History of Logic from Aristotle to Gödel by Raul Corazzon | e-mail: rc
Bagchi, Sitansusekhar. 1953. Inductive Reasoning: A Study of Tarka and Its Role in Indian Logic. Calcutta: Calcutta University.
Bandyopadhyay, Nandita. 1977. The Concept of Logical Fallacies: Problem of Hetvābhāsa in Navya Nyāya in the Light of Gaṅgeśa and Raghunātha Śiromaṇi. Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar.
———. 1989. Definition of Valid Knowledge: Pramalaksana in Gaṅgeśa's Tattvacintamani. Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar.
Vol. I: Opponents position (Purvapaksa).
Bandyopadhyay, Nandita, Bhattacharyya, Sibajiban, Chakrabarti, Kishor Kumar, Jha, V.N. , Matilal, Bimal Krishna, Mohanty, Jitendranath, Mukhopadhyaya, R.K. , Nyayacharya, Madhusudana, and Saha, Sukha Ranjan. 1993. "Gaṅgeśa." In Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. 6: Indian Philosophical Analysis: Nyāya-Vaiśesika from Gangeśa to Raghunātha Śiromani, edited by Potter, Karl H. and Bhattacharya, Sibajiban, 85-312. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Nandita Bandyopadhyaya, Sibajiban Bhattacharyya, Kishor Kumar Chakrabarti, V.N. Jha, Bimal Krishna Matilal, Jitendranath Mohanty, R.K. Mukhopadhyaya, Madhusudana Nyayacharya, Sukha Ranjan Saha: Tattvacintâmani (Book One: Perception p. 86; Book Two: Inference p. 170; Book Three: Comparison p. 238; Book Four: Verbal testimony [Language] p. 239-312).
Banerjee, Kali Krishna. 1957. "Knowledge of Knowledge: A Meta-hypothetical Study of Nyaya Theory of Knowledge of Knowledge." Journal of the Philosophical Association (Nagpur) no. 4:25-36.
Reprinted in Kalyan Sen Gupta, Krishna Roy (eds.), Language, Knowledge and Ontology: A Collection of Essays by Professor K. K. Banerjee, New Delhi: Indian Council of Philsophical Research 1988, pp. 220-232.
Beaulieu, Jack. 2021. "Gaṅgeśa on Absence in Retrospect." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 49:1-37.
Abstract: "Cases of past absence (prāṅnâstitāsthala) involve agents noticing in retrospect that an object or property was absent, such as when one notices later that a colleague was not at a talk. In Sanskrit philosophy, such cases are introduced by Kumārila as counterexamples to the claim that knowledge of absence (abhāva) is perceptual (pratyakṣa), but further take on a life of their own as a topic of inquiry among Kumārila’s commentators and their Nyāya interlocutors. In this essay, I examine the Nyāya philosopher Gaṅgeśa’s epistemology of past absence, according to which agents learn that a recollectable (smaraṇârha) object or property was absent by inferring its past absence from failing to recall (asmaraṇa) that object or property. Gaṅgeśa’s account is best appreciated against the backdrop of earlier theories and their shortcomings, and I begin by presenting historical views leading up to his. I identify two groups of views about the epistemology of past absence: recollection views, according to which cases of past absence involve agents recalling negative information; and recollection failure views, according to which cases of past absence involve agents failing to recall positive information. I reconstruct two early recollection views: a Bhāṭṭa view belonging to Uṃveka, and a competing Nyāya view belonging to Jayanta and Bhāsarvajña. I then examine Śālikanātha and Sucarita’s critiques of recollection views, following which I reconstruct a Bhāṭṭa recollection failure view belonging to Pārthasārathi. I then examine Gaṅgeśa’s critiques of Pārthasārathi’s account and the recollection failure view he constructs out of its shortcomings."
Bhatta, Vinayaka P. 1993. "Gaṅgeśa's theory of the validity of words." Bulletin of the Deccan College Research Institute no. 53:17-28.
