Annotated Bibliography of Lambertus Marie de Rijk. Third Part: from 1987 to 1994

Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1987. "The anatomy of the proposition. Logos and Pragma in Plato and Aristotle." In Logos and Pragma: Essays on the Philosophy of Language in Honour of Professor Gabriel Nuchelmans, edited by de Rijk, Lambertus Marie and Braakhuis, Henk A.G., 27-61. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.

"Introductory

This study is written in honour of a scholar who, among many other things, has laid the solid basis for the study of what may be considered the kernel of the semantics of the statement-making utterance, viz. the definition of the bearers of truth and falsity.

In the first section I present a survey of Plato's semantics of the statement-making expression and a number of key notions involved. Next, I explore Aristotle's views of the matter, starting with a discussion of Aristotle's notion of pragma including that of being qua truth and not-being qua falsehood. In search for the nature of Aristotle's logos, I discuss this notion as it occurs on the onomazein level as well as the way in which it acts on the legein level. Next, I investigate the important notions of synthesis and dihaeresis and the role of einai as a monadic functor and qua syncategorematic container of categorial being. Finally, I attempt to present a characterization of Aristotle's statement-making utterance.

(...) p. 27

"Epilogue

We may summarize what we have found as follows:

1 For Plato,

1.1 a logos is a composite expression consisting of a name (onoma) and an attribute (rhêma) which as such is not yet a statement-making utterance

1.2 a logos represents a state of affairs (pragma), i.e. an actual combination of some participata (dynameis) in the outside world

1.3 a logos eirêmenos is a statement-making utterance; it asserts that the pragma represented by the logos is actually the case.

2 For Aristotle,

2.1 a logos is a composite expression consisting of an onoma and a rhêma which represents both a notional and an ontological state of affairs. It may be characterized as a 'statable complex'

2.2 a pragma is a state of affairs either ontologically: state of affairs being part of the outside world or semantically: state of affairs conceived of and expressed by a logos

2.3 a logos apophantikos ('statement-making utterance') is a logos actually stated (either asserted or denied)

2.4 a logos may as such be used either on the onomazein level or on the legein level (qua logos apophantikos). Similarly, phasis (kataphasis, apophasis) may be used on either of these levels

2.5 synthesis is either synthesis1, = the act of uniting an onoma and a rhêma into a logos (on the onomazein level) or synthesis2 = the assertion of such a union accomplished in a logos apophantikos, (on the legein level), while dihairesis is always the denial of such a union (on the legein level)

2.6 the esti forming part of a logos apophantikos is not a copula, properly speaking. Rather, it is a sign of (it consignifies, to speak with De interp. 3,16b24-5) synthesis2. The onoma and rhêma are already united to make up a logos ('statable complex') by synthesis, and, then, the esti rather than acting as a dyadic copulative functor, is merely a monadic sign of the 'statable complex' being actually stated

2.7 The propositional structure found in the logos apophantikos may be described as follows:

linguistically: a logos expressing categorial being (i.e. syncategorematic being implemented by one or more of the ten categories of being) is stated (either affirmatively or negatively) by means of the monadic functor 'be' or 'not be' semantically: the pragma represented by the logos is said to be (or not to be, respectively) part of the outside world (or: 'be (not) the case')." (pp. 53-54, notes omitted).

———. 1987. "Logic and ontology in Ockham. Some notes on his view of the Categories of Being and the nature of its basic principles." In Ockham and Ockhamists: Acts of the Symposium organized by the Dutch society for medieval philosophy Medium Aevum on the occasion of its 10th anniversary (Leiden, 10-12 September 1986), edited by Bos, Egbert Peter and Krop, Henri, 25-40. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.

Reprinted as chapter XIII in: Through Language to Reality. Studies in Medieval Semantics and Metaphysics.

"Conclusion. There is no single reason, I think, to ascribe to Ockham any feelings of hostility towards metaphysics on this account. God created 'true and real being', but He created it in shaping 'what is truly and really being', individual beings, that is. As created, it is radically changeable and contingent as well. Uncreated, unchangeable being is not to be created, not even as some mysterious constituent present in creatural being. Human beings are not entitled to sublimate their (indispensable) conceptual tools (e.g. universal terms) so that they represent unchangeable ontic standards. Whenever we are inclined to do so, Ockham's razor comes in, not however, to make us say that the metaphysical domain is void. Rather logic (and human thought in general) should make us recognize our own limitations, and refrain from speaking about the unspeakable when, and inasmuch as, our linguistic tools are bound to lead us astray. The same applies to Ockham's view of proofs of God's existence. He only admits the proof of God as first preserver of these actual things in this actual world and rejects all atemporal proofs. However, his faith is unshakeable and not involved in any philosophical thinking either. Likewise it is Ockham's ontology (doctrine of being) which is modest, the onta 'beings') are as abundant as they are. For that matter, Ockham let them really be (ontôs einai Plato would say). Well, in order to let them be, human thinking should be prudent in cautiously managing its homemade conceptual apparatus." (pp. 38-39)

———. 1987. "Gilbert de Poitiers. Ses vues sémantiques et métaphysiques." In Gilbert de Poitiers et ses contemporains: aux origines de la Logica modernorum. Actes du septième Symposium européen d'histoire de la logique et de la sémantique médiévales. Centre d'études supérieures de civilisation médiévale de Poitiers, Poitiers, 17-22 Juin 1985, edited by Libera, Alain de and Jolivet, Jean, 147-171. Napoli: Bibliopolis.

"La contribution à notre Symposium que je vous propose maintenant a pour but de n'envisager l'oeuvre théologique du fameux maître chartrain qu'au profit de notre connaissance de sa pensée philosophique. A l'intérieur de cette entreprise, on portera un intérêt spécial à l'interférence des vues sémantiques et métaphysiques chez Gilbert.

Prenons notre point de départ dans son commentaire sur le De hebdomadibus de Boèce. On va voir que l'étude de cette oeuvre nous fera entrer dans le coeur même de la problématique." (p. 147)

(...)

" Je suis d'avis que la finesse des expositions théologiques et philosophiques que nous offre le Porrétain nous échappe, à moins qu'elles ne soient replacées dans leur contexte sémantique. C'est bien dans le domaine de la sémantique que Gilbert est digne du vif intérêt de l'historien de la logique médiévale. Non pas seulement parce que ses expositions sont bien imprégnées de la pensée logico-grammaticale de son temps; cela n'a rien d'étonnant étant donné qu'il s'agit d'un savant de son envergure. Mais ce qui est d'un plus grand intérêt pour nous, ce sont les contributions que Gilbert a lui-même faites à l'évolution de la pensée sémantique au douzième siècle.

L'étude des oeuvres théologiques de Gilbert nous permet d'avancer les deux thèses suivantes:

(1) C'est par l'étude sémantique qu'est favorisée au plus haut point notre compréhension des pensées théologiques et philosophiques du Porrétain; je considère comme essentielles la manière et la mesure dont Gilbert a habillé, pour ainsi dire, sa pensée théologique et philosophique du vêtement de ses pensées grammatico-logicales.

(2) En expliquant les difficultés assez pénibles dans les opuscula sacra de Boèce, Gilbert a formulé ses propres vues sémantiques. Celles-ci, aussi empreintes de la tradition platonicienne qu'elles soient, ne témoignent pourtant pas moins d'une profondeur vraiment originale." (p. 171)

———. 1987. "War Ockham ein Antimetaphysiker? Eine semantische Betrachtung." In Philosophie im Mittelalter. Entwicklungslinien und Paradigmen. Wolfgang Kluxen zum 65. Geburstag, edited by Beckmann, Jan P., Honnefelder, Ludger and Wieland, Georg, 313-328. Hamburg: F. Meiner.

