1986, pp. 92-100.

  97. ———. 1986. The Logic of the Intermediate Causal Link. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications.

    Containing the Sanskrit Ttext of the Apurvavada of the Sabdakhanda of the Tattvacintamani of Gangesa with English Translation and Introduction.

  98. Joshi, S. D. 2001. "Syntactic and Semantic Devices in the Astādhyāyī of Pānini." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 29:155-167.

  99. Kahrs, Eivind. 1998. Indian Semantic Analysis: The Nirvacana Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  100. Kak, Subhash. 2010. "Logic in Indian Thought." In Logic in Religious Discourse, edited by Schumann, Andrew, 20-32. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

    Abstract: "This paper presents an overview of the Indian tradition of logic. The paper starts with Vedic ideas and goes on to summarize the relevant contributions of the formal schools of philosophy which included one devoted principally to logic. The Indian tradition of logic reached its peak in the Navya Nyāya school of medieval India."

  101. Kalghatgi, T. G. 1981. Jaina Logic (Anekānta, Naya and Syādvada). New Delhi: Shri Raja Krishen Jain Charitable Trust.

  102. Kalyana Sastry, O. G. P. . 2022. "Technical Language of Navya Nyāya." In Handbook of Logical Thought in India, edited by Sarukkai, Sundar and Chakraborty, Mihir Kumar, 1-23. Dordrecht: Delhi.

    Abstract: "The Nyāya system, which is one of the six schools of Indian orthodox philosophy, can be broadly classified into Prācīna Nyāya and Navya Nyāya with respect to chronology. The older school of Nyāya discussed mainly about the objects of a valid cognition, namely Prameyās, while the neo-Naiyāyikās shifted their area of focus onto the means of valid cognition, i.e., the Pramāṇās. Hence, it is said that Prācīna Nyāya is Prameyā Pradhāna while Navya Nyāya is Pramāṇā Pradhāna.

    During this process of shifting, there evolved a methodology of language which was so technical yet precise that many other streams like grammar, law, and aesthetics adopted it. Words like avacchedaka, nirūpaka, pratiyogin, anuyogin, etc. were used frequently during philosophical debates and while defining new concepts.

    The current chapter deals with how such a methodological language evolved over a span of 15 centuries, ever since the Sūtras, the need for the development of such a technical language, and finally some of the unique characteristics of this technical language."

  103. Kataoka, Kei. 2003. "The Mimamsa Definition of Pramana as a source of New Information." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 31:89-103.

  104. Keith, Arthur Berriedale. 1921. Indian Logic and Atomism: An Exposition of the Nyāya and Vaiçeṣika Systems. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Reprint: New York: Greenwood Press, 1968 and New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corp., 1977.

  105. Kellner, Birgit. 2003. "Integrating Negative Knowledge into "Pramana" Theory: The development of the "Drśyānupalabdhi" in Dharmakīrti' earlier works." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 31:121-159.

  106. Kronen, John, and Tuttle, Jacob. 2011. "Composite Substances as True Wholes: Toward a Modified Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Theory of Composite Substances." Canadian Journal of Philosophy no. 41:289-316.

  107. Kulkarni, Amba. 2022. "Later Nyāya Logic: Computational Aspects." In Handbook of Logical Thought in India, edited by Sarukkai, Sundar and Chakraborty, Mihir Kumar, 1-23. Dordrecht: Delhi.

    Abstract: "In this article we describe the computational aspects of the Technical Language of Navya-Nyāya. Navya-Nyaya is an off-shoot of the early Nyāya philosophy. It deviates from the Nyāya philosophy in three major ways. First, instead of prameyas the discussions are centered around the pramāṇas. Second, the Navya-Nyāya has adapted the Vaiseṣika ontology. And finally it has introduced a few concepts expressed through an unambiguous technical terminology that brings in a clarity in the communication removing the inherent ambiguities of a natural language. In this article the syntax of expressions involving this technical terminology is described, followed by a scheme based on Conceptual Graphs of Sowa for their graphical rendering. Finally a computational algorithm is described that renders the graphs corresponding to the Navya-Nyāya expressions semi-automatically."

  108. Kuniko, Hosono. 2014. "Uddyotakara's Logic and Predicate Logic." Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies no. 62:1156-1161.

  109. Lama, Doboom Tulku, and Joshi, Maya. 2010. Pramana: Dharmakirti and the Indian Philosophical Debate. New Delhi: Manohar Publishers & Distributors.

  110. Lawrence, David Peter. 2022. "Pratyabhijñā Inference as a Transcendental Argument about a Nondual, Plenary God." In Handbook of Logical Thought in India, edited by Sarukkai, Sundar and Chakraborty, Mihir Kumar, 1-30. Dordrecht: Delhi.