Bhattacarya, Tara Sankar. 1945. "The five provisional definitions of vyāpti (vyāptipañcaka) in Gaṅgeśa [First part]." Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute (Allahabad) no. 3:67-88.
———. 1946. "The five provisional definitions of vyāpti (vyāptipañcaka) in Gaṅgeśa [Second part]." Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute (Allahabad) no. 5.
———. 1949-50. "Gaṅgeśa's definitions of valid knowledge." Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute (Allahabad) no. 7:99-107.
———. 1957-58. "Gaṅgeśa's treatment of general nonexistence (sāmānyābhāva)." Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute (Allahabad) no. 15:1-12.
Bhattacharya, Dineshchandra. 1958. History of Navya-nyāya in Mithilā. Darbhanga: Mithilā Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning.
Chapter III: Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya and his Son Vardhamāna, pp. 96-112.
Bhattacharya, Gopikamohan. 1986. "Gaṅgeśa's kevalānvayī inference." Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal (Calcutta) no. 28:12-30.
Bhattacharya, Tushar Kanti. 1994. "Viśiṣtapratīti as a ground of samavāya: Gaṅgeśa's view." Vishwabhāratī Journal of Philosophy no. 31.
Bhattacharyya, Sibajiban. 1993. Gaṅgeśa's Theory of Indeterminate Perception: Nirvikalpakavada, Part 1. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research.
———. 1996. Gaṅgeśa's Theory of Indeterminate Perception: Nirvikalpakavada, Part 2. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research.
Chakraborty, Krishna. 1978. "Determination of universal concomitance." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 8:291-310.
———. 1978. "Definitions of Vyāpti (pervasion) in Navianyāya: A Critical Survey." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 5:209-236.
Char, D. Prahlada. 2006. "A review of the akhyāti theory of Prābhākara school of Mīmāṃsa īn Tattvacintāmaṇi of Gaṅgeśopādhyāya." In Pūrvamīmāṃsā from an Interdisciplinary Point of View, edited by Pandurangi, K. T., 495-527. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Chattopadhyaya, Uma. 2015. Faultless to a Fault: Gaṅgeśa on Upamāna in Indian Epistemology. New Delhi: DK Printworld.
Dalai, B. K. 1994. "Gaṅgeśa's Treatment of Inherence: A Critique." In Pandit N.R. Bhatt Felicitation Volume edited by Filliozat, Pierre-Sylvain, Narang, Satya Pal and Bhatta, C. Panduranga 345-364. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
"This paper aims at presenting a critical analysis of the Samavāyavāda(1) of Gaṅgeśa with a view to bring out his significant contribution to the problem of relations in general and the relation of inHerence in particular. It may be mentioned here that Gaṅgeśa's
contribution to the problem of Inherence should mainly be viewed in the light of (1) his refutation of the view of the opponent(= opp.) and the objector to the opp. (= ob-opp.), who, in most cases, is either a Buddhist or a Vedāntin or a Mimāsaka, and (2) strengthening the Nyāya position on inherence. One of the prime concern of this paper has been to identify these opp., along with their arguments by quoting suitable extracts from their texts along with the text of Gaṅgeśa."
(1) For the first time a critical analysis of the Samavāyavāda of Tattvacintāmaṇi is presented here. MM. Satis Chandra Vidyābhūsaṇa has pn:senttd a summary of it wbich hardly presents the analysis as such. Vide A History of Indian Logic, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1971, pp. 414 f.
Das, Nilanjan. 2011. "Lakṣaṇā as inference." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 39:353-366.
———. 2021. "Gaṅgeśa on Epistemic Luck." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 49:153-202.