Reprinted as chapter XIV in: Through Language to Reality. Studies in Medieval Semantics and Metaphysics.

"IV. Schlußbetrachtung. Ockham anerkennt ohne Einschränkung den transzendenten Bezirk, d. h. das Metaphysische oder Übersinnliche als Bezirk; in diesem Sinne ist er also gewiß kein Antimetaphysiker. Aber verwirft er denn die Metaphysik als Wissenschaft, oder höhlt er sie zumindest aus? Zuerst muß anerkannt werden, daß Ockham im Prinzip der Metaphysik das Weisungsrecht über die Seienden (d. h., für Ockham, die individuellen Seienden) keineswegs abspricht. Zugleich kann nicht geleugnet werden, daß bei ihm der Metaphysik eine auffallend bescheidene Stelle zukommt. Wie läßt sich das unter Berücksichtigung von Ockhams unzweifelbarer Ehrfurcht vor dem Übersinnlieben erklären?

Der Schlüssel zur Lösung dieser Frage liegt nicht bloß in Ockhams Ontologie des individuellen Seins, sondern auch in seinen anthropologischen Auffassungen. Der Mensch ist nach ihm in seinen Denken und Sprechen nicht imstande, das Erhabene wesentlich zu durchforschen. Dessen soll sich der Mensch fort während eingedenk sein. Dies ist für Ockham in zwei deutliche Strategien übersetzbar:

a) nicht jedem modus significandi oder loquendi entspricht ein modus essendi in der Wirklichkeit

b) viele maßgebende Aussagen, sowohl sakrale wie profane, soll man nicht de virtute sermonis (dazu reicht unser Sprechen zuwenig aus), ondern der Ab sicht des Redners oder Schriftstellers entsprechend deuten." (ss. 326-327)

Rijk, Lambertus Marie de, and Braakhuis, Henk A.G., eds. 1987. Logos and Pragma. Essays on the Philosophy of Language in Honour of Professor Gabriel Nuchelmans. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.

Table of contents: Introduction XI; List of Professor Nuchelmans' publications 1950-1987 XI-XVII; W. E. Abraham: The strategy of Plato's philosophy of language 1; L. M. de Rijk: The anatomy of proposition: Logos and Pragma in Plato and Aristotle 27; N. Kretzmann: Boethius and the truth about tomorrow's sea battle 63; H. A. G. Braakhuis: The view of Peter of Spain on propositional composition 99; E. P. Bos: The theory of the proposition according to John Duns Scotus' two commentaries on Aristotle's Perihermeneias 121; E. Stump: Consequences in Ockham's Summa Logicae and their relation to syllogism, topics and insolubles 141; K. H. Tachau: Wodeham, Crathorn and Holcot: the development of the Complexe significabile 161; E. J. Ashworth: Jacobus Naveros (fl. ca. 1533) on the question: 'Do spoken words signify concepts or things?' 189; E. M. Barth: Contradictions and symmetry rage in the logical Interregnum. An essay in empirical logic 215; E. Morscher: Propositions and all that: ontological and epistemological reflections 241; M. F. Fresco: Über das Verhältnis von Sprache, Denken und Welt. Ontologische Fragen unter besondere Berücksichtigung der Philosophie von J. A. der Mouw 259; Bibliography 281; Index of passages quoted or referred to 299; Index of names 311; Index of concepts and terms 317.

Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1988. "De quelques difficultés de nature linguistique dans le vocabulaire de Gilbert de la Porrée." In Actes du colloque Terminologie de la vie intellectuelle au moyen âge, edited by Weijers, Olga, 19-25. Turnhout: Brepols.

Colloque at Leyde/La Haye, 20-21 September 1985.

"On sait que, comme ceux de l'Antiquité, les philosophes du moyen âge ont fait aussi leur propre vocabulaire technique.

Le but de cette courte communication est de mettre en lumière quelques difficultés spéciales du vocabulaire philosophique et théologique de Gilbert de Poitiers, auteur bien connu de la première moitié du XIIe siècle.

D'abord, il faut remarquer que ces difficultés ressortent de l'usage très personnel et très original que fait Gilbert des termes courants de la langue philosophique du XIIe siècle.

Il va de soi que ces difficultés sont délicates une fois de plus pour les philologues, en général pour les non-initiés en ce qui concerne l'histoire de la philosophie, parce que la confusion terminologique se présente déjà dans le domaine philosophique lui-même.

Aussi va-t-on commencer par quelques termes connus, c'est-à-dire les termes substantia, subsistentia et subsistens et, dans ce contexte, la différence entre esse et esse aliquid. On va essayer de placer la terminologie dans le contexte des vues philosophiques de Gilbert, en particulier de la doctrine porrétaine sur le statut ontique de la chose concrète." (p. 19)

———. 1988. "'Categorization' as a key notion in ancient and medieval semantics." Vivarium no. 26:1-18.

"The aim of this paper is to argue for a twofold thesis: (a) for Aristotle the verb 'katêgorein' does not as such stand for statemental predication, let alone of the well-known 'S is P' type, and (b) 'non-statemental predication' or 'categorization' plays an important role in Ancient and Medieval philosophical procedure.

1. Katêgorein and katêgoria in Aristotle

Aristotle was the first to use the word 'category' (katêgoria) as a technical term in logic and philosophy. It is commonly taken to mean 'highest predicate' and explained in terms of statement-making. From the logical point of view categories are thus considered 'potential predicates'.(*)" (p. 1)

(...)

1.3 Name giving ('categorization') as the key tool in the search for 'true substance'

What Aristotle actually intends in his metaphysical discussions in the central books of his Metaphysics (Z-Th) is to discover the proper candidate for the name 'ousia'. According to Aristotle, the primary kind of 'being' or 'being as such' (to on hêi on) can only be found in 'being-ness' (ousia; see esp. Metaph. 1028b2). Unlike Plato, however, Aristotle is sure to find 'being as such' in the domain of things belonging to the everyday world. Aristotle's most pressing problem is to grasp the things' proper nature qua beings. In the search for an answer name-giving plays a decisive role: the solution to the problem consists in finding the most appropriate ('essential') name so as to bring everyday being into the discourse in such a way that precisely its 'beingness' is focussed upon." (p. 4)

(...)

2. The use of 'praedicare' in Boethius

The Greek phrase katêgorein ti kata tinos is usually rendered in Latin as praedicare aliquid de aliquo. The Latin formula primarily means 'to say something of something else' (more precisely 'of somebody'). Of course, the most common meaning of the Latin phrase is 'to predicate something of something else in making a statement of the form S = P'. However, the verb praedicare, just as its Greek counterpart katêgorein, is used more than once merely in the sense of 'naming' or 'designating by means of a certain name', regardless of the syntactic role that name performs in a statement. In such cases praedicare stands for the act of calling up something under a certain name (designation), a procedure that we have labelled 'categorization'. (...)

Boethius' use of praedicare is quite in line with what is found in other authors. Along with the familiar use of the verb for statemental predication, Boethius also frequently uses praedicare in the sense of 'naming' or 'designating something under a certain name' whereby the use of the designating word in predicate position is, sometimes even explicitly, ruled out." (pp. 9-10)

(*) See L. M. de Rijk, The Categories as Classes of Names (= On Ancient and Medieval Semantics 3), in: Vivarium, 18 (1980), 1-62, esp. 4-7

———, ed. 1988. Some earlier Parisian Tracts on Distinctiones sophismatum. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.