    Abstract: "The two most well-known and important nondual Śaiva and tantric philosophers are Utpaladeva (c. 900–950 CE) and Abhinavagupta (c. 950–1020 CE). Utpaladeva furthered the initiatives of his teacher Somānanda (c. 900–950 CE) in creating the originary verses and commentaries of the Pratyabhijñā system of philosophical theology. Abhinavagupta is famous for brilliant and extensive commentaries on Utpaladeva’s writings as well as for the creation of a vast corpus of philosophical hermeneutics, itself comprising both a poetics and an exegetics of tantric symbolism and ritual.

    This chapter clarifies and build upon the interpretations of the overarching Pratyabhijñā inference as a transcendental argument in the article, “Tantric Argument: The Transfiguration of Philosophical Discourse in The Pratyabhijñā System of Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta” (1996) and the book Rediscovering God with Transcendental Argument (1999). It considers how the Pratyabhijñā inference may be characterized as transcendental, answering various objections to that characterization, provides translations of key passages for understanding the Pratyabhijñā method (especially, IPV 2.3.17 and a paragraph from IPV 1.17.1 on the identification of cosmogony and teleology), and summarizes some of the author’s later research that pertains to this subject."

  111. Lloyd, Keith. 2022. "Early Nyāya Logic: Rhetorical Aspects." In Handbook of Logical Thought in India, edited by Sarukkai, Sundar and Chakraborty, Mihir Kumar, 1-24. Dordrecht: Delhi.

    Abstract: "Nyāya philosophy emerged when Akṣapāda Gautama (first century CE), credited with authoring the Nyāyasūtra, redacted ideas originating from Medhatithi Gautama (fifth century BCE). However, many of Medhatithi’s ideas were “reproduced” in the Caraka Saṃhitā about 78 CE (Vidyābhūṣaṇa History 25), indicating that concepts from both Medhatithi and Nyāya were in circulation well before Akṣapāda’s redaction – including elements of the five-part approach to reasoning called “the Nyāya method.” The Caraka Saṃhitā, though mostly about Ayurvedic medicine, includes a very focused debate manual bearing profound implications for the history and study of “comparative” rhetoric, which attempts to look beyond ancient Greece for other origins and interpretations of rhetoric. Early studies of Robert Oliver (Communication and culture in Ancient China and India. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 1971) and George Kennedy (Comparative rhetoric : An historical and cross-cultural Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press. 1998) identified Indian forms of rhetorical practice found in ancient literature. However, the presence of rhetorical manuals and terminologies shows that India, though it did not develop a concept exactly like Greek rhetoric, not only practiced debate but created theories about it, leading to an entire school of philosophy. To expand the knowledge of rhetorical terminologies, approaches, and contexts in ancient India, this chapter traces the case-based rhetorical origins and concepts that became Nyāya philosophy, focusing upon the Caraka Saṃhitā, the Nyāyasūtra, and other ancient sources."

  112. Łucyszyna, Olena. 2017. "On the Notion of Linguistic Convention (saṁketa) in the Yogasūtrabhāṣya." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 45:1-19.

    Abstract: "The aim of this study is to clarify the meaning of the term saṁketa, which is usually translated as ‘(linguistic) convention’, in the Yogasūtrabhāṣya, the first and the most authoritative commentary to the Yogasūtras. This paper is a contribution to the reconstruction of the classical Yoga view on the relation between word and its meaning, for saṁketa is a key term used by this darśana in discussing this relation. The textual analysis of the Yogasūtrabhāṣya has led me to the conclusion that its author’s understanding of the linguistic convention (saṁketa) is different from the notion of the linguistic convention (saṁketa/samaya) of the Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas and similar to the notion of the linguistic convention (samaya/saṁketa) of the Grammarians (as presented in Houben’s article “Bhartrhari’s samaya/Helārāja’s saṁketa. A contribution to the reconstruction of the Grammarian’s discussion with the Vaiśeṣikas on the relation between śabda and artha”, published in the “Journal of Indian Philosophy”) [*]. These are interpretations of the term saṁketa which reflect Yogasūtrabhāṣya’s understanding of the linguistic convention: the tradition of the usage of words, established (practice/custom of the) usage of words. Saṁketa of the Yogasūtrabhāṣya, unlike saṁketa/samaya of the Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas, is not an agreement established by anyone, but an agreement in the sense of tradition, established practice, or established custom.

    Unlike the saṁketa/samaya of these philosophers, the saṁketa of the Yogasūtrabhāṣya, having neither beginning nor end, is not re-created (re-established), but only made known (revealed) at the beginning of each cycle of existence of the world."

    [*] Vol. 20, No. 2 (June 1992), pp. 219-242