Abstract: "This essay explores a problem for Nyāya epistemologists. It concerns the notion of pramā. Roughly speaking, a pramā is a conscious mental event of knowledge-acquisition, i.e., a conscious experience or thought in undergoing which an agent learns or comes to know something. Call any event of this sort a knowledge-event. The problem is this. On the one hand, many Naiyāyikas accept what I will call the Nyāya Definition of Knowledge, the view that a conscious experience or thought is a knowledge-event just in case it is true and non-recollective. On the other hand, they are also committed to what I shall call Nyāya Infallibilism, the thesis that every knowledge-event is produced by causes that couldn’t have given rise to an error. These two commitments seem to conflict with each other in cases of epistemic luck, i.e., cases where an agent arrives a true judgement accidentally or as a matter of luck. While the Nyāya Definition of Knowledge seems to predict that these judgements are knowledge-events, Nyāya Infallibilism seems to entail that they aren’t. In this essay, I show that Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, the 14th century Naiyāyika, solves this problem by adopting what I call epistemic localism, the view that upstream causal factors play no epistemically significant role in the production of knowledge."
———. 2021. "Correction to: Gaṅgeśa on Epistemic Luck." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 49:203-204.
Dasgupta, Surendranath. 1932. "An analysis of the epistemology of the new school of logic of Bengal." In Mālavīya Commemoration Volume, 459-468. Benaras: Hindu University.
Reprinted in S. Dasgupta, Phlosophical Essays, Calcutta: University of Calcutta 1941, pp. 321-331.
Dash, Achyutananda. 1995. "Exploring Gaṅgeśa's Pramālakṣaṇa: a prima facie view." Journal of the Indian Council for Philosophical Research no. 12:39-62.
———. 2007-2008. "Gaṅgeśa's theory of perception revisited." Vishweshwarānand Indological Journal no. 45-46:129-140.
Dash, Subas Chandra. 1992. Gaṅgeśa on Yogarūḍhi, containing the original text of the Yogarūḍhivāda of the Śabdakhaṇḍa of the Tattvacintāmaṇi with an English translation and detailed introduction. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications.
Dravid, N. S. 2007. Paksata: The Nature of Inferential Locus, a Psycho-epistemological Investigation of the Inferential Process. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research.
Study of Tattvacintāmaṇididhiti of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, commentary on Pakṣatā, portion of Tattvacintāmaṇi of Gaṅgeśa, dealing with the essential nature of proposition (pakṣatā), of Navya Nyāya school in Hindu philosophy.
Gangopadhyay, Mrinalkanti. 1975. "Gaṅgeśa on Vyāptigraha: The Means for the Ascertainment of Invariable Concomitance." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 3:167-208.
"The article is an exposition of the Vyaptigrahopaya (means for the ascertainment of invariable concomitance) section of the Tattvacintamani, the famous NavyaNyaya work of Gangesa. The Sanskrit original, given in transliteration, is divided into nineteen short texts. Texts 1-15 give the Prabhakara position: invariable concomitance is not ascertained through 'repeated observation', but through 'single observation'. texts 16-18 give Gangesa's refutation of the Prabhakara. Text 19 gives Gangesa's own position: the cause for the ascertainment of invariable concomitance is the perception of the coexistence of the probans with the probandum along with the absence of cognition concerning the irregularity of the probans."
Ghosh, Raghunath. 1980-82. "Certain ambiguities and clarifications in Prof. Mohanty's Gaṅgeśa's Theory of Truth." Vishwabhāratī Journal of Philosophy no. 16-18:138-147.
Reprinted in Daya Krishna, K. L. Sharma (eds.), The Philosophy of J. N. Mohanty, New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research 1991, pp. 45-54.
———. 1990. "Gaṅgeśa on Vallabhācārya's definition of vyāpti." Vishwabhāratī Journal of Philosophy no. 27:32-38.
Goekoop, Cornelis. 1967. The Logic of Invariable Concomitance in the Tattvacintamani. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Gangesa's Anumitinirupana and Vyaptivada, with introduction, translation, and commentary.