Edited by L. M. de Rijk with introduction and indexes.

Content: I. Tractatus Vaticanus De multiplicatibus circa orationes accidentibus -- II. Tractatus Florianus De solutionibus sophismatum -- III. Tractatus Vaticanus De communibus distinctionibus.

"As a matter of fact, syncategorematic words(3) play a predominant role in ambiguous expressions and sentences taken as a genre called sophismata, i.e. puzzling sentences of which the exact meaning can only be determined by introducing subtle semantic distinctions.(4) Every reader of the tracts involved is well acquainted with the Mediaeval authors' habit of closely linking up the treatment of syncategoremata with the solution to fallacies and sophismata. The author of the pseudo-Boethian tract De disciplina scolarium also testifies to the close connection of these items, when he recommends the study of syncategoremata:

Terminorum autem determinaciones quae sincategoreumata appellamus, memorialiter menti imprimende, utpote que sophistice non parum deserviunt fantasie.(5)

The literary genre covering this sort of scholastic writings, is threefold:

1. the tracts on syncategoremata, which classify the precise meaning of a number of syncategorematic words, the ways in which they are used ambiguously; and they discuss current grammatical, semantic and logical rules related to these words and, finally, deal with special sophismata and the (attempted) solutions to them;(6)

2. the sophismata collections, where the sophismata themselves are the primary objects of discussion, although each of them is typical of a special difficulty concerning special ambiguous terms or phrases;

3. the so-called Sophistariae, the tracts on sophismata which, unlike the Sophismata collections, take the usual solutions (in fact, distinctiones concerning the ambiguous expression involved) as their starting-points." (pp. IX-X)

(3) For the sense of this term, see Kretzmann [1982: 211]: "Any word that can be used alone as a subject term or as a predicate term is classifiable as a categorematic word; all other words are classifiable as syncategorematic words, those that can occur in a proposition ... only along with at least one properly matched pair of categorematic words." See also de Libera [1985b: 64ff].

4. It is aptly defined by Kretzmann [1977: 6] as "a sentence puzzling in its own right or on the basis of a certain assumption, designed to bring some abstract issue into sharper focus the mediaeval ancestor of "The morning star is the evening star" or "George IV wished to know whether Scott was the author of Waverley". He is right in rejecting the modern label 'sophism' as sophismata "are sentences rather than arguments and intended to be illuminating and instructive rather than specious and misleading". (ibid. n.9; see also Kretzmann [1982: 217, n. 24]. Some Master Martin (? of Alnwick) defines sophisma as 'diversitas veritatis et

falsitatis que in propositionibus oritur ex diversa situatione terminorum exponibilium vel resolubilium facientium terminos sequentes se diversimode supponere'. It should be noted in this connection that Martin's tract belongs to the Probationes tenninorum genre. See de Rijk [1982: 33]. 5. I 11, p. 97,6-8, ed. Weyers (Pseudo-Boece, De disciplina scolarium. Edition critique, introduction et notes, Leiden-Köln 1976).

6. For this genre, see Braakhuis [1979: passim]; and Kretzmann [1982: passim]. A lucid distinction between the different genres, Distinctiones, Sophismata and Syncategoremata is given by de Libera [1985b: 64-8].

References

H.A.G. Braakhuis, De 13e eeuwse tractaten over syncategorematische tennen. Deel I, Inleidende studie, Meppel 1979

Norman Kretzmann, 'Socrates is Whiter than Plato Begins to be White', Nous 11 (1977), 3-15

Norman Kretzmann, 'Syncategoremata, Exponibilia, Sophismata', in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (ed. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, J. Pinborg, Cambridge 1982), 211-145

Alain de Libera, 'La litterature des abstractiones et la tradition logique d'Oxford,' in The Rise of British Logic. Acts of the Sixth European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, Balliol College, Oxford, 19-24 June 1983, edited by P. O. Lewry, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies (coll. Papers in Medieval Studies, 7) 1985, 63-114

L.M. de Rijk, 'Some 14th Century Tracts on the probationes terminorum. Martin of Alnwick O.F.M., Richard Billingham, Edward Upton and Others," Artistarium. A Series of Texts on Mediaeval Logic, Grammar and Semantics, eds. L.M. de Rijk, H.A.G. Braakhuis, E.P. Bos, C.H. Kneepkens. Nijmegen 1982

———. 1988. "Semantics and metaphysics in Gilbert of Poitiers. A chapter of Twelfth century Platonism. Part I." Vivarium no. 26:73-112.

"1 The Ontic Constituents of Natural Bodies

There is one distinction that is of paramount importance in order for us to understand Gilbert's ontology, viz. the Boethian contradistinction of id quod and id quo. We have to start with this pair of key notions.

1.1 Preliminary: 'id quod' and 'id quo'

According to Gilbert, our world consists of a number of individual 'things'. This world and its inhabitants appear to have the following characteristics:

(a) each and every 'thing' is in fact to be considered as one self-contained entity, (a 'subsistens') whose identity and ontological unity are due to the singularity of what is proper to it (sue proprietatis singularitas; Eut. 30, 88; Trin. 144, 58-62),

(b) however, every 'subsistent' (henceforth my rendering of Latin 'subsistens') itself consists of a plurality of forms; in addition, there are 'circumstantial features' (rather than 'forms' properly speaking) that determine its actual state or condition ('status'); Trin. 137, 55; cf. Nielsen(*), 56-8 and below, our nrs 1.2 and 1.72.

In fact, Gilbert's ontology is one continuous attempt to establish two basic relationships, one between a natural thing and its Creator and the other between the thing's diverse actual constituents, which while being totally different from each other grant it its intrinsic unity at the same time." (p. 74)

(...)

"1.9 Summary

Each inhabitant of our world Gilbert calls (following Boethius) an id quod est or subsistens. Its main constituents are the subsistentiae (or the subsistent's id quo which is sometimes taken collectively to stand for ea quibus) and these are accompanied by the 'accidents', quantity and quality. The subsistent owes its status (or transitory condition) to a collection of inferior members of the Aristotelian class of accidents, which to Gilbert's mind are rather 'accessories' or 'attachments from without' (extrinsecus affixa).

The term 'substantia' is used both to stand for substance and substantial form (subsistentia), i.e., that by which something is subsistent (or 'is a substance').

The collection of subsistentiae (substantial forms) or the forma totius is called natura. However, 'natura' is also used to stand for either just one subsistentia or all the forms found in a subsistens even including its 'accidental' forms (quantity and quality). The inclusion of all kinds of accidents (including those inferior ones that make up a thing's status) is seldom found in the intension of the word 'natura'.

One of the key notions featuring in Gilbert's ontology is esse aliquid. 'To be a-something' has a threefold import. First, it means 'to be only some thing', and to miss perfection. Second, it has the positive sense of 'being a something', i.e. 'being determinate and well-delineated', not indefinite, not formless that is. Third, 'to be a something' implies concreteness, corporealness and singularity." (pp. 111-112)

(*) Lauge Olaf Nielsen, Theology and Philosophy in the Twelfth Century. A study of Gilbert Porreta's thinking and the theological expositions of the doctrine of the Incarnation during the period 1130-1180, Leiden 1982.

———. 1988. "On Boethius' notion of Being. A chapter of Boethian semantics." In Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy: Studies in Memory of Jan Pinborg, edited by Kretzmann, Norman, 1-29. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Reprinted as chapter I in: Through Language to Reality. Studies in Medieval Semantics and Metaphysics.

"From Parmenides onwards, ancient and medieval thought had a special liking for metaphysical speculation. No doubt, speculative thought was most influentially outlined by Plato and Aristotle. However, what the Christian thinkers achieved in metaphysics was definitely more than just applying and adapting what was handed down to them. No student of medieval speculative thought can help being struck by the peculiar fact that whenever fundamental progress was made, it was theological problems which initiated the development. This applies to St Augustine and Boethius, and to the great medieval masters as well (such as Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus). Their speculation was, time and again, focused on how the notion of being and the whole range of our linguistic tools can be applied to God's Nature (Being).

It is no wonder, then, that an inquiry into Boethius's notion of being should be concerned, first and foremost, with his theological treatises, especially De hebdomadibus. (p. 1)

(...)

My final section aims at showing how Boethius's notion of being is clearly articulated in accordance with his semantic distinctions. This is most clearly seen in the main argument of De hebdomadibus where they may be actually seen at work.

As is well known, the proper aim of De hebdomadibus is to point out the formal difference between esse and esse bonum, or in Boethius's words: 'the manner in which substances are good in virtue of their being, while not yet being substantially good' (38.2-4). Its method consists in a careful application of certain formal distinctions, viz.:

(a) The distinction between an object 'when taken as a subsistent whole and id quod est = the constitutive element which causes the object's actually' being; it is made in Axiom II and used in Axiom IV.

(b) The distinction (closely related to the preceding one) obtaining between the constitutive element effecting the object's actual being (forma essendi, or ipsum esse) and the object's actuality as such (id quod est or ipsum est); it is made in Axioms VII and VIII.

(c) The distinction between esse as 'pure being' (= nihil aliud praeter se habens admixtum), which belongs to any form, whether substantial or incidental, and id quod est admitting of some admixture (lit. 'something besides what it is itself'); it is made in Axiom IV and in fact implies the distinction between esse simpliciter and esse aliquid.

(d) The distinction between 'just being some thing', tantum esse aliquid, and 'being something qua mode of being'. It is made in Axiom V and used in Axiom VI and is in fact concerned with a further distinction made within the notion of id quod est. It points out the differences between the effect caused by some form as constitutive of being some thing and that caused by the main constituent (forma essendi) which causes an object's being simpliciter.

(e) The distinction between two different modes of participation, one effecting an object's being subsistent, the other its being some thing, where the 'some thing' (aliquid) refers to some (non-subsistent) quality such as 'being white', 'being wise', 'being good', etc.

The application of these distinctions enables Boethius to present a solution to the main problem: although the objects (ea quae sunt, plural of id quod est) are (are good) through their own constitutive element, being (being good), nevertheless they are not identical with their constitutive element nor (a fortiori) with the IPSUM ESSE (BONUM ESSE) of which their constituent is only a participation." (p. 22-23)

———. 1989. "Semantics and metaphysics in Gilbert of Poitiers. A chapter of Twelfth century Platonism. Part II." Vivarium no. 27:1-35.

"Gilbert's View of Transcendent Reality.

Gilbert's world consists of quite a lot of singular subsistent objects which owe their being and 'being-a-something' to a collection of forms, both subsistential and accidental. Well, God has created this world after what in the Platonic tradition was called the 'exemplary Forms'. For Gilbert, creation and concretion are two complementary notions which play an important role in his ontology. Creation is the reception of a total form or collection of subsistentiae; it is also called generation. As a natural process it amounts to 'beginning to be-of-acertain-kind'." (p. 1)

(...)

"POSTSCRIPT. In his short study on Gilbert of Poitiers (in A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy, ed. Peter Dronke, Cambridge 1988, 328-52) John Marenbon rightly argues that when presenting an account of Gilbert's thought one should not separate his philosophy from his theology. However, I fully disagree with his suggestion (p. 351) that as a metaphysician Gilbert proves to have been a thinker whose 'treatment is inadequate and confused'. On the contrary, when dealing with really intricate theological problems Gilbert of Poitiers, like many other Medieval thinkers (e.g. Thomas Aquinas), develops his (NeoPlatonic) metaphysics as a 'clear-minded and subtle writer', and so there seems to be no reason at all to oppose Gilbert against people like Aquinas, Scotus, Ockham and others. They were all real philosophers, albeit in a theological context, which as such confronted them with a series of genuinely philosophical issues. In fact, why should any historian of philosophy approach only Gilbert of Poitiers 'as a thinker who tackled a set of changeless (sic!) metaphysical problems-identical (sic!) to those which faced, for instance, Plato and Aristotle, or Kant and Hegel'?" (pp. 34-35)

———. 1989. Through Language to Reality: Studies in Medieval Semantics and Metaphysics. Northampton: Variorum Reprints.

The volume is dedicated to L. M. De Rijk on the occasion of his 65th birthday.

Contents: Preface IX-XI; SIXTH CENTURY: I. On Boethius's notion of Being. A chapter of Boethian semantics; TWELFTH CENTURY: Peter Abälard (1079-1142): Meister und Opfer des Scharfsinns; III. The semantical impact of Abailard's solution of the problem of universals; IV. La signification de la proposition (dictum propositionis) chez Abélard; V. Die Wirkung der neuplatonischen Semantik auf das mittelalterliche Denken über das Sein; VI: Abailard's semantics views in the light of later developments; THIRTEENTH CENTURY: VII. Die Bedeutungslehre der Logik im 13. Jahruhndert und ihr Gegenstück in der metaphysischen Spekulation; VIII. Each man's ass is not everybody's ass. On an important item in 13th-century semantics; IX. The development of Suppositio naturalis in mediaeval logic, I. Natural suppositiojn as non-contextual supposition; FOURTEENTH CENTURY: X. The development of Suppositio naturalis in mediaeval logic, II. 14th-century natural supposition as atemporal (omnitemporal) supposition; XI: On Buridan's doctrine of connotation; XII. Semantics in Richard Billingham and Johannes Venator; XIII. Logic and ontology in Ockham. Some notes on his view of the categories of Being and the nature of its basic principles; XIV. War Ockham ein Antimetaphysicker? Eine semantische Betrachtung; Indexes. 1. Manuscripts; 2. Anonymous tract; 3. Ancient and medieval names; 4. Modern names; 5. Subjects and terms. (This volume contains XII + 322 pages).

———. 1989. "Ist Logos Satz? Zu Heideggers Auffassung von Platons Stellung 'am Anfänge der Metaphysik'." In Heideggers These vom Ende der Philosophie. Verhandlungen des Leidener Heidegger-Symposiums (April 1984), edited by Fresco, Marcel, Van Dijk, Rob and Vijgeboom, Peter, 22-32. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag.

———. 1989. "Einiges zu den Hintergünden der Scotistischen Beweistheorie: die Schlüsselrolle des Sein-Könnens (Esse possibile)." In Die Kölner Universität im Mittelalter. Geistige Wurzeln und soziale Wirklichkeit, edited by Zimmermann, Albert, 176-191. Berlin: Walter de Gruiyter.

"Wer Scotus' Beweistheorie in den Griff bekommen will, wird schließlich noch dadurch mit einer dritten Belastung rechnen müssen, daß Scotus sich nie in einer eigenen Kommentararbeit zu Aristoteles' Zweiten Analytiken systematisch über die Lehre vom Beweis geäußert hat, wie stark er auch immer, wie die übrigen mittelalterlichen Denker, in seiner Auffassung der Beweislehre vom aristotelischen Gedankengut beeinflußt wurde.