Goswami, Ashok K. 1989-91. "Gaṅgeśa's treatment of lakṣaṇā." Śrī Veṅkateśvara University Oriental Journal no. 32-34:161-168.
Guha, Nirmalya. 2012. "Lakṣaṇā as a creative function of language." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 40:489-509.
Ingalalli, R. I. 1988. "Gaṅgeśa's concept of knowledge." Pathway to God (Belgaum) no. 22:25-35.
Iwasaki, Yoichi. 2006. "From Udayana to Gaṅgeśa on the Independence of Śabda as a Pramāṇa." Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies no. 57:1183-1187.
———. 2011. "Some Remarks on Gaṅgeśa's Argument on Tāiparya." Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies no. 59:1132-1136.
———. 2014. "Svarūpa yogyatā and ākāṅkṣā: on the meaningfulness of sentences according to Navya-naiyāyikas." Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies no. 62:1162-1166.
Mandal, Prodyot Kumar. 1991-92. "Gaṅgeśa on nirvikalpakapratyakṣa." Darshan-Manjari. The Burdwan University Journal of Philosophy no. 6:71-77.
Matilal, Bimal Krishna. 1968. "Gaṅgeśa on the Concept of Universal Property (Kevalanvoyin)." Philosophy East and West no. 18:151-161.
Miyasaka, Yuko. 1987. "The definition of vyāpti in Navyanyāya--its nature and construction with reference to Gaṅgeśa and Raghunātha Śiromaṇi." Sambhasa no. 9:47-82.
Mohanta, Dilip Kumar. 2002. "Gaṅgeśa's theory of inherence (samavāyavāda) with a note on the nature of inherence (samavāya)." The Philosophical Quarterly. Journal of North Maharashtra University Pratap Centre no. 8:85-102.
Mohanty, Jitendra Nath. 1966. Gaṅgeśa's Theory of Truth. Santiniketan.
Containing the text of Gangesa's Pramanya Jnapti Vada with an English Translation, Explanatory notes, and an Introductory Essay.
Second revised edition: Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1989.
———. 1984. "Prāmāṇya and workability--response to Potter." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 12:329-338.
Mukherjea, Justice A. K. 1976. "The definition of pervasion (vyāpti) in Navya-Nyāya." Journal of lndian Philosophy no. 4:1-50.
———. 1979. "The definition of pervasion (vyāpti) in Navya-Nyāya II." Journal of lndian Philosophy no. 7:107-152.
Mukhopadhyaya, Pradyot Kumar. 1992. The Nyāya Theory of Linguistic Performance: A New Interpretation of Tattvacintāmaṇi. Calcutta: Jadavpur University.
Phillips, Stephen H. 1993. "Gaṅgeśa on Characterizing Veridical Awareness. The pramā-lakṣaṇa-vāda and pramā-lakṣaṇa-siddhānta from Gaṅgeśa's Tattvacintāmaṇi. An Annotated Translation." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 21:107-168.
———. 1996. "The Error of 'That": Gaṅgeśa on the Epistemology of the Memory Cognition ''That" (tad iti)." Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion no. 1:77-85.
———. 2000. "From Gaṅgeśa's Tattvacintamani: Discourse on Perceptual Presentation of Something as Other than What It Is." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 28:567-650.
"Classical Indian theory of perceptual illusion is refined by Gangesa (c. 1325) in this translation (with explanation) of an important section of his masterwork, "Jewel of reflection on the truth (about epistemology)". Illusion is a single cognition of an entity as qualified by a qualifier that is fused by memory into current perception. This view is challenged by various adversaries (mainly Mimansaka but also Buddhist and Vedantic). Examples agreed to are of people making false statements on the basis of perceptual evidence, e.g., "this is silver," when an object in front is really mother-of-pearl. One rival camp sees the unsuccessful effort to pick up silver as flowing from a failure to cognize of a certain sort, not from a perceptual misrepresentation. Gangesa devotes (successful) effort to refuting this and other views, his overall strategy being that though his view faces difficulties they are much less severe than those faced by the alternatives."