Es scheint mir daher angebracht, zuerst etwas vorzubringen über die Rolle, die eine Beweistheorie, oder vielmehr ein Beweisverfahren, in jedem beliebigen spekulativen Denksystem, ungeachtet dessen theologischer oder philosophischer Natur, besitzt; zunächst soll etwas über die Lehre vom Beweis bei Aristoteles und den mittelalterlichen Autoren, besonders Scotus, gesagt werden, um zuletzt einige wichtige Punkte aufzugreifen, deren genauere Betrachtung uns die wichtigeren Hintergründe des scotischen Denkens über Beweis und sicheres Wissen vordringen läßt." (s. 177)

Peter, of Spain. 1990. Language in Dispute: An English Translation by Francis P. Dinneen of Peter of Spain's Tractatus called afterwards Summulae logicales. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: Benjamins.

On the basis of the critical edition established by L. M. De Rijk.

Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1990. "Ockham's theory of demonstration: his use of Aristotle' s kath' holou and kath' hauto requirements." In Die Gegenwart Ockhams, edited by Vossenkuhl, Wilhelm and Schõnberger, Rolf, 232-240. Weinheim: VCH-Verlagsgesellschaft.

"Far from being a sceptic William of Ockham made every effort to corroborate the basis of philosophical and theological thought by purifying it of all sorts of untenable presuppositions. His main contribution to fourteenth century philosophical and theological development lies in systematically rethinking scholastic doctrines, and especially their assumptions, on the firm basis of his own favourite leading principles: the strictly individual nature of all that really is and the radical contingency of all creatural being.

These two principles also play a major part in Ockham's way of dealing with the Aristotelian theory of demonstration. The present paper aims at investigating Ockham's doctrine of demonstrative proof, focusing on the way in which he felt forced to adapt or rephrase the special requirements Aristotle had laid down for propositions to enter into syllogistic proof, especially strict proof (the so-called 'demonstratio potissima'). Our main argument will concern Aristotle's rather peculiar 'kath holou' requirement and Ockham's appliance of the 'kath hauto' (Latin: 'per se') notion which is also involved in framing correct premisses for demonstrative proofs. A few preliminary remarks will be made about the essentials of Aristotle's theory of demonstration." (p. 232)

(...)

"Conclusions.

To sum up our findings: Ockham's adaptations and manipulations of Aristotle's requirements for genuine demonstrative propositions are as many demands imposed by his own metaphysical views. He comments on Aristotle, always starting from his own favourite views. Though Aristotle is the Master, Ockham is the one to say what the Master meant, or what he should have meant. On the other hand, his introducing the 'per se strictissimo modo' rather seems to be a matter of technicality. Whereas in Posterior Analytics Aristotle deals with the scientific procedure of apodeixis in general, in which the apodeictic syllogism is merely a vehicle for correctly framing an apodeixis, the Medievals, and Ockham in particular, were apt to reduce Aristotle's theory of demonstrative proof to a theory of demonstrative syllogism. That is why the 'demonstratio potissima' (including its specific demands) so heavily influenced Ockham's theory of demonstration." (p. 239)

———. 1990. "Specific tools concerning logical education." In Méthodes et instruments du travail intellectuel au moyen âge, edited by Weijers, Olga, 62-81. Turnhout: Brepols.

"Unlike in our days logical doctrine was very influential in the Middle Ages. Logic was indeed considered then the vehicle par excellence both in matters of teaching and scientific inquiry in any field of knowledge. When embarking upon a discussion of the specific terminology concerning logical education, some preliminary remarks seem to be indispensable.

The reader should be warned, first. Logical theory taken as such, which comprises a great mass of specifically logical terms (such as 'praedicamentum', 'predicable', 'syllogism', 'fallacy', 'supposition', 'appellation', 'ampliation', 'distribution', 'syncategorema', and so on) is out of scope now; those terms and their like will be mentioned only in passing, inasfar namely as they occur in educational practice.

Another remark better starts from the well-known Medieval distinction between logica docens and logica utens, the former of which being logical doctrine as developped, expounded and taught for its own sake, whereas the latter is rather logic practically applied in any sort of logical analysis or argumentation. To be sure, logica utens does not merely coincide with the more or less explicit occurrence of logical argumentation in whatever context. Even qua logica utens the art of logic displayed a high degree of technicality. In other words: medieval logica utens rather than being practical argumentation as loosely accomplished by somebody who exhibited a remarkable natural ability for logical reasoning consisted in the performance of somebody being really well-versed in all those logical techniques he had been taught in his youth in class room. So, whoever is interested in specific terms of logical teaching and learning should surely not leave exhibitions of logica utens out of consideration (*).

Our third remark which is in the line of the previous one, concerns the remarkably wide scope of logica utens. Of course, logica docens played a very important part in Medieval education, as may be also gathered from its predominant position in Medieval curricula. However, according to a good Peripatetic tradition, logic was taken to serve as the organon or instrument of all other branches of learning and science, which means that logic, and logic alone, provided other disciplines with the correct art of thinking and reasoning. Thus logic proves to have been effectually present, for example, in theological disputation, a fact that every student of Medieval theology is fully aware of. But it had an equally prevailing position in other fields of learning, too, such as Natural science ("Physics"), Ethics and even Political philosophy.

A final preliminary remark aims at elucidating the large scope of Medieval logic from still another point of view, viz. the close relationship between scientific inquiry and exposition as well as scientific education in the Middle Ages. That is to say that scientific inquiry and exposition as well as education and learning were controlled by the same didactics of exposition and argumentation. Indeed, nearly all Medieval writings that contain scholarly investigations in any field of learning whatsoever display didactic approaches which are quite similar to those used by works mainly intended for instruction, no matter for the benefit of beginners or advanced people." (pp. 62-63)

(*) For the contradistinction of dialectica docens and dialectica utens both of them especially concerned with the use of logical topics (loci), see Eleonore Stump, Topics: their development and absorption into consequences in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, 1982, p. 281, n. 41.

———. 1990. "The Posterior Analytics in the Latin West." In Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy: Proceedings of the Eight International Congress of Medieval Philosophy (SIEPM), Helsinki, 24-29 August 1987. Volume I, edited by Asztalos, Monika, Murdoch, John Emery and Niiniluoto, Ilkka, 104-127. Helsinki: Acta Philosophica Fennica.

"It is common knowledge that Aristotle had the conviction that all reality was to be found within our world of sensible experience and that Plato's assumption of another, Transcendent World of Perfect Being was merely 'empty talk and poetic metaphor' (Metaph. A9, 991a20). Indeed, Aristotle took Plato's Forms to be quite useless for explaining the possibility of true knowledge about our world. However, like his master, Plato, Aristotle stuck to the Parmenidean conviction about the real existence of unchanging formal principles of being. As is well-known, his formal principles are in things as their immanent dynamic natures (eidê).

For Aristotle, true knowledge concerns the essential natures immanent in things (see e.g. Metaph., 991a12-3; 999a24-9; 1018b36; 1032b1 ff. et alibi). To be sure, all being is individual being and so Aristotle is compelled to answer the quite intriguing question: if the proper object of true knowledge is universal nature and everything real is a particular, how, then, are we able to gain genuine knowledge about the things in their own right? In his Posterior Analytics Aristotle explains what he understands by truly knowing things. Well, quite in line with his philosophical stand, Aristotle claims that all scientific knowledge is concerned with discerning a universal nature as immanent in a particular. In I 2, 72a75-7 e.g., it is explicitly said that the elements of the deduction are such and such in concreto (cf. 73a29-31). For Aristotle, demonstration in fact concerns some phenomenal state of affairs of which the investigation aims to clarify the essential structures." (p. 102)

(...)

"Aristotle's description of induction and its role in the scientific process fits in remarkably well with what he has earlier remarked about the process of proper categorization. Referring to the well-known battle simile - how a general retreat comes to an end after one man makes a stand, and then another etc., the author argues that 'as soon as one of the undifferentiated percepts makes a stand, there is a primitive universal in the mind ... until the highest genera have been reached' (II 19, 100a14-b4).

The faculty, or rather cognitive attitude, by which we become familiar with the first principles is the Nous or intellective apprehension. Well, just as the Nous precedes all principles (such as axioms etc.), in the same way scientific knowledge covers the whole domain of states of affairs (pragmata), Aristotle concludes (100b16-17).

Let us try, now, in the next sections, to discover the Medievals' doctrinal reception of the Posterior Analytics by discussing their views of some themes characteristic of Aristotle's scientific method. It would be useful, to that end, to single out the following items: the Medievals' discussion of the well-known four questions, their views of the three requirements for 'hunting essential attributes', their (different) views of necessity, and, finally, the Medieval conceptions of induction and our knowledge of the First Principles." (p. 110)

———. 1990. "Un tournant important dans l'usage du mot 'idea' chez Henri de Gand." In Idea. VI Colloquio Internazionale del Lessico internazionale Europeo. Roma, 5-7 Gennaio 1989, edited by Fattori, Marta and Bianchi, Massimo Luigi, 89-98. Roma: Edizioni dell'Ateneo.

"1. Introduction. On sait que le terme 'idée' était un mot-clé dans la métaphysique de Platon. Les exposés importants de ce matin ont rendu entièrement superflu de rappeler le rôle du mot idea chez Platon ainsi que dans la tradition platonicienne et dans la patristique.

Les communications que nous venons d'écouter cet après-midi nous ont fait comprendre l'importance du mot latin idea, ou plutôt la valeur de la notion d'idée, dont le mot idea n'était que l'un des véhicules à côté de forma, species, notio, conceptus, intentio, etc.

Il n'est pas nécessaire d'être spécialiste de l'histoire de la philosophie médiévale pour bien savoir que, quelle que soit la dette des auteurs médiévaux envers des sources antiques, et quel que fût le respect qu'ils ont ressenti envers toute autorité -- les sources ne les ont cependant jamais empêchés de suivre leur propre voie au fur et à mesure que cela s'imposait dans l'intérêt de leur réflexions philosophiques.

C'est pourquoi l'étude de l'usage des termes philosophiques et leur développement au cours du moyen-âge n'est pas seulement d'intérêt linguistique. Au contraire, l'analyse de ce développement est tout à fait indispensable pour bien comprendre les doctrines philosophiques elles-mêmes de la période médiévale.

Je me propose dans cette communication de mettre en relief le tournant important qu'a subi l'usage du mot latin idea chez certains auteurs de la seconde moitié du 13e siècle, usage, bien entendu, qui s'est prolongé au 14' siècle. La figure centrale sera celle du philosophe flamand Henri de Gand (mort en 1293).

Comme je viens de vous suggérer, ce tournant est significatif d'un développement doctrinal chez ces auteurs. Aussi ce développement doctrinal s'impose comme le cadre adapté aux exigences d'un exposé sémantique à propos de l'usage du mot idea, disons après saint Thomas d'Aquin (mort en 1277)." (p. 89)

———. 1991. "Two short questions on Proclean metaphysics in Paris B. N. lat. 16.096." Vivarium no. 29:1-12.

"The collectaneous manuscript Paris, B.N. lat. 16.096 (formerly belonging to the codices Sorbonnenses) contains (ff. 172va-177vb, which part dates, it seems, from the second half of the 13th century) some anonymous questions referred to by the catalogue (*) as Quaestiones super librum Posteriorum. This description, however, is incorrect as these questions have no bearing whatsoever on the doctrine of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics. Actually, they are two short metaphysical questions (called expositiones by the author) on the key notions of 'beingness' and 'oneness' respectively, followed by a longer, incomplete treatise on the nature of the components of a definition (or rather a diffinitum).

(...)

Only two of the five questions announced in the beginning of this third treatise are preserved. One of them deals with the problem of whether the definition consisting of genus and differentia requires a real composition of the components of the diffinitum, the other examines whether immaterial substances are composite in some respects. Unlike the first two tracts, the third does not show any influence of Neoplatonic doctrine.

To my knowledge, the expositions on Ens and Unum have only come down to us in the Paris manuscript. They are interesting in that the author makes a successful effort to penetrate some of the basic views of Proclean metaphysics." (pp. 1-2, notes omitted)

(*) L. Delisle, Inventaire des manuscrits latins de la Sorbonne, conservés à la Bibliothèque Impériale sous les nos. 15.176-16.718 du fonds latin, in: Bibliothèque de l'École des chartes, 31 (1870), 135 ff.

Peter, of Spain. 1992. Syncategoreumata. Leiden: Brill.

First critical edition by L. M. de Rijk with an introduction, critical apparatus, indexes and an English translation by Joke Spruyt.

Content of the English translation: Introduction 39; Chapter 1. On composition 45; Chapter 2. On negation 73; Chapter 3. On exclusive words 105; Chapter 4. On exceptive words; Chapter 5. On consecutive words 197; Chapter 6. On the verbs 'begins' and 'ceases' 249; Chapter 7. On the words 'necessarily' (necessario) and 'contingently' (contingenter) 283; Chapter 8. On conjunctions 307; Chapter 9. On 'Quanto', 'Quam' and 'Quicquid'; Chapter 10. On answers 425; Critical apparatus 434; Index locorum 572; Index rerum notabilium 574; Index sophismatum 613.

"Peter of Spain (ca 1205-77) who, in 1276, became Pope under the name of John XXI, was the author of an impressive number of scholarly works, inter alia the Tractatus (a textbook of logic, widely known afterwards under the title Summule logicales) and the Syncategoreumata. The latter work, which deals with syncategorematic terms, is here critically edited for the first time, together with an English translation.

Peter's authorship of the Syncategoreumata is beyond all doubt: it is confirmed again and again by nearly all our manuscripts. As to the date and place of origin of the Syncategoreumata: they were surely written after the Tractatus (which were written not later than the 1230's, see my Introduction to the edition of this work, p. LV-LVII).

There is no reason at all to assume a connection between the Syncategoreumata and Peter's stay at the University of Paris, which he left in 1229, before the composition of the Tractatus. Clearly, Paris does not play any role in the early diffusion of the Syncategoreumata. It seems highly probable, therefore, that the Syncategoreumata were written by Peter in the same region where he wrote the Tractatus, i.e. Northern Spain or Southern France. The work's most likely date is between 1235-1245 (cf. my Introduction to the Tractatus, pp. XXXIV-LXI). From Peter's use of lectio (see X, cap. 8) it may be concluded that the Syncategoreumata were meant as a piece of school-teaching." (p. 9, notes omitted)

Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1992. "Causation and participation in Proclus. The pivotal role of scope distinction." In On Proclus and His Influence in Medieval Philosophy, edited by Meijer, Pieter Ane and Bos, Egbert Peter, 1-34. Leiden: Brill.

1. Status questionis; 2. Causation and participation in Plato; 3. Procession and participation in Plotinus and Jamblichus; 4. Proclus' refined metaphysics; 4.1 Preliminary; 4.2 The Proclean universe from the viewpoint of causation; 4.3 The Proclean universe from the viewpoint of participation; 5. The meaning of amethekton and metekomenon in Proclus; 5.1 Méthexis c.a. in the Elementatio; 5.2 Méthexis c.a. in the Platonic Theology; The basic role of the metexomenon for continuity and reversion; Scope distinction in Neoplatonic doctrine and procedure; 7.1 Two famous cases of scope distinction in Proclus; 7.2 Scope distinction deliberately applied and recommended; 7.3 The philosophical impact of scope distinction in Neoplatonism.