———. 2001. "Ellipses and propositional anaphora in Gaṅgeśa's Tattvacintāmaṇi: translational difficulties." In Les Sources et le Temps. Sources and Time, a Colloquium, Pondicherry 11-13 January 1997, edited by Grimal, François, 173-185. Puducherry: Institut Français de Pondichéry.
———. 2010. "From the Tattva-Cintāmaṇi by Gaṅgeśa: the Evāvyatir-ekaprakaraṇam: negative-only inference (annotated translation and comentary)." In Logic and Belief in Indian Philosophy, edited by Balcerowicz, Piotr, 435-506.
Second revised edition Warsaw 2016, pp. 447-517.
———. 2013. "Liberation: Gaṅgeśa’s Muktivāda and Nyāya on the supreme perssonal good (paramapuruṣārtha)." In An Indian Ending: Rediscovering the Grandeur of Indian Heritage for a Sustainable Future: Essays in Honor of Prof. Dr. John Vattanky SJ on completing Sixty Years, edited by Pandikattu, Kuruvilla and Pichalakkattu, Binoy, 193-210. New Delhi: Serials Publications.
———. 2017. "A Defeasibility Theory of Knowledge in Gaṅgeśa." In The Oxford Handbook of Indian Philosophy, edited by Ganeri, Jonardon, 541-558. New York: Oxford University Press.
Potter, Karl H. 1984. "Does Indian epistemology concern justified true belief?" Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 12:307-327.
Reprinted in Daya Krishna, K. L. Sharma (eds.), The Philosophy of J. N. Mohanty, New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research 1991, pp. 121-142 and in Roy W. Perrett (ed.), Indian Philosophy: A Collection of Readings. Volume 1: Epistemology, New York: Routledge 2001, pp. 121-142.
Saha, Sukharanjan. 1982. "A study in Gaṅgeśa's theory of viśeṣaṇa." Jadavpur Studies in Philosophy no. 4:109-166.
———. 1988. "Gaṅgeśa and transfer of meaning." Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion no. 7:57-98.
———. 1994. "Gaṅgeśa on self-mentioning words." In Knowing from Words: Western and Indian Philosophical Analysis of Understanding and Testimony, edited by Matilal, Bimal Krishna and Chakrabarti, Arindam, 367-384. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
———. 2008. "Meaning of the First Person Pronoun: Gaṅgeśa's View and Its Perspectives." Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion no. 13:87-110.
Shaw, J. L. . 1995. "The concept of relevance (saṃgati) in Gaṇgeśa." Sambhasa no. 16:133-136.
Shukla, C. S. 2013. "Gaṅgeśa’s critique of akhyātivāda of Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā: a critical appraisal." In An Indian Ending. Rediscovering the Grandeur of Indian Heritage for a Sustainable Future. Essays in Honor of Prof. Dr. John Vattanky SJ on completing Sixty Years, edited by Pandikattu, Kuruvilla and Pichalakkattu, Binoy, 155-164. Delhi: Serials Publications.
Tivari, Heeraman. 1989. "Meanings re: Gaṅgeśa." In Dharma-Nirājanā: A Volume Dedicated to the Memory of Dr. Dharmendra Nath Shastri, edited by Upadhyaya, Vachaspati, Narang, Satyapal and Punjani, Shakuntala, 386-394. Delhi: Parimal Publications.
Vatttanky, John. 1979. "Śaśadhara's Īśvaravāda: An important source of Gangeśa's Īśvaravāda." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 7:257-266.
———. 1982. "The inference of Gaṅgesa to establish the existence of God." Journal of Indian Philosophy:37-50.
———. 1984. Gaṅgeśaʼs Philosophy of God: Analysis, Text, Translation, and Interpretation of Īśvaravāda Section of Gaṅgeśaʼs Tattvacintāmaṇi with a Study of the Development of Nyāya Theism. Madras: Adyar Library and Research Centre.