"The present paper aims to investigate in some more detail the transcendence-immanence antinomy. First an outline of its historical background will be presented from Plato onward through Plotinus and Jamblichus up to Proclus. Next I shall discuss Proclus' doctrine on these matters in the larger perspective of his philosophy, and focus on the intriguing notion of amethekton. Finally a few remarks will be added on the important role of what we might call 'scope distinction' in Proclus' doctrines and dialectical arguments." (p. 2)

———. 1992. "John Buridan on Universals." Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale no. 97:35-59.

"It is common knowledge that Plato strongly believed that, in order to explain the nature of whatever is (either things or states of affairs, including Man and his environment), the assumption of Transcendent Universal Forms is indispensable. In his view, these universal Forms are the ontic causes of each and every sublunary entity, which all owe their being to their sharing in these Forms. Consequently, everyone who is in want of firm knowledge (episteme) about, the things of the outside world is bound to direct his attention to the transcendent domain of the universal Forms'.

However, Plato was the first to recognise, and seriously deal with, the objections that can be raised to this doctrine. These objections mainly concern the status (and the dignity, however modest) of our transient world and, above all, the possibility to obtain, true knowledge of this world as it stands, in its ever-changing nature, that is." (p. 35)

(...)

"To be sure, the Medievals all rejected the Platonic Ideas taken as separate substances and they adhered to the Aristotelian common sense principle that only individuals have independent existence. Nevertheless, they were still under the spell of the status of «universal being» as the indispensable basis of true knowledge.

Marylin McCord Adams has analysed some early fourteenth century solutions to the problem of universals (Scotus, Ockham, Burley and Harclay) (*). In McCord's article Buridan's view of the matter is left out of consideration. Quite understandably so, since Buridan's solution to the problem differs considerably from the sophisticated arguments given by his contemporaries. Buridan seeks.for a solution in analysing the several ways of human understanding. In directing his attention to the propositional attitude involved in the cognitive procedure Buridan is remarkably close to the ingenious solution Peter Abelard had come up with two centuries earlier. In the next sections I shall give an outline of Abelard's treatment of the question of universals followed by an analysis of Buridan's discussion of the matter (as found in his commentary on the Metaphysics and elsewhere)." (p. 37)

(...)

"We may conclude, then, that two bright logicians of the Parisian tradition have come up with quite an ingenious solution to the problem of universals. Both of them started out from the firm conviction that nothing exists but particulars. Nevertheless, they apparently were not satisfied with purely extensional solutions as brought forward by Oxford logicians such as Heytesbury and Ockham. Maybe extensionalists are out to show how people ought to think. Abelard and Buridan, however, were especially interested in the various ways of conceiving we actually use in daily life, in our attempts to conceptually deal with the outside world." (p. 59)

(*) "Universals in the early Fourteenth century" in Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, from the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Desintegration of Scholasticism 1100-1600 pp. 411-439.

———. 1992. "Peter Abaelard (1079-1142)." In Sprachphilosophie. Philosophy of Language. La philosophie du langage. Eine internationales Handbuch zeitgenössicher Forschung. Volume 1, edited by Dascal, Marcelo, Gerhardus, Dietfried, Lorenz, Kuno and Meggle, Georg, 290-296. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

1. Die Sprache als menschliche Ausdrucksweise; 2. Nomen, Verbum, Oratio; 3. Die prädikativ-kopulative Funktion des Verbum; 4. Sememverschmelzung als Schlüsselverfahren in Abaelards Semantik; 5. Die Einstellung Abaelards zur Sprache; 6. Literatur in Auswahl.

———. 1993. "Der Streit über das medium demonstrationis: die Frucht eines Misverständnisses?" In Argumentationstheorie. Scholastische Forschungen zu den logischen und semantischen Regeln korrekten Folgerns, edited by Jacobi, Klaus, 451-463. Leiden: Brill.

"In der alten Ausgabe des Kommentars zu den Zweiten Analytiken von Aegidius Romanus' findet sich nach dem Kommentar eine kurze Abhandlung aus der Feder des Augustiner-Eremiten Augustinus de Biella. Sie wurde zur Verteidigung der Auffassung des Aegidius über das medium demonstrationis geschrieben. Aegidius hatte gelehrt, daß bei einer demonstratio potissima (also bei der aristotelischen Apodeixis im strengsten Sinne) das medium sich aus der Definition des Attributs (passio) ergebe, und nicht, wie die communis opinio lautete, aus der Definition des Subjekts. Wie üblich, fängt Biella damit an, Argumente gegen die Auffassung Aegidius' anzuführen, um dieselben anschließend zu widerlegen. Biella hat aber augenscheinlich den Text von Aegidius nicht zur Hand gehabt, denn er fährt fort, dominus Aegidius sei wohl dieser Auffassung über (las rnedium demonstrationis gewesen, "wie ich von den doctores ordinis (Tatrum heremitarum gehört habe" (oder: "wie ich es deren Schriften entnommen habe")." (s. .451)

———. 1993. "La supposizione naturale: una pietra di paragone per i punti di vista filosofici." In Logica e linguaggio nel Medioevo, edited by Fedriga, Riccardo and Poggioni, Sara, 185-220. Milano: LED, Edizioni universitarie di lettere, economia, diritto.

Italian translation of: "La philosophie au moyen âge" (1985), chapter 8, pp. 184-203.

———. 1993. "On Buridan's view of Accidental Being." In John Buridan: A Master of Arts. Some Aspects of His Philosophy. Acts of the Second Symposium Organized by the Dutch Society for Medieval Philosophy Medium Aevum on the Occasion of its 15th Anniversary. Leiden-Amsterdam (Vrije Universiteit), 20-21 June, 1991., edited by Bos, Egbert Peter and Krop, Henri, 41-51. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.

"One of the most striking characteristics of late medieval metaphysics is the upgrading of 'accidental being'. The strict opposition between 'esse per se' and 'esse per accidens', which had been of paramount importance ever since Aristotle, has lost its relevance in the ontological discussions of the fourteenth century. The status of 'accidental being' came rather close to that of 'substantial being'. In the views of philosophers such as Ockham and Buridan (not to mention thinkers like Crathorn) the nature of 'accidental being' (or rather 'quantitative and qualitative being') can no longer be properly defined in terms of ontological dependency upon substance. In other words, 'per se subsistence' is assigned not only to substance but to 'accidental being' as well.

In the present contribution I will illustrate this development by discussing some of Buridan's expositions in his Questiones commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics (IV, q. 6 and VII, q. 3-4)." (p. 41)

———. 1993. "Works by Gerald Ot (Gerardus Odonis) on logic, metaphysics and natural philosophy rediscovered in Madrid, Bibl. Nac. 4229." Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge no. 60:173-193; 378.

"Some twenty years ago I discovered in the Biblioteca Nacional in Madrid a very interesting manuscript with works (all of them anonymous, to be sure) on logic, metaphysics and natural philosophy. In fact, my discovery turned out to be a rediscovery, for the manuscript contained a note written by the famous historian of Franciscan philosophy and theology, Father Ephrem Longpré OFM, which said that, with the exception of the writings occurring from fol. 204r onwards, all tracts found in this codex are by a Franciscan master, Gerardus Odonis. (...)

Gerard Odon OFM (who as Patriarch of Antiochia died in 1349 of the plague, at Catania, Sicily, where he was gifted with the benefices of a wealthy church) is especially known as the much troubled successor of the deposed Michael of Cesena as Master General of the Franciscan Order and a close adherent of Pope John XXII in the debate on the beatific vision." p. 173

"The Ms Madrid, Bibl. Nac. 4229 appears to be of the utmost importance for our knowledge of Gerard Odon's doctrine on several subjects in the fields of logic, metaphysics and natural philosophy. To establish his authorship of all the works as occurring in the present Ms with certainty requires more research. The results of the present investigations can be summarised in the following survey:

I LOGIC:

1.1 Quid est subiectum in logica (69va-74rb)

1.2 De sillogismis (1ra-19va)

1.3 De tribus dubiis circa naturam dictionum exclusivarum et suppositionis simpliciter simplicis (37rb-43ra)

1.4 De principiis scientiarum (45ra-69va)

II METAPHYSICS:

2.1 De intentionibus (incomplete; 74va-122vb)

2.2 De esse et essentia (125ra-132vb)

2.3 De principiis nature (156ra-174vb, together with 19va-28vb)

2.4 De natura universalis (incomplete; 204ra-207vb)

III NATURAL PHILOSOPHY:

3.1 De augmento forme (132vb-150rb)

3.2 De intensione et remissione formarum (175ra-179ra)

3.3 De continuo (179rb-186vb)

3.4 De loco (187ra-192va)

3.5 De tempore (192vb-199va)

3.6 De motu (199vb-203vb)" (p. 193?

———. 1994. "John Buridan on man's capability of grasping the truth." In Scientia et ars im Hoch- und Spätmmittelalter, edited by Craemer-Rügenberg, Ingrid and Speer, Andreas, 281-303. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

Miscellanea Mediaevalia, vol. 22/1.

"Introduction. As is well-known, two subjects are distinctive of the fourteenth century theory of cognition, namely 'certitudo' and 'evidentia'. It is true, thirteenth century philosophers, such as Thomas Aquinas, were also concerned with certitude and evidentness as indispensable requisites for 'true knowledge' ('scientia'). However, until the end of the thirteenth century certitude and evidentness were not prominent in the discussions about the cognitive procedure nor were they treated as separate matters, requiring separate attention. In Thomas Aquinas for example, the conviction that man is really capable of grasping the truth with certainty is really constitutive of his philosophical (and theological) thought and praxis (*)', or to speak with J. A. Aertsen, of 'Thomas' way of thought'.(**) This, however, does not alter the fact that in Aquinas' philosophy 'certitudo' is not highlighted as such, and the specific role of 'evidentia' is even virtually ignored.

Buridan's theory of cognition, on the contrary, clearly focusses on the ingredients 'certitudo' and 'evidentia', and, within this framework, on the notion of 'assensus'. In the present paper I aim to elucidate the role of this key notion of John Buridan's theory of cognition." (p. 281)

(*) See the excellent paper by Gerard Verbeke, "Certitude et incertitude de la recherche philosophique selon saint Thomas d'Aquin", in: Rivista di Filosofia neo-scolastica 66 (1974), 740-57.

(**) Jan Aertsen, Nature and Creature. Thomas Aquinas' Way of Thought. Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters herausgegeben von Albert Zimmermann, Band XXI, Leiden etc. 1988, passim.

———. 1994. Nicholas of Autrecourt: His Correspondence with Master Giles and Bernard of Arezzo. Leiden: Brill.

A critical edition by L. M. de Rijk from the two Parisian manuscripts with an introduction, English translation, explanatory notes and indexes.

Contents: Acknowledgements IX; Introduction 1; 1. Nicholas of Autrecourt. Life and works 1; 2. Nicholas' correspondence with Bernard and Giles 5; 3. The extant letters. Their tradition and structure 24; 4. Principles of the present edition and translation 37; Conspectus siglorum 45; Text and translation 46; Explanatory notes 113; Appendices 139; Indices 209; Bibliography 238.

"The present edition is based on the two Mss hitherto known, Paris, BN lat. 16408 (A) and 16409 (B). They are far from being perfect as they derive from exemplars that were themselves not quite reliable witnesses of the letters. However, they provide sufficient support for constituting a critical edition.

(...)

A translation is provided in order to make the letters accessible to all those who are not well-acquainted with Latin grammar and idiom. For that matter, Nicholas writes in a fairly clear and occasionally vivid Latin, but he is not a talented stylist. At times, he is not very particular about contaminated constructions. I have tried to smooth away some of these solecisms." (pp 37-38)

———. 1994. "A special use of 'ratio' in 13th and 14th century metaphysics." In Ratio. VII Colloquio del Lessico Intellettuale Europeo. Roma, 9-11 gennaio 1992, edited by Fattori, Marta and Bianchi, Massimo Luigi, 197-218. Firenze: L. S. Olschki.

"In the opening lines of the fifth tract of his Summulae Peter of Spain deals with six different meanings of the terminus technicus 'ratio'. (a)

Three of them are relevant to the present discussion:

'Ratio' is used in more than one way. In one way it is the same as definition or description, as in «univocal things are those which have a name in common and whose 'ratio substantie' corresponding to that name is the same» (b) [...]. In another way 'ratio' is the same as the form imposed on matter (forma materie), e.g. in a knife iron is the matter and the arrangement imposed on the iron is the form. In yet another way 'ratio' is the same as a common essence that is predicable of many things, e.g. the essence of a genus, a species or a differentia. [...].

The aim of the present paper is to elucidate the important role of the term 'ratio' in metaphysical discussions from the thirteenth century onwards. The three above mentioned senses all refer to (what belongs to) a thing's essential nature. The first sense, however, is the one that comes

most close to the subject matter of our discussion. (c) The opening lines of Aristotle's Categoriae, which are referred to by Peter may serve as the starting point of our investigation." (p. 197)

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"7. Conclusion.

We may summarise the foregoing observations as follows:

(1) As early as in Boethius (Aristotle) ratio (Greek 'logos') was used to stand for one specific (ontic or logical) characteristic that a thing has in common with other things, notwithstanding the dissimilarity of their respective 'complete natures'. Thus 'man' and 'cow' have the ratio animalis in common and a white wall and a white statue have whiteness in common.

(2) Ratio may also be used to refer to a thing's 'complete nature' as distinct from either the nature of other things (e.g. the ratio hominis vs the ratio lapidis) or from the thing's individuality (ratio singularitatis).

(3) Distinguishing several rationes in one and the same thing is a procedure which is typical of man's intellectual capability. This procedure forms the backbone of many philosophical and theological arguments concerning God and the entities occurring in the outside world.

(4) Possible translations of ratio as used in the special sense discussed in this paper are:

- logically: 'logical aspect', 'logical characteristic'; 'concept', 'notion' (bearing on some aspect characteristic or feature); 'meaning', 'descriptive account', 'definition'.

- ontologically:'ontic aspect', 'characteristic', 'feature' (including formal ones)." (p. 218)

(a) Peter of Spain, Tractatus called afterwards Summule logicales. First Critical Edition from the Manuscripts with an Introduction by L. M. de Rijk, Assen, 1972, p. 55, 4-14. Cf. the English translation in The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts, Vol. I: Logic and the Philosophy of Language, edited by Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump, Cambridge etc., 1988, p. 226.

(b) ARISTOTLE, Categoriae, 1, 1 a 8-9.

(c) For that matter, the distinction between the three senses as given by Peter of Spain is not entirely clear-cut: they are, at least partially, overlapping.