Vidyabhusana, Satis Chandra. 1918. "The Tattvacintāmaṇi, a most advanced work in Hindu logic." Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, Bombay Branch no. 4:279-331.
Reprinted in S. C. Vidyabhusana, A History of Indian Logic (Ancient, Mediaeval and Modern Schools), Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1920, pp. 407-453.
———. 1920. A History of Indian Logic (Ancient, Mediaeval and Modern Schools). Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Wada, Toshihiro. 1991. "Gaṅgeśa and Mathurānātha on the pakṣa and pakṣatā." In Kalyana-Mitta: Professor Hajime Nakamura Felicitation Volume, edited by Jha, V. N., 137-142. Delhi: Satguru Publications.
———. 1994. "A source of Gaṅgeśa's conclusive definition of vyāpti." Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies no. 43:9-13.
———. 1995. "Gaṅgeśa and Mathurānātha on Siṃhavyāghralakṣaṇa of Vyapti (1)." no. 23:273-294.
———. 1997. "Gaṅgeśa and Mathurānātha on Siṃhavyāghralakṣaṇa of Vyapti (2)." no. 25:375-391.
———. 1998. "Gaṅgeśa and Mathurānātha on Siṃhavyāghralakṣaṇa of Vyapti (3)." no. 26:131-159.
———. 1998. "Gaṅgeśa and Mathurānātha on Siṃhavyāghralakṣaṇa of Vyapti (4)." Nagoya Studies in Indian Culture and Buddhism: Sambhasa no. 19:1-21.
———. 1999. "Gaṅgeśa and Mathurānātha on Siṃhavyāghralakṣaṇa of Vyapti (5)." Journal of Indian Philosophy no. 27:397-409.
———. 1999. "Gaṅgeśa and Śaśadhara's second conclusive definition of vyāpti." In Wisdom in Indian Tradition: Prof. K.P. Jog Felicitation Volume, 301-309. Delhi: Pratibha Prakashan.
———. 2000. "Gaṅgeśa and Mathurānātha on Siṃhavyāghralakṣaṇa of Vyapti (6)." no. 28:77-98.
———. 2003. "The generation of Sanskrit texts in the New School of Indian logic (1). From Gaṅgeśa's Tattvacintāmaṇi to its Commentaries." Journal of Studies for the Integrated Text Science no. 1:63-80.
———. 2006. "A Navya-nyāya presupposition in determining the meaning of words." Acta Asiatica no. 90:71-91.
———. 2006. "Quotation and context in commentaries of the new school of Indian logic (Navya-nyāya)." In Conflict between Tradition and Creativity in Indian Philosophy: Text and Context, edited by Wada, Toshihiro, 61-71. Nagoya: Graduate School of Letters.
———. 2007. "Gaṅgeśa on the meaning of verbal suffixes." In Expanding and Merging Horizons. Contributions to South Asian and Cross-Cultural Studies in Commemoration of Wilhelm Halbfass, edited by Preisendanz, Karin, 415-431. Wien: Austrian Academy of Sciences Press.
———. 2010. "The Genesis of Sanskrit Texts and Their Context in Navya-nyāya: From Gaṅgeśa's Tattvacintāmaṇi to Its Commentaries." In Indian Philosophy and Text Science, edited by Wada, Toshihiro, 183-201. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
———. 2014. "Gāṅgeśa’s theory of the meaning of verbal suffixes (ākhyāta)." Sambhasa no. 31:61-74.
———. 2016. "Gaṅgeśa on the meanings of verbal roots (dhātu)." Journal of VA Foundation for Indological Studies no. 2:35-50.
———. 2016. "The Logical Structure of the Third and Fifth Definitions in the Vyāptipañcaka Section of Gaṅgeśa’s Tattvacintāmaṇi." In Comparative Philosophy and J.L. Shaw, 203-215. Dordrecht: Springer.